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Abstract
A mechanistic insight on the role of visual-attention in context-dependent preference
reversal effects
Classical economic theories of rational choices assume that individuals have well-defined
and ordered preferences which are revealed at the time of the choice. However, experimental
evidence has shown that these assumptions do not always hold, and preferences can be
affected by the context and by the choice set in which the decision is made. Notable
violations of these principles are the framing and the decoy effects, which are clear examples
of preference reversals in context-dependent decision making.
Despite a lack of deep understanding of the inner mechanisms or a consensus on the
driven factors that generate these preference reversals, many computational models have
been proposed in the cognitive science literature to account for these types of context-
dependent effects. However, none of the theories is able to explain all of the effects at the
same time, and the models have to be adapted for the different contexts to account for the
different preference reversals. Thus, a still open question in cognitive sciences is whether
there exists one inner mechanism that is related to all of the different context-dependent
reversals.
Here, I investigate the hypothesis that changes in allocation of attention driven by the
changing context could be a candidate common mechanism for preference reversals in
decision-making. The intuition for this prediction comes from a growing stream of evidence
in decision neuroscience showing a high impact of attention on choice frequency, and
from the observation that in most of the context-dependent decisions where these context-
dependent effects are generated what changes in the decision set is only the focus of the
decision makers on different aspects of the decision.
Thus, I combine behavioral paradigms, eye-tracking and computational techniques to
examine the role of visual-attention as a proxy for attention in context-dependent changes of
preferences during risky decision problems.
v
Three experimental and computational studies are reported in this dissertation. In the
first study, we investigate the framing effect based on an attentional drift diffusion model
(aDDM) framework, and find evidence for a possible decision process in which shifts of
attention allocation are the main source of changes in choice frequency without directly
altering the valuation of the options in the choice set. In the second study, the decoy effect
is examined and the computational predictions of existing models are tested in our data. We
find attentional related effects on choice frequency which have not been recorded before, and
we explore whether there are existing models of attention that can account for our finding
which predictions can be found in the empirical data.
In this dissertation, I also discuss the importance of model fitting and recovery parameters
analysis when dealing with computational models in cognitive science, and I propose a
standard procedure to follow when dealing with new data sets or new models. In the third
study, we develop a method to quickly and efficiently fit hierarchical Bayesian drift diffusion
models that have piecewise constant drift rates, and we discuss in details the recovery
parameters procedure prior to the empirical model fitting. This method is used in the first
study and aim to improve the quality and the accuracy of the model fitting.
vi
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Many classical economic theories of decision making are based of the assumption that
choices are revealed by a well-defined preference order for each individual over any set
of options. Thus, each option has some personal value (or utility) for the decision maker
and a well established position in her preference ordering which does not depend on the
context or on the choice set of the decision. A practical implication of this principle can
be illustrated with the following example. If, for instance, the reader prefers spending her
free time reading this dissertation on A mechanistic insight on the role of visual-attention in
context-dependent preference reversal effects versus Jules Verne’s adventure book Twenty
Thousand Leagues Under The Sea, she does not prefer spending her free time reading Jules
Verne’s book instead of my dissertation. This concept seems to be simple and intuitive at a
first glance, however, when the choice is not as obvious as preferring this dissertation over
an adventure novel, the assumption does not always hold and experimental evidence has
suggested that preferences can be affected by the context and by the choice set in which the
decision is made. Decision makers do not appear to have clear preferences before the choice
is faced and do not seem to know a priori what they prefer before encountering the options
in a specific choice context. For example, let’s assume that before facing the above decision
the reader is falsely framed about how boring this dissertation is going to be. Then, she
might want to choose reading Verne’s book now, even though the two options in the choice
set were kept exactly the same. Psychology and cognitive sciences research have widely
explored this and other type of framing effects (Kahneman and Tversky,1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981; Shafir 1993), but very few computational models of decision making in
Economics can account for it (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Another example of a violation of this assumption is the decoy effect. Suppose again
that our reader is offered the choice between this manuscript and Twenty Thousand Leagues
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Under The Sea, but now she vacillates between these two options until she convinces her
self that reading this dissertation is the right way to spend her free time. However, just
before she can start reading all about visual-attention in preference reversals effects, she
realizes that there is another option on the book shelf, she could also use her time reading
The Mighty Orinoco of which author is once more Jules Verne. This changes everything,
now she knows she definitely wants to read Twenty Thousand Leagues Under The Sea.
Several examples of such paradoxical reversal behavior have been recorded in many
studies in a wide ranges of contexts and across species since the earliest 70s (Tversky, 1972;
Heath and Chatterjee, 1995; Shafir et al., 2002; Trueblood et al., 2013; Berkowitsch et
al., 2014). All of the different decoy effects (such as attraction effect, similarity effect,
compromise effect, etc.) violate the independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) principle
which is a fundamental property of the majority of choice theories such as expected utility
theory (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) and is implied by common choice rules such
as Luce’s choice axioms or the softmax choice rule (Luce, 1959; Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Despite a lack of deep understanding of the inner mechanisms or a consensus on
the driven factors that generate these decoy effects, many computational models have
been proposed to account for these types of preference reversal (Kahneman and Tversky,
1984; Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Hotaling et al., 2010; Roe et al., 2001; Usher and
McClelland, 2004; Bhatia, 2013; Noguchi and Stewart 2018; Gluth et al. 2018).
Most of the computational modelling in decision-making over the past 25 years have
focused on integrating models from perceptual processing into value-based (or preference-
based) decision-making. Notable examples of this attempt are sequential sampling models
which have become the dominant theory in the cognitive sciences and have also started
to play a central role in decision neuroscience (Ratcliff et al. 2016; Forstmann et al.
2016; Hanks and Summerfield 2017). The rise of sequential sampling models can be
attributed to mainly three reasons: 1) they have been shown to be good at fitting a wide
variety of experimental data set (Ractliff and Smith 2004; Ractliff et al. 2016), 2) they can
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simultaneously account for choices and response time distributions – i.e. trade-off speed
accuracy, and 3) there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the firing properties of
neurons that likely drive decisions in the Lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP) and the frontal
eye field (FEF) areas are well described by stochastic sequential sampling models (e.g.,
Ditterich, 2006; Gold and Shadlen 2007; Churchland et al., 2008; Purcell et al. 2012).
In order to reproduce context-dependent effects with computational modelling, different
features have been added to sequential sampling models. Some research pointed out the
need of multi-attributes models for decision making (Busemeyer et al. 2019), others
lateral inhibition leakage (Roe et al., 2001; Usher and McClelland, 2004), or loss aversion
features (Usher and McClelland, 2004) and saliency (Tsetsos and Usher 2012; Towal et
al. 2013). However, all of these added features cannot explain more than some context-
dependent effects on choices at the same time, and the models have to be adapted for
the different contexts to account for preference reversals. Thus, a still open question in
cognitive sciences is whether there exists one inner mechanism that is related to all of the
different context-dependent effects. One main aim of this thesis is to test whether attention
could be a candidate common mechanism for preference reversals in context-dependent
decision-making.
The intuition for this hypothesis comes from the observation that in most of the context-
dependent decisions where changes in preferences are observed what actually changes in
the decision set is the focus by the decision maker on different aspects of the decision. For
instance, in our reader example above, introducing a third option which is very similar to
one of the other options, i.e. The Mighty Orinoco by Jules Verne is similar to the second
option Twenty Thousand Leagues Under The Sea by the same author, put the similar original
option on a different light. In our example, we could speculate that our reader’s willingness
to read an adventure book by Jules Verne is reinforced by the introduction of the third option.
Now, reading a science fiction book attracts more attention, and in turns more weight than
reading a long dissertation on the role of visual-attention in preference reversal effects.
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Further less speculative reasons for believing that attention could be an inner mechanism
which can affect choices and drive preference reversals can be found in the recent growing
literature about attention in decision-making. This stream of research has shown a high
impact of attention on choice frequency, namely the decision-makers are more likely to
choose options they have attended longer (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel
2011; Krajbich and Rangel 2012; Towal et al. 2013), and that this bias is present even
when the attention is experimentally manipulated (Shimojo et al. 2003; Armel et al. 2008;
Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Tavares et al. 2017). Second, attention has previously been
linked to preference reversals in the decoy effect (Noguchi and Stewart 2018) and some
models have incorporated it in their framework (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Roe et al., 2001;
Usher and McClelland, 2004; Bhatia, 2013; Noguchi and Stewart 2018; Gluth et al. 2018).
However, in most of these computational theories attention plays only a secondary role in
explaining context-dependent effect such as the decoy. Thus, we hypothesize that attention
could play a more important role in explaining context-dependent preference reversals than
previously believed. This thesis aims to seek evidence to support the assumption of a key
role of attention in preference reversals as an inner mechanisms of the decision process. In
particular, we are going to examine the role of eye-movements, i.e. visual attention, that
have been shown to be good proxy for overt attention (Mohler and Wurtz, 1976; Kustov and
Robinson 1996).
In the first two studies described in the next chapters, we combined behavioral choice-
tasks, eye-tracking and computational modelling to examine the role of visual fixations in
two context-dependent changes of preferences during risky decision problems, the fram-
ing effect and the decoy effect. Before going into the details of the experimental work
which is summarised in the next chapter, I will first review some neurobiological basis of
visual-attention and its link with subjective values in value-based decisions, which will
provide a background to better understand our hypotheses on the role of visual-attention
in context-dependent effects tested in the first two studies of interest. Then, I will discuss
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the computational modelling approach that will be used to test some of the hypotheses and
disclose possible inner mechanism in the decision process. In this computational modelling
section, I review the main features of sequential sampling models and the main reasons for
adopting such models in decision-making and in particular in our research. Second, I will
discuss when this models are not appropriate for the data and what is the best practice to
follow when attempting to computationally model empirical data sets.
1.1 Attention
Deciding between options requires a flexible selection of information gathering. In the
visual domain, this function is implemented by attention. Visual attention serves to prioritize
stimuli processing according to their physical salience (“bottom-up” or exogenous attention)
or their relevance to current decision goals on specific rules or motivation factors (“top-
down” or endogenous attention), while it discards irrelevant stimuli. At the neuronal level, it
has been shown in several electrophysiological studies that attention have different ways to
modulate features of the neurons activity improving the signal to noise ratio. First, attention
modulates the firing rate of visual neurons enhancing activity of neuronal populations
representing the attended stimuli. This modulation has been shown to be multiplicative and
the scaling of the neuronal response to be dependent on the similarity between the neuron’s
preferred stimulus and the attended feature. Second, attention decreases the variability of
responses across trials and the correlated variability among neurons. Third, more recent
studies have shown that attention can also enhance local gamma frequency (30–60 Hz)
synchronization among neurons that encode the attended stimuli (for reviews see Paneri and
Gregoriou 2017; Sapountzis and Gregoriou 2018).
Numerous studies have established the prefrontal cortex (PFC) as the candidate brain
area in target selection and attentional shifts. For instance, many studies have associated
enhancements in frontal eye field (FEF) activity with attention, and FEF appears to have
a general role in highlighting locations of behavioral relevance both in exogenous and
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endogenous attention (Thompson et al., 1997, 2005; Armstrong et al., 2009; Gregoriou et al.,
2012). Besides the modulation of neural firing activity, FEF has also shown local changes
in gamma frequency synchronization related to spatial attention (Gregoriou et al., 2009b).
Although a causal role of the different cortical areas in the different aspects of attention
are a matter of current debate, it is well-established a prominent role of PFC neurons in
encoding current goals and rules, and facilitate selective processing of information and
planning through response modulation in posterior visual areas.
Another well-established role of PFC is its implication in value-based decision making.
In particular, activity in the frontal lobe has been shown to reflect the subjective-value of the
available options (Kable and Glimcher 2007; Padoa-Schioppa and Assad 2006; Bartra et al.
2013; Rangel and Clithero 2013) and to predict choices during the decision process (Tusche
et al. 2010). Also, more recent work has found that patients with damage to this region and
adjacent orbitofrontal cortex are more inconsistent when making preference-based choices
and violate transitivity suggesting a casual link of PFC and value-based decision processes
(Fellow and Farah 2007; Henri-Bhargava et al. 2012; Camille et al. 2011). Thus, it seems
clear that attention and subjective values could be closely related in the brain. Also at
the behavioral level, recent studies have shown that visual fixations influence value-based
choices. In particular, it has been observed that decision-makers choose options they have
looked at longer more often than would be predicted by their a priori value ratings of those
options alone (Krajbich et al.2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011, Krajbich et al. 2012) , and
that this bias is present even when the duration of fixations is experimentally manipulated
(Shimojo et al. 2013; Armel et al. 2008; Tavares et al. 2017). There are not many models
in literature that account for this effect of attention on choice frequency in value-based
decisions. Notable ones are the attentional drift diffusion model (aDDMs; Krajbich and
Rangel 2011) and the mutual inhibition with value-based attentional capture (MIVAC)
model. These and other models that make assumption on the allocation of attention during
the decision process are reviewed in the supplementary material of study 2 in the appendix
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of the dissertation. Here, I will mainly focus on sequential sampling models which have
become the dominant theory in the cognitive sciences and decision neuroscience.
1.2 Computational Modelling
Like signal detection theory (SDT) (Green and Swets, 1966), the theory of sequential
sampling mechanisms starts from the assumption that simple perceptual and cognitive
decisions are statistical in nature. This premise comes from the observation that sensory
and cognitive systems are inherently noisy and that the decision-making process can be
sequential even when all of the information is immediately available. Sequential sampling
models (SSMs) have become extremely popular in cognitive sciences in the domain of
perceptual decision making for mainly two reasons. First, they can reproduce the observed
trade-off speed accuracy of choices, i.e. faster choices are less accurate than slow choices,
and they make testable predictions on other aspects of the decision process such as difficulty
of task and response time. Second, the core mechanisms of these models, such as evidence
accumulation and the decisions threshold crossing, resemble features of neural firing rate
activity. More recently, however, both cognitive scientists and decision neuroscientists
have become increasingly interested in applications of SSMs to value-based decisions.
These decisions, also known as preferential choices, involve affective rather than inferential
evaluations and the tasks adopted to to investigate this type of decisions usually employ more
complex choice options – i.e. options that are characterized by multiple attributes such as the
amount and probability of gambles, or the amount and delay of intertemporal choice options,
or the price and quality of consumer products. Some notable examples of SSMs are the
drift diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008), the decision field
theory (DFT; Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993) and the leaky competing accumulator model
(LCA; Usher and McClelland, 2004). An important feature that all of these models have
in common is the accumulation to threshold which assumes that the decision mechanism
samples information (or accumulates evidence) until a threshold is reached at which point a
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choice is obtained. In practical terms, a SSM can be formalized as stochastic process that
represents the accumulated evidence available to the decision mechanism at a given time.
This process will be denoted X(t) in study 1 and 3 . Formally, X(t) is a random variable
defined on the probability space of all possible sequences of accumulated information at
time t.
The mentioned models, however, can differ in including different features to their models.
For instance, they can have one versus two accumulators in the decision rule which can in
turn be relative or absolute, or they can differ in the drift rate, i.e. constant or time varying,
and also in the presence or absence of inhibition or decay. All of the different features
in SSMs make very distinct and testable predictions that can be confirmed or rejected by
analyzing experimental data sets. Most of the mentioned features like boundary separations
and time-varying drift rates have been widely explored in cognitive sciences (Ratcliff and
Smith 2004; Turner et al. 2017; Ratcliff et al. 2018; Voss et al. 2019). However, their
need in terms of improving data fitting or their neurobiological validity is still not clear
and matter of current debate. Yet, an open question in decision-making research is how to
choose the most appropriate model to fit specific data of interest and whether adding extra
parameters to the model is a necessary or redundant exercise. We also encountered similar
issues when planning and implementing the computational modelling in our experimental
studies on visual-attention in context-dependent preference reversals. Thus, we took a less
traditional approach on the modelling phase of our research. We proposed that before fitting
new experimental data sets few important steps have to be followed. First, testing all the
possible predictions of the model to the experimental data set and vice-versa, i.e. testing
patterns in the behavioral data and confirming that the model can account for them, increase
the probability of the model of being the generating process behind the behavior. Second,
performing parameter recovery fitting analysis on the specific parameters resulting from
the model fitting assures the researcher that the model and the used fitting method can
successfully retrieve the generating parameter of the decision process, and it can distinguish
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between different magnitudes of these parameters (for a detailed explanation see appendix:
study 3). The two steps should be done in the mentioned order and failing in the first one
should discourage the researcher from fitting the model to the data. Concerning the first
step, this procedure was successful in one out of two studies presented in this dissertation.
In the first study, we investigate the role of visual-attention in the framing effect and
we test the hypothesis that visual-attention in our task affects choice frequency according
to the attentional drift diffusion model theory (aDDM; Krajbich and Rangel 2011; and see
appendix: study 1 for a detailed formalization of the model). The reasons for adopting
such model are several. 1) The model does not make any specific assumptions on the
allocation of attention which is given as an exogenous variable to the model. 2) The
model assumes a multiplicative effect of attention on options’ values and a similar effect
of multiplicative modulation has been observed in the brain at the neuronal response level
(Paneri and Gregoriou 2017; Sapountzis and Gregoriou 2018). 3) The aDDM appeared
to be relative simple to estimate and fit to the data. In the third study presented in this
dissertation, we show how the aDDM can be approximated by a standard DDM, and thus
be fitted and estimated to the data with already existing hierarchical bayesian methods (see
appendix: study 3 for a general discussion about the benefits of using hierarchical bayesian
methods). As previously discussed however, these reasons are not enough to conclude that
the model can be a good approximation of the generating decision process. Thus, we also
test in our specific data set that first the predictions of the model are met in the behavioral
and eye-gaze empirical data, and second that the model can predict the patterns observed
in the data before fitting the model and make any conclusions on the generating process.
This approach was successful in our study 1, but the data set in study 2 failed some of the
predictions of the aDDM and other models which incorporate attention. The result in study
1, where all the predictions of the aDDM are met by the data set, is certainly not a proof of
the fact that the model is the exact generating process mechanism of the data, however it
ensures that the model could be a good approximation of the inner decision process. On the
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contrary, in study 2, where we investigate the role of visual-attention in the decoy effect, we
test several different models incorporating visual-attention (including the aDDM) and find
that all of them fail in at least one prediction concerning either attention allocation or the
interaction choice frequency and visual-fixation patterns. Unfortunately, our data set was not
designed to propose a different new model for the decoy effect. Thus, study 2 opens more
research questions about the inner computational mechanisms on the interaction between
visual-attention and choice frequency in the decoy effect than it can truly answer. Further
data and research are needed to answer the following research questions: how does the
decoy affect visual-attention allocation in this type of context-dependent effect? And how
does visual-attention in turns affect choices? With this example, we show that even though
models can in practice fit the experimental data, it is not necessarily informative of the inner
mechanisms of the decision process if the predictions of the model do not fully match the
patterns in the experimental data. This statement might appear trivial to researcher who are
experts in modelling data, however, this does not seem to be often the followed procedure
in the field of psychology, cognitive neuroscience and neuroeconomics. Thus, we use our
studies also as an example of a possible approach from data to computational modelling that
can fail and can be informative of the generating decision process. In the next chapter, I will
summarize the three studies that are the core work behind this dissertation and that can be
found in the appendix section of the manuscript.
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Chapter 2: Overview of the studies
As I describe in the previous chapter, this thesis primarily aims to seek evidence for a
fundamental role of attention during the decision-making process as a common inner
mechanism among different context-dependent preference reversal effects. In order to rule
out how attention, in particular visual-attention, affects choice frequency and response time
distributions, and how attention is allocated differently depending on the different context,
we measured eye-movements in two lottery task contexts and use computational modelling
tools to further investigate the inner processes. In study 1 summarized above, we investigate
the framing effect in a lottery choice-task and we examine the mechanisms through which
visual-attention can influence choices and generate the recorded behavioral framing effect in
an attentional drift diffusion framework. After testing and confirming the predictions of the
aDDM in our data set, we directly fit the model to choice and response time distributions
with a hierachical bayesian version of the aDDM (HaDDM).
The method we implemented to perform parameter recovery fitting analysis and fitting
the model to the experimental data is described in study 3.
Study 2 investigate the role of attention for the decoy effect in a similar lottery task to
study 1. In this study eye-movements are also recorded, and different models which make
predictions about visual-attention allocation and its interaction with choice frequency are
tested.
2.1 Study 1: A mechanistic foundation of the role of visual-attention in the framing
effect
Background
Subjective preferences have been shown to change across different contexts even when the
options are kept constant. For example, Kahneman and Tversky have shown that humans
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tend to prefer sure options over risky prospects, when these options are presented as gains,
but this aversion to risk is diminished if the sure options are presented as losses. This effect
of framing on choices occurs even when both decision problems are identical in terms of
possible outcomes (Kahneman Tversky, A., 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The
framing effect is a well documented example of preference reversal in which individuals
seem to change their subjective valuation of the options in the choice set. However, the
neurological and internal mechanisms that lead people to change their choices depending
on the different frames are still unclear. Why should mere changes in the description of an
objectively identical relationship between choices and outcomes affect decision-making?
Here, we examined the hypothesis that changes in framing cause changes in the allocation
of visual-attention to the different options, and in turns visual-attentional changes give rise
to changes in the decision process. To build mechanistic and computational supports for this
thesis, we adopted an attentional drift diffusion framework (i.e. an attentional drift diffusion
model or aDDM). According to this model, visually guided attention temporarily biases the
decision process in favour of the alternative that is attended (Ashby et al., 2016; Cavanagh
et al., 2014; Konovalov and Krajbich, 2016; Kovach et al., 2014; Krajbich and Rangel,
2011; Krajbich et al., 2010; Lim et al., 2011; Schonberg et al., 2014; Shimojo et al., 2003;
Stewart et al., 2016; Towal et al., 2013; Vaidya and Fellows, 2015). The advantage of using
a particular framework such as the aDDM can be found in the fact that it provides accurate
and quantitative predictions that can be tested in our experimental data. In particular, the
aDDM makes specific predictions about the relationship between options’ values, visual
fixations, reaction time and choices. The key aim of this study was to adopt such quantitative
predictions to make inferences about how and whether changes in preferences are influenced
by visual-guided attention in the context of the framing effect. We documented that in
decision making under risk the framing of sure alternatives as a gain – as opposed to a loss –
induces a visual-attentional advantage for the sure option relative to the risky one which is
accompanied with an increase in the choice probability of the sure option, i.e., an increase in
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risk aversion. Based on the aDDM framework, we proposed an explanation for the framing
effect that is exclusively dependent on a reallocation of visual-attention through changes in
the parameters of the model that do not involve a change in the valuation of the options in
the choice set. We tested our hypotheses with a hierarchical Bayesian modelling approach
(HaDDM), and find that frames have an impact primarily on the initial bias of the evidence
accumulation process that, combined with changes in the allocation of visual-attention, can
fully explain the observed changes in risk aversion. Our results suggest that the main drivers
of framing effects in decision-making are shifts in attention allocation that alter the inner
mechanisms of the evidence accumulation process.
Methods
We asked 30 participants to perform a series of binary decisions between two options, a
gamble and sure option, in two differently framed conditions while we simultaneously
recorded their gaze patterns with eye-tracker. In one condition the sure alternative on the
decision screen was framed as a gain and in the other condition the same sure option was
framed as a loss as in De Martino et al. (2006). Each trial started with a screen that showed
the subject’s initial monetary endowment for that trial. Then, a decision screen that showed
the gamble and the sure option appeared. Each option was presented to the subjects as a
combination of a rectangle and a pie-chart (as an example see appendix study 1 figure A.1)
that the subjects trained with two extensive training phases before the choice task in order to
recongnize and learn the meanings of the shapes and colors. After the binary choice task,
the subjects had to perform a elicitation task in which they were shown all the gambles that
they encountered during the choice task. In each trial a gamble and a list of sure amounts
of money was shown to the participant (as an example see appendix study 1 figure A.2).
The subject had to make 10 decisions in each trial between the gamble displayed on the left
hand-side of the screen and 10 sure amounts of money. The sure amounts of money were
displayed in a decreasing order from a maximum value smaller but close to the amount of
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money that they could win if they choose the gamble to a minimum value close to zero. For
each gamble, which was constant across the two frame conditions, i.e. gain and loss, we
used the elicitation task to estimate its subjective value or certainty equivalence (CE). The
subjects were incentivized for the experiment with real money. They were informed that
one of the two tasks – i.e. the choice task or the elicitation task – was randomly selected
and implemented as a payment at the end of the experiment. Concerning the modelling,
we fitted the HaDDM to the data with the method described in study 3 in the appendix.
In the hierachical bayesian method, we make the standard assumption that individuals are
members of a normally distributed population and assign a normal prior for each individual
level parameter. Furthermore, before fitting the model we ran recovery fitting analysis to
make sure the model was able to correctly fit the data.
Results and conclusions
At the behavioral level, we replicated the framing effect on choices, i.e. participants on
average chose the sure option in the gain condition more often than in the loss condition.
Then, we tested the hypotheses of the aDDM on the relationship between eye-gaze fixations,
options’ values, choices and reaction time on our experimental data and find that the
predictions of the model were confirmed. First, as expected subjects looked more often at
the sure option in the gain condition compared to the loss condition revealing a framing
effect at the fixation level which was also significantly and highly correlated with the
framing effect on choices at the individual level. Secondly, visual-attention seems to impact
choice frequency independently of the framing condition when analysing the impact on
choices of fixation biases towards an option in both gain and loss conditions. Thus, both at
the individual and at the trial level visual-attention is significantly correlated with choice
frequency and the framing effect. Also, we found that the predictions of the model about the
relation between reaction time and fixation biases are in line with the model. We registered
faster decisions for the sure option in the gain condition compared to the loss condition, and
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faster response time in choosing the sure option compared to the gamble at higher expected
value trials. The previous evidence provides support for the view that the framing effect
is an attention-driven phenomenon. It appears that the gain frame directs more attention
towards the sure option which then enhances the probability of choosing the sure option
more frequently and more quickly. With the evidence collected thus far however, we could
not claim that the link between choice frequency and visual-attention goes from fixations
to choices, or vice-versa, but separately analysing fixation time and eye-gaze movements
we found some additional evidence supporting the hypothesis that the decision makers in
our experiment are more likely to choose what they look at and not vice-versa. In fact, we
found that both middle fixation duration and first fixation duration do not correlate with the
options’ values, and also we do not find a significant dependency between visual fixation
time and value differences in our data. This evidence seems to suggest a prominent role
of visual-attention on choices that is driven by the condition. According to the aDDM
framework, the frame changes where people look, and this change in visual gazes can
account for part of the changes in choices across conditions. We then were interested in
investigating how framing also affects the different aspects of the evidence accumulation
process, i.e. the parameters of the aDDM. In particular, we noticed that changes in visual
fixation patterns alone are unlikely to be the only source through which the framing effect
is generated, since there is still some unexplained variance in our data that cannot be fully
explained by visual-attention alone. Thus, we expect other parameters of the aDDM to vary
across conditions. We fitted the HaDDM to our data and estimated the parameters of the
model. The hierarchical estimation of the mean population parameters at the group level
allowed us to make inference about the parameters accounting for variation coming from
sources like individual differences. Thus, we could benefit from this method to investigate
the group level differences in parameters across gain and loss fitting the model separately for
the two conditions. We found that the main difference in parameters between loss and gain
was in the initial bias and in the drift rate parameters. Additionally, the attentional discount
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parameter was slightly lower – i.e. higher discount for the unattended option in the gain
condition than in the loss condition and, in addition, with lower variability – i.e narrower
distribution in the gain condition. We also split subjects in two groups based on whether
they showed a framing effect below or above the median and analysed the parameters for the
two groups at the individual level. For the above median framing effect group of subjects the
initial bias, the drift rate constant and the discount factor were significantly different across
conditions, whereas they were not for the below median framing effect group of individuals.
Ultimately, we ran a logistic mixed-effect regression for subject specific slope and constant
of the probability of choosing the sure option as a function of condition, proportion of
fixation time to the sure option, value difference, expected value, and, in addition, for every
subjects their mean value for each parameter of the aDDM for gain, one value for loss
condition and all the interactions with proportion of fixation time to the sure option. Notably,
the results show that the frame condition did not have significant effect on the probability
of choosing the sure option that was then completely accounted by the visual gazes, the
changes in the parameters and their interactions. To conclude, we found that gaze patterns,
changes in drift rate and initial bias, and their interactions can completely account for the
framing effect without changing the valuation of the options. Thus, our results suggest a
prominent role of visual-fixation time in the framing effect that interacts with the decision
process changing the speed of the accumulation and the initial advantage of the sure option
across frames.
2.2 Study 2: Is the decoy effect an attention-driven phenomenon?
Background
The decoy effect is a well documented example of a preference reversal in which individuals
seem to change their subjective valuation of two options (A vs B) when a third, irrelevant,
alternative (D) is introduced in the choice-set. Although the decoy effect has been known in
Economics since 40 years and also more recently has been widely investigated in psychology
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and in neuroscience, which tried to unveil the brain and psychological processes during this
type of decisions, there is still scarce consensus on the driving mechanisms for such effect
and the conditions under which decision makers exhibit different forms of this violation
are a matter of current debate. There have been many computational modelling attempts
to explain the various types of decoy effects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Busemeyer
and Townsend, 1993; Hotaling et al., 2010; Roe et al., 2001; Usher and McClelland, 2004;
Bhatia, 2013; Noguchi and Stewart 2018; Gluth et al. 2018), and more recently the idea
that attention could play a role in the decision process have been incorporated in some of
models (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Tsesos, Chater and Usher 2012; Gluth, Spektor and
Rieskamp 2018; Nouguchi and Stewart 2014). However, in most of these computational
theories attention plays a secondary role in explaining context-dependent effect such the
decoy. Additionally, in very few studies that investigate the decoy effect (Nouguchi and
Stewart 2014; Gluth et al. 2018) attention has been fully recorded. In the present work,
we examined the hypothesis that attention plays a more important role in explaining the
decoy effect than previously believed. The study aimed to seek evidence to support the
assumption that introducing a third alternative in the choice-set causes changes in the
allocation of visual-attention to the options, and in turns visual-attention changes give rise
to changes in the decision process. Thus, we combined a behavioral paradigm, eye-tracking
and computational techniques to examine the role of visual fixations as a proxy for attention
in decoy-dependent changes of preferences during risky decision problems. We developed a
lottery task in which subjects performed a series of trinary decisions between risky options
while their gaze movements were recorded. One of the options was always the irrelevant
decoy, i.e. always dominated in money and probability by one of the other two options which
we refer here as the target. We investigated and replicated the attraction effect. Although the
decoy was essentially never chosen it had a considerable effect on the relative allocation
of attention to the two relevant options. If the decoy was similar to option A, i.e. option A
is the target, it induced frequent comparisons between the decoy and this option and thus
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strongly increased the relative attention to option A. Additionally, we recorded an effect on
choice frequency of looking time to the decoy. Surprisingly, the probability of choosing
the target was significantly influenced by the time participants spent attending the decoy.
We investigated this result further and find evidence suggesting that that the decoy alters
attention allocation to the choice set making the target option the center of attention. From
our result, it seems reasonably clear that visual-attention plays a major role in the decoy
effect. To further investigate the mechanism with which the decoy influences visual-attention
allocation and visual-attention influences choice frequency, we tested the predictions of
models that assumes a role of attention in the decoy effect. We found that only very few
features in the examined models seem to be in line with our eye-gaze data, suggesting a
more complicated and still unsolved role of attention in the decoy effect. Our results suggest
a fundamental role of the decoy in attracting and shaping attention allocation which was not
previously recorded. The decoy causally manipulates the attention allocated by the decision
maker on options in the choice set and this shifts in attention are strictly related to choice
frequency in very specific ways that have not been previously accounted for.
Methods
40 healthy subjects performed a series of trinary decisions between three lotteries, option
A, option B and a decoy, while we simultaneously recorded their gaze patterns with an
eye-tracker. Each option, if chosen, would always give an amount of money with a certain
probability p or nothing with probability 1-p. During the all task, option A was the option
with high money low probability trade off and B was the low money high probability option,
whereas the decoy could be either of type A, i.e. low money high probability, or of type
B, i.e. high money low probability. Irrespectively of its type, the decoy was always a
dominated option either by option A or by option B and the decoy determines the condition
type. Namely, in half of the trials the decoy was always smaller in both attributes, i.e.
money and probability, than option A – i.e. condition 1, see Figure B1a in appendix for an
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example –, and in the other half of the trials it was smaller in both attributes than option B
– i.e. condition 2 in figure B1a in appendix. Whenever the decoy is of type A we refer to
option A as the target option and option B as the competitor. Vice-versa, when the decoy
is of type B, option B is the target option and A the competitor. During the presentation
of the decision screen, subjects were not shown numbers and words; they could only see
shapes and colors of which were extensively trained before the choice task to learn and
understand the meaning. Our participants were incentivized for the experiment with real
money. They were informed that they would receive the average amount of money of all the
trials realized choices that they made. Furthermore, subjects were instructed to treat each
decision separately and independently of the others.
Results and conclusions
At the behavioral level, we observed the predicted attraction effect, i.e. the target was
chosen significantly more often than the competitor. Then, we tested the hypothesis that
also at the fixations level we would expect to see a decoy effect, i.e. a bias in attention
towards the target option. Thus, we asked whether the decoy not only changed the choice
frequency between A and B, but whether it also changed the allocation of attention between
the two options. As expected, there was a significant bias in fixation time for option A or B
depending on whether the decoy is of type A or B respectively, thus resulting in a decoy
effect on fixations. In addition to the strong effect of a fixation bias on choice frequency, we
also noticed that the decoy effect can be reversed for trials in which the fixation bias is in
turn reversed, namely trials in which the competitor was attended longer than the target had
also a higher choice probability for the competitor than the target. We then investigated why
and how the the decoy makes the target to be attended longer, and find that the decoy forced
more eye-gaze transitions from and to the target. The looking time of the decoy in a trial
decreased in time, suggesting that once the dominance relation between target-decoy had
been resolved the decision maker did not need to look at the decoy. Thus, we speculated
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that the decoy makes the target the center of attention attracting more evidence in favour of
choosing the target. Another effect that surprisingly we recorded is that the decoy effect
on choices, i.e. the difference in probability of choosing the target and the competitor, in
our data was significantly increased by the proportion of fixation time to the decoy. Thus,
only looking at the decoy increased the probability of the target to be chosen. Also, these
two main effect of proportion of fixation time to the target and to the decoy were highly
correlated at the individual level to the decoy effect on choices. In a further analysis, we
investigated the predictions on visual-attention allocation, i.e. the probability of attending an
option, and the predictions on the relation between visual-attention and choice frequency of
some of the models in literature that incorporate attention in their framework. This analysis
allowed us to test which are the most likely mechanisms through which visual-attention
operates to influence choices in the decoy effect. It turned out that most the predictions of
the models could not be found or were only partially met in our experimental data. Overall
our results suggest very strong effect of visual-attention on choices that, however, seems to
be more complicated that previously modelled. Also, it appeared from our results that the
decoy its-self and not necessarily the values or the distance between options was the main
driver of attention allocation. Namely, the different types of decoy made the decision maker
to allocate attention differently during the decision process, and this attention allocation bias
seemed to have a strong impact on choices. Unfortunately, our experiment was not designed
to rule out the dependent variables that impact visual-attention allocation to options, thus
further analysis and different designs are needed to better investigate the probability of
attending the option in the choice-set and better understand the visual-attention influence on
choice frequency in the decoy effect.
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2.3 Study 3: Simple method to fit hierarchical Bayesian piecewise time-constant
drift diffusion models.
Background
Sequential sampling and accumulation to threshold principles have proven to be important
and highly influential in modelling value-based and perceptual decision making in the
social and biological sciences. To date, most examples of this class of models that have
been fit to empirical data have assumed a constant evidence accumulation or drift rate
throughout the choice process – e.g. the standard drift diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff,
1978) or the leaky competing accumulators model (LCA; Usher and McClelland, 2004).
The reasons for maintaining this assumption has been the practical considerations relating to
the computational complexity and time required to fit models that relax this assumption and
the rise of hierarchical Bayesian estimation methodologies (Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx,
and Lee, 2011; Wiecki, Sofer, and Frank, 2013; Wabersich and Vandekerckhove, 2014)
which often require an analytical solution of the equations within the model. Despite the
clear advantages of time-varying drift rate sequential sampling processes in modelling
different type of decision strategies and inner mechanisms, it often remains theoretically
and computationally challenging to estimate and implement such formulations. However,
most of the time-changing drift rate diffusion processes found in literature can be capture
with a drift rate that is time-constant in fixed or alternating intervals, i.e. it is piecewise
time-constant. Diffusion models with piecewise time-constant drift rates (pcDDM) can
be approximated with a standard drift diffusion model (DDM) for which the drift rate is
constant in time.
Methods
In this study, we illustrated how to transform a pcDDM into a standard DDM with a fully
time-constant drift rate allowing for the use of existing hierarchical Bayesian estimation
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tools that were developed for the DDM. We showed that a piecewise time-constant drift
rate can be expressed as a constant drift that is a function of the first passage time - i.e
reaction time - and the times for each constant interval. To demonstrate the efficacy and the
benefit of this method, we applied it to two practical examples, the attentional drift diffusion
model (aDDM; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010) and the time-varying
sequential sampling (tSSM; in preparation). We derived the mathematical formulations of
the method for these two examples, and we applied them to simulated and real data sets.
Our results show that the method allows us to quickly and accurately recover parameters
from simulations and fit empirical data sets in a hierarchical Bayesian fashion. In the study,
we derived mathematically the drift rate of a general pcDDM and then applied it to two
example models, the aDDM and the stDDM.
Then, we used two experimental data sets to test our models. The first data set was
taken from the gain condition of the lottery task described in study 1, in which we used an
eye-tracker to record gaze-movement data that are given as an input to the aDDM.
Concerning the second data set, eighty-six healthy subjects participated in a food task
choice experiment. The experimental design was divided into two parts: a rating phase
and a decision phase. During the rating phase participants had to rate 180 food items
for healthiness and tastiness. After the ratings, subjects had to perform a series of binary
food-choice decisions in which two food items were presented on the computer screen and
they had to choose the food that they would like to receive at the end of the experiment.
In addition, subjects had to express their willingness to try to eat, i.e. choose, healthy.
Participants who were not willing to try to eat healthy were subsequently excluded from the
analysis.
Concerning the recovery and the data fitting analysis, we implemented the aDDM and
the stDDM models with the derived method in R and Jags. We made use of the existing
function in Jags to fit a standard DDM, dwieners(). The details on the code for simulations,




We showed that any pcDDM model, i.e. any sequential sampling model with a piecewise
time-constant drift rate, can be written as a DDM with constant drift rate that depends on
the reaction time and on the time intervals where the drift rate of the pcDDM is constant.
Then, we tested the recovery fitting ability of two different pcDDMs, the aDDM and the
stDDM. First, we ran a recovery fitting analysis where all subjects had the same parameters
values. We observed that at the group and at the individual level, the hierarchical aDDM
and the hierarchical stDDM were both able to recovery different values of the parameters in
the drift rate, i.e. the attentional parameter θ and the time parameter s respectively, without
affecting the other parameters of the DDM. This also hold when performing a recovery
fitting analysis with heterogeneous parameters where each subject had parameters for the
simulations that were randomly drawn from gaussian distributions. Second, both models
performed well when we ran a recovery fitting analysis using the parameters coming from
the experimental data fitting. Namely, we first fitted the two data sets described above with
the hierarchical aDDM and the hierarchical stDDM, then we used for each subject the mean
parameters given by the fitting to simulate the models and try to recover the original fitted
parameters. We also ran an extra analysis where we used the same fitted parameters for
the DDM but try to recover different values of the drift parameters such as the attentional
discount factor θ in the aDDM and the time parameter s in the stDDM. Ultimately, we
compared the reaction time and choice distributions of the real data with the fitted ones and
confirmed that the models could correctly reproduce the experimental data.
Our results confirm that both mathematically and computationally every pcDDMs can
be expressed as a standard DDM given the reaction time and the time-constant intervals. We
also showed the importance of recovery fitting analysis in particular when dealing with new
data sets, and we suggested a before-fitting confirmatory parameter recovery procedure to
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test whether a particular data set can be fitted with the model of interest. The first step in such
a recovery test is to check the ability of the model and fitting procedure to recover known
generating parameters. This can be done by simulating the data with the parameters obtained
when originally fitting the empirical data, and then re-fitting the model to the simulated
choice and response times. The second step of the recovery test consists in making sure that
the model and the fitting procedures are able to accurately distinguish between different
generating parameter values. Specifically all the simulating parameters but one have to be
taken from the fitting of the empirical data as in the first step. The one remaining parameter
is then varied across a range of plausible values to test. This procedure ensures that the




One goal of decision making is to understand the inner and generating processes that give
rise to preference reversals in context-dependent value-based decisions. In this thesis, we
explore the hypothesis that a key factor and common mechanism that can drive different
context-dependent choices is attention. Growing literature has identified a prominent role of
attention in perceptual and value-based decision-making (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and
Rangel 2011; Krajbich and Rangel 2012; Towal et al. 2013), however, attention has never
been recorded and investigated in different context-dependent preference reversal effects.
Here, I explored experimentally and computationally how visual-attention, which has
been shown to be a good proxy for overt attention (Mohler and Wurtz, 1976; Kustov
and Robinson 1996), is allocated and it affects choice frequency in two popular context-
dependent effects, i.e. the framing effect and the decoy effect.
Study 1 investigated the framing effect in an attentional drift diffusion framework,
providing evidence for an explanation of this preference reversal only through changes
in visual-attention allocation and its interactions with the sequential sampling decision
process. Without a change in the valuation of the options across frames, we could provide
evidence for a possible decision process mechanism where the context influences attention
and attention has in turns an impact on choice frequency. Contrarily to an other stream of
research in the context-dependent decision literature which identifies preference reversals
as the result of an encoding representation of values in a normalized form (Louie et al.
2013; Landry and Webb, 2019), we did not find evidence for such normalization effects
in our studies. Absolute options’ values appeared to have an impact on choice frequency
which cannot be accounted for by such adaptation effects. Thus, we took a drift diffusion
modelling approach and we developed a simple, yet efficient, method to perform the fitting
procedure in a hierarchical Bayesian fashion.
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Study 3 showed that an aDDM model can be easily formalized as a standard DDM thus
improving and simplifying the computational workload. In this study, we also emphasized
the importance of carefully perform parameter recovery fitting analyses before applying the
model or the method to empirical data. Also, our approach in study 1 showed an example of
how to rigorously test all the quantitative predictions and assumptions of a model before
fitting the model to the data.
As a further example, study 2 showed instead a failure of this testing procedure and led us
to the decision of not fitting any existing models to our experimental lottery data. Specifically,
study 2 investigated the role of visual-attention in a decoy effect lottery choice-task, i.e.
the attraction effect. This study underlined the need for a better mechanistic understanding
on the role of visual-attention in the decoy effect. As for the framing effect, we found a
prominent role of visual-attention in influencing choice frequency in the attraction effect,
however, none of the exiting models seemed to be fully in line with our experimental
data set. Most of the theories we tested, such as multialternative decision field theory
(MDFT; Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Hotaling et al., 2010; Roe et al., 2001), the
multiattribute leaky competing accumulator (MLCA; Usher and McClelland, 2004), the
associations and accumulation model (AAM; Bhatia, 2013), the multialternative decision by
sampling (MDbS, Noguchi and Stewart 2018), or the mutual inhibition value-based attention
capture (MIVAC, Gluth et al. 2018), make precise predictions about how attention should
be allocated among options in the choice set.
Some models such as the AAM, the MDbS and MIVAC assumed that the probability of
attending an option should depend on the overall value of the attributes, the value distance
from other options or on the option’s integrated value, respectively. We found that only
partially this was confirmed in our data. More specifically, the degree and the sign of the
dependency on the mentioned features of the choice set varied with the option type, i.e.
either the decoy, the target or the competitor, which seemed to be the main factor driving
attention as if the decision-maker would recognize the type of option and change attention
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allocation accordingly.
Furthermore, in study 2 we observed different effects of attention never recorded before.
We first noticed that the eye-gaze transition probability strictly depended on the option’s
type, i.e. either the decoy, the target or the competitor. Secondly, we found an effect of
looking time to the decoy onto the probability of choosing the target which was a priori
unexpected.
To summarize, this work shows how mechanistically and behaviourally visual-attention
could have a fundamental role in explaining context-dependent preference reversal effects
without directly changing the valuation of the options. This work also aim to present
computational modelling case studies and show a possible efficient procedure to follow
before fitting and applying models (or new methods) to the fitting of empirical data sets.
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A mechanistic foundation of the role of visual-attention in the framing effect
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A.1 Abstract
Subjective preferences have been shown to change across different contexts even when the
options are kept constant. The framing effect is a well documented example of preference
reversal in which individuals seem to change their subjective valuation of the options in
the choice set. However, the neurological and internal mechanisms that leads people to
change their choices depending on the different frames are still unclear. Why should mere
changes in the description of an objectively identical relationship between choices and
outcomes affect decision-making? Here, we examine the hypothesis that changes in framing
cause changes in the allocation of visual-attention to the different options, and in turns
visual-attentional changes give rise to changes in the decision process. We document that
in decision making under risk the framing of sure alternatives as a gain – as opposed to a
loss – induces a visual-attentional advantage for the sure option relative to the risky one
which is accompanied with an increase in the choice probability of the sure option, i.e.,
an increase in risk aversion. Based on an evidence accumulation process (aDDM), we
propose an explanation for the framing effect that is exclusively dependent on a reallocation
of visual-attention through changes in the parameters of the model that do not involve a
changes in the valuation of the options in the choice set. We tested our hypotheses with a
hierarchical Bayesian modelling approach (HaDDM), and find that frames have an impact
primarily on the initial bias of the evidence accumulation process that, combined with
40
changes in the allocation of visual-attention, can fully explain the observed changes in risk
aversion. Our results suggest that the main drivers of framing effects in decision-making are
shifts in attention allocation that alter the inner mechanisms of the evidence accumulation
process.
A.2 Introduction
Subjective preferences have been shown to change across different contexts even when the
options are kept constant. For example, Kahneman and Tversky have shown that humans
tend to prefer sure options over risky prospects, when these options are presented as gains,
but this aversion to risk is diminished if the sure options are presented as losses. This effect
of framing on choices occurs even when both decision problems are identical in terms of
possible outcomes (Kahneman and Tversky, A., 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). The
framing effect is a well documented example of preference reversal in which individuals
seem to change their subjective valuation of the options in the choice set. However, the
neurological and internal mechanisms that leads people to change their choices depending
on the different frames are still unclear. Why should mere changes in the description of an
objectively identical relationship between choices and outcomes affect decision-making?
Here, we examine the hypothesis that changes in framing cause changes in the allocation
of visual-attention to the different options, and in turns visual-attentional changes give
rise to changes in the decision process. To build mechanistic and computational supports
for this thesis, we adopt an attentional drift diffusion framework (i.e. an attentional drift
diffusion model or aDDM). According to this model, visually guided attention temporarily
biases the decision process in favour of the alternative that is attended (Ashby et al., 2016;
Cavanagh et al., 2014; Konovalov and Krajbich, 2016; Kovach et al., 2014; Krajbich and
Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010; Lim et al., 2011; Schonberg et al., 2014; Shimojo
et al., 2003; Stewart et al., 2016; Towal et al., 2013; Vaidya and Fellows, 2015). The
advantage of using a particular framework such as the aDDM can be found in the fact that it
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provides accurate and quantitative predictions that can be tested in our experimental data.
In particular, the aDDM makes specific predictions about the relationship between options’
values, visual fixations, reaction time and choices. The key aim of this study is to adopt such
quantitative predictions to make inferences about how and whether changes in preferences
are influenced by visual-guided attention in the context of the framing effect. We document
that in decision making under risk the framing of sure alternatives as a gain – as opposed to
a loss – induces a visual-attentional advantage for the sure option relative to the risky one
which is accompanied with an increase in the choice probability of the sure option, i.e., an
increase in risk aversion. Based on the aDDM framework, we propose an explanation for
the framing effect that is exclusively dependent on a reallocation of visual-attention through
changes in the parameters of the model that do not involve a changes in the valuation of the
options in the choice set. We tested our hypotheses with a hierarchical Bayesian modelling
approach (HaDDM), and find that frames have an impact primarily on the initial bias of
the evidence accumulation process that, combined with changes in the allocation of visual-
attention, can fully explain the observed changes in risk aversion. Our results suggest that
the main drivers of framing effects in decision-making are shifts in attention allocation that
alter the inner mechanisms of the evidence accumulation process.
A.3 Results
Experimental Design
The main purpose of our study is to examine the attentional processes that are potentially
underlying the framing effect in risky choices. Subjects in our study participated in a binary
choice task in which they had to decide between a gamble and a sure option in differently
framed decision trials while we simultaneously recorded their gaze patterns with eye-tracker.
The sure alternative on the decision screen was either framed as a gain or as a loss as in
De Martino et al. 2006). Each trial started with a screen that showed the subject’s initial
monetary endowment for that trial. Then, a decision screen that showed the gamble and
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the sure option appeared. In each trial, the expected value of the sure and the risky option
was identical such that – given the natural tendency towards risk aversion – subjects were
expected to show an overall preference towards the sure option but in the presence of a
framing effect this tendency should be magnified in the gain condition and mitigated – or
even overturned in favour of risk seeking behavior – in the loss condition.
As shown in figure A.1, each option was presented to the subjects as a combination of a
rectangle and a pie-chart. The color-filled area of the rectangle represented the part of the
initial endowment that the participants could keep or lose, whereas the color-filled area of
the pie-chart denoted the probability with which money could be kept or lost. The color with
which the shapes were filled indicated whether money could be kept or lost. For example,
in the two trials shown in figure A.1 subjects received in both conditions an initial amount
of money of 100 Swiss Francs that was indicated in the middle of the screen. Then, they
had to look at this amount for at least 2 seconds in order to move on to the decision screen;
this feature of our design ensured that their initial gaze on the decision screen would not be
biased towards any of the two options.
In the gain condition of figure A.1 subjects had to decide between a risky option on the
left-hand side of the screen that offered them the possibility to keep the 100 Swiss Francs
with 70% probability and a sure option on the right-hand side of the screen that offered them
to keep 70 out of the 100 Swiss Francs with 100% probability. In the loss condition, the
final consequences of each option were exactly the same as in the gain condition, but the
sure option was framed as a loss, i.e., they could lose 30 out of the 100 Swiss Francs with
100% probability. In figure A.1, the blue colors represented the ’keep’ frame, and orange
indicated the ’lose’ frame. The meaning of the colors was randomized between subjects,
and the location of the sure and risky option on the screen was randomized between trials
and subjects. It is worth mentioning that during the presentation of the decision screen,
subjects were not shown the numbers and words; they could only see shapes and colors.
This feature of our design allowed us to have longer fixation duration and minimize the
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attentional component that might come from memory – i.e. it is much easier to remember
something written in number and letters than a perceptual component of the task. However,
we ensured that subjects knew the meaning of the shapes and colors with two extensive
training phases before we started the main experiment.
In the first training phase, subjects were presented with many subsequent pie-charts
and they had to indicate the correct probabilities represented by the color-filled area in the
pie-charts. In addition, they had to specify whether the filling colors indicated a loss or a
gain in each trial. The number of pie-charts presented (i.e. trials) to each subject depended
on the her own performance with a minimum of 30 presentations. Thus, after indicating the
correct probabilities of 30 pie-charts for which they received feedback on correct/incorrect
responses, the subject had to respond correctly to 10 pie-charts in a row in order to end the
task.
In the second training phase, subjects were presented with many subsequent rectangles
and they had to indicate the correct amount of money represented by the color-filled areas and
the meaning (gain or loss) of the colors. Similarly to the real task, before each presentation
a monetary endowment was associated with each rectangle, and the amount of money
represented in the color-filled area of the rectangle depended on this endowment – i.e the
color-filled area was always a proportion of the initial endowment. As for the first training
phase, the number of trials was performance dependent on each subject with a minimum of
50 presentations. Thus, after indicating the correct amount of money of 50 rectangles and
the meaning of the colors - they received feedback on correct/incorrect responses on each
trial -, the subject had to respond correctly to 10 rectangles in a row in order to end the task
(for more details see Methods section).
In addition to the training phases and the choice task, our subjects performed a second
task – the certainty equivalent elicitation task. In each trial of this task they were asked to
choose between a gamble and many possible sure amounts of money presented as a list
(figure A.2; also, see details in Methods section). This task provided us with a method to
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elicit the certainty equivalent (CE) for each gamble presented in the preceding choice task -
i.e. the guaranteed amounts of money that each subject would view as equally desirable as
the gambles. The elicited certainty equivalents (CEs) served as an important input for the
estimation of the parameters of an attention-based drift-diffusion model (aDDM) described
in more detail below.
Choice behavior
Similar to De Martino et al. (2006) subjects chose the sure option on average significantly
more often in the gain condition than in the loss condition (Fig A.3a). The data also show
that there is an overall tendency to choose the sure option more than the gamble in both
conditions but this tendency is much more pronounced in the gain condition. The data
clearly indicate a behavioral framing effect at the individual level because almost all subjects
chose the sure option more frequently in the gain condition (Fig A.3b). This result is further
corroborated by a logistic mixed effects regression with random effects (Table A.1, model 1)
that shows that the loss condition significantly decreases the probability of choosing the sure
option (beta = -0.93, p < 0.001), and this reduction in the choice probability of the sure option
is larger at higher expected values of the options (beta = -0.26, p = 0.047). Furthermore,
if the subjective attractiveness of the sure option relative to the gamble – measured by the
difference between the monetary value Ms of the sure option and the certainty equivalent CE
of the gamble – increases, the probability of choosing the sure option increases (beta = 0.62,
p = 0.009). Finally, model 1 in Table A.1 also answers the question how choice behaviour
responds to a general rise in the stake level, i.e., a rise in Ms =Ev: at higher stakes subjects
increase their preference for the sure option both in the gain and the loss condition (beta =
0.63, p < 0.001).
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Model Framework
Because we measure subjects’ gaze with the eye tracker we can use patterns of visual-
fixations to provide a deeper mechanistic understanding of the role of framing in subjects’
decision process. In particular, the aim of this paper is to investigate the role of visual-
attention on the framing effect. Namely, we want to study how visual-attention is related
to differences in choices and reaction time across frames and how it interacts with the
values of the options on the screen. For this purpose, we use the attentional drift diffusion
model (aDDM) to derive testable predictions about the relationship between subjects’ visual
fixation patterns and their choices in the decision task. The rationale for adopting this model
instead of other attentional based models is noteworthy and need some careful explanation.
We will first present the aDDM in details, and then illustrate the features and the assumptions
that make this model suitable for our data set and for investigating the role of visual-attention
in the framing effect.
The aDDM assumes that the brain, over time, computes and updates a relative decision
value (RDV) signal, which depends on the difference between the noisy accumulated
evidence for the two decision options. The speed at which the RDV moves in favour of one
of the two options is proportional to the subjective value difference of the options multiplied
by a drift parameter that determines the slope of the evidence accumulation. A key feature
of this model is that the evidence accumulation process depends on where the subject is
looking: on average, an individual accumulates more evidence in favour of the attended
option than the unattended one. This accumulation mechanism has important implications
for the decision process. In particular, the visual fixation pattern is assumed to influence
choices, i.e., the more time a subject spends at looking at one option, the more likely she is
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to choose that option. The aDDM can be formalized as follow:
dV (t) = µ(t)dt +σdW (t), (A.1)
V0 = x0,
τ = inf{t > 0 | V (t) /∈ (B,−B)} ,
where V (t) is the evidence accumulated at time t (or relative decision value), τ is the first
passage time (or reaction time) when the evidence crosses a certain threshold B, µ(t) is
the drift rate or speed of the accumulation process, σ is the constant diffusion rate or the
standard deviation of the brownian motion and x0 the initial bias parameter that is positive
when there is an initial bias towards the sure option and negative if there is an initial bias
towards the gamble. x0 is a bias towards one or the other alternative that is independent
from the evidence accumulation process, i.e., it could arise from features of the decision
task that trigger a spontaneous attraction or aversion towards one option. For example, if
there is a spontaneous aversion against accepting a sure loss, then x0 may be negative. The
evidence V (t) evolves in time according to a biased random walk with Gaussian increments,




δ (Ms −θCE) if the sure option is attended (A.2)
δ (θMs −CE) if the gamble is attended
where Ms is the monetary amount offered in the sure option, CE the certainty equivalent of
the gamble, δ is the constant drift parameter that controls the speed or slope of the evidence
accumulation, θ is the attentional discount factor that is always between 0 and 1. Because
the unattended option is multiplied by θ and obeys the restriction 0 < θ < 1, the model
captures the idea that less evidence is accumulated for the unattended option. Previous
research has indicated that the discount factor is typically considerably smaller than 1 for
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virtually all subjects (Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010; Lim et al., 2011).
Let us consider now limitations, assumptions and advantages of adopting this model.
In general, the standard DDM – the version without the visual-attention component (i.e.
θ = 1) – predicts a specific relation between choices and reaction time. In particular, it
predicts a decrease in reaction time as the absolute subjective value difference between
the two options, |Ms – CE|, increases. In other words, the easier the choice the faster the
response should be. In addition, the model predicts that the reaction time distribution has
the shape of an exponentially modified Gaussian (ex-Gaussian) distribution. These two
basic predictions should be satisfied in the data to have trust in the applicability of the
model to our data. It turns out that our data meet both of these predictions. Table A.1 in
the appendix regresses the logarithm of the response time (RT) on (i) the loss condition, (ii)
the absolute subjective value difference |Ms – CE|, and (iii) the interaction of both variables.
This regression shows that higher absolute value differences are associated with lower RTs.
Figure SA1 in the supplementary materials shows that the RT-distribution is right skewed
with the characteristic long right tail indicated by an ex-Gaussian.
Considering the aDDM, an assumption of the model that might be considered a weak
limitation of this framework is the randomness of visual gazes. Clearly, the model assumes
that gaze patterns do not depend on options’ values nor on attributes’ values, and the
aDDM does not make any prediction nor inference on the transition probability of a fixation
from one option (or attribute) to another. Thus, visual search strategies or probabilities
of gazes to the attributes are not accounted for in this model. However, we will argue
that this assumption – or better, this non-assumption – of the model should not affect our
interpretation of the data and our results of the model fitting.
The first attempt to overcome this weakness is through the way we formalized the model
in equation A.1. A fixation is considered belonging to a specific option whenever one of its
attributes is attended, i.e. any fixation that fell into the money or the probability attributes
was consider a fixation to the option to which the attributes belong. This allows us to have
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random fixations from one option to the other as there are only two options in the choice set.
In other words , in the model we formalized, equation A.1, the money and the probability
attributes are integrated together to form options’ values that are then compared.
However, people often make choices by comparing the options’ attributes (e.g., Gonzalez-
Vallejo, 2002) instead of the integrated values. We try to investigate whether we can use
the assumption that our participants are mainly integrating the attributes of the options.
Thus, we analysed gaze transitions between and within the options’ attributes in our data
to test whether subjects were performing more an attribute comparison or an attribute
integration type of strategy. We based our investigation on the premise that participants who
look more within options (i.e., between attributes of the same option) are more likely to
integrate the attributes of an option, whereas participants that look more between different
options’ attributes of the same type (i.e., between money attributes or between probability
attributes of different options) are more likely to compare the attributes of different options
instead of integrating the attributes of a given option as in Reeck et al. 2017. Figure SA2
in the supplementary materials shows that on average people make much more within
option transitions than between option transitions, suggesting that they are more involved in
integrating the options’ attributes. This is also supported by an individual level analysis of
within and between option transitions. Overall, 27 out of 30 subjects showed gaze patterns
that indicate a prevalence of attribute integration over attribute comparison (supplementary
material table SA4).
These findings are evidence for the view that using the integrated values of the options
should not influence the results, and that the aDDM assumptions are not violated in our data
set. Thus, we can apply this model to our data and also take advantage of the fact that it
makes strong testable predictions about the link between visual fixation patterns and choices,
as well as the role that the discount factor plays in this process.
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Predictions on the role of visual-fixations for choice behavior
In the aDDM visually guided attention plays a causal role in individuals’ choice behavior:
the longer one option in the choice set is visually fixated in a trial the more likely it will
be chosen in that trial. Thus, if the framing of options affects subjects’ visual-attention
pattern the model predicts that the change in the attention patterns across frames should
be associated with a change in choice frequencies across frames. In addition, the aDDM
predicts an interaction between the values of the options and the degree to which visual-
attention influences the evidence accumulation process; this interaction follows from the
multiplicative components (θ CE and θMs) in formula A.1, as opposed to other attentional
models like the decision by sampling (Noguchi and Stewart 2018) or the additive model
(Cavanagh et al. 2014). Finally, yet importantly, the model makes clear predictions about
reaction time in relation with fixations and option values.
Thus, several specific predictions about the relationship between choice behavior, visual-
attention, reaction time, the option values and their interactions can be directly derived from
the model by assuming a discount factor strictly smaller than 1.
First, the model predicts that if, ceteris paribus, the sure option has a bigger fixation time
advantage over the risky option in the gain condition compared to the loss condition the sure
option also has a bigger choice advantage in the gain relative to the loss condition. Thus,
a larger advantage in fixation time towards the sure option in the gain condition relative
to the loss condition could by itself explain the framing effect in choices. The intuition
for this prediction is the following. If one option receives more overall attention in a trial,
more evidence is accumulated in favour of this option relative to the unattended option:
the attended option gains an advantage in evidence accumulation that is proportional to
1−θ > 0 and therefore it reaches the decision threshold faster than the alternative option.
As a consequence, the longer attended option has a higher probability of being chosen.
Second, the above prediction should not only hold on average but it should also hold at
the individual level. Subjects that exhibit a greater change in the fixation time advantage
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for one option across frame conditions should also display a greater change in the choice
advantage for that option across conditions. The intuition for this hypothesis is that an
individual with a higher fixation time advantage towards one option relative to the other
accumulates more evidence in favour of the advantaged option relative to an individual that
has a smaller or no fixation time advantage for that option.
Third, the intuition described in the first prediction should also hold at the level of
individual trials, regardless of the framing condition: in choice trials in which an option
is systematically advantaged in terms of fixation time, this option should have a higher
probability of being chosen relative to the choice trials in which the other option has an
advantage in fixation time. With regard to our experiment this means that for a given framing
condition – regardless of whether it is the loss or the gain condition – the sure option should
be chosen more often in those trials in which it has a fixation time advantage over the risky
option compared to trials in which the fixation time advantage is in favour of the risky
option.
Fourth, another frame-independent prediction of the aDDM is that a given fixation time
advantage for one of the options translates into a larger choice advantage for that option at
higher values of both Ms and CE when (Ms - CE) is kept constant. Intuitively, this follows
from the fact that at higher values of both Ms and CE the attentional discount (1−θ)Ms and
(1−θ)CE is higher. Yet, the aggregate effect of the attentional discount on choices depends
on which option has a fixation time advantage. If, e.g., the subject looks more often at the
sure option in a trial the discount θ CE is more often relevant compared to the discount
θ Ms. In other words, a given fixation time advantage of the sure option leads to a larger
choice advantage for that option at higher overall values for Ms and CE.
Fifth, the aDDM also generates a hypothesis regarding the interaction between the
values of the two options and the fixation time. The model predicts that the higher the
value of both options the higher the influence of a change in fixation time on choices. The
source of this interaction effect is again the higher attentional discounting ((1−θ)Ms and
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(1−θ)CE) that occurs if both options have a higher value. Therefore, a rise in the fixation
time of, say, the sure option over the gamble leads to a stronger choice advantage of the sure
option if both options have a higher value.
In addition to the choice-related predictions, the aDDM also generates hypotheses about
how fixation time advantages for one option affect the overall reaction time. This allows us
to formulate two further predictions concerning the reaction time.
First, the stronger the fixation time advantage of one option the faster a choice should
be made because the non-attended option will be attentionally discounted for a larger
proportion of time (see simulated example in figure A.4). To illustrate this with regard to
our experiment, recall from the first hypothesis above that if, say, the sure option has a larger
fixation time advantage in the gain condition relative to the loss condition it is predicted to
have a larger choice advantage in the gain relative to the loss condition. Yet, a larger fixation
time advantage for the sure option in the gain condition also means that sufficient evidence
in favour of this option is accumulated more quickly in the gain condition such that the sure
option is chosen more quickly in the gain compared to the loss condition.
Finally, if we observe a general fixation time advantage for the sure option then we
should also observe faster response times in choosing the sure option compared to choosing
the gamble.
Results on the role of visual-fixations for behavior in the binary choice task
All of the above hypotheses predict a systematic relationship between the visual-attention
patterns, subjects’ choices’, subjective values and value differences (Ms - CE), and response
times. Our first prediction above concerns the relation between choices and fixation patterns.
The aDDM predicts that if the gain condition affects subjects’ visual-attention in favour of
the sure option, the framing effect on choices can be at least partly explained as an attention-
driven phenomenon. However, do the gain and the loss frames really affect visual-attention
in this way? We indeed find that there is a strong and statistically significant advantage in
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the allocation of fixation time to the sure option in the gain condition that is significantly
reduced when subjects are in the loss condition (Fig A.5A and Table A.2). Figure A.5A
shows that at all levels of the expected value of the gamble, Ev, the fixation time advantage
of the sure option is higher in the gain compared to the loss condition. The regression in
Table A.2 column 2 indicates that the fixation time advantage of the sure option is reduced by
25 percentage points in the loss condition (p < 0.01). Together with the behavioural framing
effect in figure A.3, this result is perfectly consistent with the first hypothesis: if there is a
larger fixation time advantage for the sure option in the gain relative to the loss condition,
then we should observe the same qualitative result in the domain of choice behaviour, i.e., a
larger choice advantage for the sure option in the gain relative to the loss condition.
The second prediction above states that if the different frames affect choices by triggering
changes in fixation time patterns then we should observe this not only at the aggregate but
also at the individual level: Individuals for whom the gain condition triggers a larger fixation
time change in favour of the sure option should display a larger change in the frequency of
choosing the sure option in the gain relative to the loss condition. Figure A.5B supports this
hypothesis. We observe a high and significant correlation (Pearson index 0.765, p < 0.001)
between the difference in the fixation time that is allocated to the sure option in the gain
condition relative to the loss condition, and the difference in the probability of choosing
the sure option in the gain relative to the loss conditions. In other words, individuals that
show a higher fixation time advantage towards the sure option in the gain relative to the
loss condition also show a higher choice advantage towards the sure option across the two
conditions.
The third hypothesis above states that irrespective of the framing condition a fixation
time advantage for the sure option in a given trial leads to a higher probability of choosing
the sure option compared to trials in which the gamble has a visual-attention advantage.
Figure A.5C shows that this is indeed the case. In both the gain and the loss condition the
probability of choosing the sure option is substantially lower in those trials in which the
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gamble has a fixation time advantage.
In the binary choice task the monetary value of the sure option, Ms , is always equal to
the expected value of the gamble, Ev, which – due to subjects’ known tendency towards risk
aversion – generally favours the choice of the sure option. Figure A.3aa shows, however,
that at higher expected values (Ms = Ev) of the two options the tendency to choose the
sure option even increases. Moreover, this increase in risk aversion at higher stakes occurs
in both the gain and the loss condition. The aDDM can explain this pattern if subjects
allocate relatively more visual-attention to the sure option at higher expected values. Then
the gamble suffers from more attentional discounting at higher expected values and therefore
the sure option is more often chosen. Figure A.5A indeed shows that more visual-attention
is allocated to the sure option both in the gain and the loss condition when the stakes (Ms =
Ev) are higher, and Table A.2 shows that this increase in visual-attention in response to a rise
in Ev is significant (p < 0.001). These findings are consistent with the idea that the increase
in visual-attention towards the sure option may be a source of the increased behavioural risk
aversion at higher levels of Ev.
Our fourth hypothesis above is related but not identical to the issue of increasing risk
aversion. It states that a given fixation time advantage for one option translates into a higher
choice advantage for that option at higher stakes when keeping the difference (Ms - CE)
constant. The reason behind this hypothesis is that at a generally higher level of Ms and
CE the visually disadvantaged option suffers for a greater attentional discount (1−θ)Ms
or (1−θ)CE. As in our experiment, the gamble is generally the option that receives less
attention we should observe that the frequency of choosing the sure option increases as
Ms increases (when controlling for Ms −CE). Regression 1 in Table A.1 shows that this
prediction is met. The coefficient on Ms (resp. Ev) is significant in all three models in Table
A.1.
Next, we examine the hypothesis (prediction five above) that there is an interaction effect
between Ms and the fixation time advantage of an option. More specifically, this hypothesis
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states that a rise in the fixations towards the sure option relative to the gamble leads to a
stronger choice advantage of the sure option if both options have a higher value because at
the higher values of the two options the visually less attended option (i.e., the gamble) is
discounted more heavily. Model 3 in Table A.1 shows that the coefficient on the interaction
term between Ms and the fixations towards the sure option is positive and significant.
Finally, we investigate the effect of fixation time advantages on reaction time. In figure
A.5A we have seen that the sure option enjoys a larger fixation time advantage in the gain
condition relative to the loss condition and in the previous section we hypothesized that
this should translate into faster decisions for the sure option in the gain condition compared
to the loss condition. The same logic should apply with regard to stake size. Figure A.5A
shows that a rise in Ev is associated with a large rise in the attention towards the sure option.
According to the aDDM this implies that the sure option should be chosen more quickly at
higher levels of Ev. Figure A.6b shows that both of these predictions are met by the data:
the sure option is chosen more quickly in the gain condition and at higher levels of Ev and
this latter effect holds both in the gain and the loss condition. Further evidence for these
results is provided in the supplementary materials (Table SA2) where we regress the log of
response times on the loss condition (i.e., omitted category = gain condition), Ms =Ev, and
the interaction of the two. The regression shows that the RTs are significantly larger in the
loss condition and significantly faster at higher levels of Ms . Furthermore, we know from
figure A.5A and Table A.2 (column 2) that there is a fixation advantage for the sure option
that is larger at higher stakes (Ms =Ev). Therefore, the model implies that there should be a
faster response time when the the sure option is chosen compared to when the gamble is
chosen at higher Ms =Ev. Figure A.6a shows that this is indeed the case and regression 2 in
Table SA2 in the supplementary materials corroborates this prediction econometrically. The
regression shows a significantly positive interaction between "Gamble chosen" and Ms on
response times.
The previous evidence provides support for the view that the framing effect is an attention-
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driven phenomenon. It appears that the gain frame directs more attention towards the sure
option which then increases the probability of choosing the sure option more frequently and
more quickly. However, how do we know that the link goes from visual-attention to choices
and not the other way around? In other words, how do we know whether individuals choose
what they look or whether they look at what they prefer? Fortunately, our data enable us to
directly examine this question by looking at the correlation between visual-attention and
the options’ values as well as the subjective value differences. We found that both middle
fixation duration and first fixation duration do not correlate with the options’ values, Ms
and CE, respectively. Figure A.7 shows the average duration of middle and first fixations
as a function of options’ values. In this figure the options’ values are defined as CE if the
attended option is the gamble or Ms if the attended option is the sure option. The figure
shows that options with higher values do not attract longer fixation duration. We also run
two separate linear mixed-effect regressions of the logarithm of middle fixation duration and
first fixation duration on the options’ values and did not observe a significant correlation (see
table SA7 in the supplementary materials and figure A.7, beta = 0.022, p-value = 0.11 and
beta = 0.028, p-value = 0.72, respectively). Further, the regressions in Table A.2 show that
neither the percentage of fixations to the sure option nor the fixation time advantage of the
sure option are affected by the relative subjective attractiveness (Ms-CE) of the sure option.
In both regressions these coefficients are rather small and clearly insignificant (p = 0.24 and
p = 0.52 in regressions 1 and 2, respectively). Thus, our data do not support the view that the
attractiveness of the options influences visual-attention. Rather, they are consistent with the
view that the gain frame changes people’s visual-attention in favour of the sure option and
that this change induced an increase in the choice frequency of this option. However, there is
still some unexplained variance in our data that cannot be fully explained by visual-attention
alone. In fact, despite accounting for the proportion of fixation time towards the sure option
in the logistic mixed-effect regression model (Table A.1, model 2), there is still a main effect
of the loss condition in which the probability of choosing the sure option is significantly
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decreased (beta=-0.89 , p-value<1e-5). In addition, there is a significant negative interaction
between the loss condition and the proportion of fixation time towards the sure option (beta =
-1.63, p-value = 0.01), suggesting that the impact of fixation time towards the sure option on
the probability of choosing the sure option is reduced in the loss condition. This interaction
effect between visual-attention and the loss condition means that, for a given visual fixation
advantage of the sure option, the loss condition transforms this advantage to a lower degree
into a choice advantage for the sure option. But what does that exactly mean in terms of the
underlying mechanisms that link visual-attention and choices? Additionally, are there other
aspects and mechanisms in the evidence accumulation process that play a role in the framing
effect? For instance, is the discount factor or the drift rate affected by the frame? Or is there
an initial bias in the accumulation process driven by the frame? In our attempt to answer
these questions, we fitted the aDDM to our data first separately for gain and loss conditions.
Towards a mechanistic understanding of the framing effect
As previously discussed, the main features of the aDDM are the drift rate parameter (δ ) that
determines the speed of the evidence accumulation, the discount factor (θ ) that "penalizes"
the unattended option, the initial bias parameter (x0) that provides one or the other option with
an initial advantage in terms of evidence, and the threshold parameter (B) that determines
how much evidence is needed to reach a decision. We are now interested in examining
how framing affects the different parameters of the aDDM. As we already discussed in the
previous section, changes in visual fixation patterns alone are unlikely to be the only source
through which the framing effect is generated. On the contrary, it seems easily possible that
the parameters of the aDDM vary across conditions. For example, the interaction between
the loss condition and the fixation time advantage for the sure option is difficult to explain
without a change in parameters across frames. In addition, quantitative evidence on how the
different parameters change across frames might – in combination with the fixation time
changes induces by framing – make it possible to fully account for the changes in choice
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behaviour across frames.
To identify changes in parameters between frames we fitted the aDDM model to our data
with a hierarchical Bayesian method (HaDDM). The hierarchical estimation of the mean
population parameters at the group level allows us to make inference about the parameters
accounting for variation coming from sources like individual differences. Thus, we can
benefit from this method to investigate the group level differences in parameters across gain
and loss fitting the model separately for the two conditions (Model fitting of the Methods
section).
We show the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters of the aDDM model
in figures A.8 – A.11. Each of these figures has three elements – A, B and C. In Figures
A.8A – A.11A we show the posterior distributions of the parameter means – for each aDDM
parameter – at the Group level. The Group level distribution for the gain frame is in blue
while for the loss frame it is illustrated in red. These results suggest that framing changes
primarily the initial bias and in the drift rate parameter – both of which are higher in the
gain condition – but the gain frame also slightly lowers the attentional discount parameter,
i.e., there is a higher attentional discount for the unattended option in the gain condition
compared to the loss condition. In addition, the variance of the attentional discount parameter
is considerably smaller in the gain condition. The figure for the threshold parameter indicates
that it is slightly larger in the loss condition, i.e., subjects seem to demand more evidence
until they make a choice in the loss condition.
To corroborate these results and further investigate how the parameter changes between
loss and gain conditions are related to the framing effect, we analysed the parameters’ means
at the individual level for individuals with a large and a small behavioural framing effect.
In particular, we split subjects in two groups based on whether they showed a behavioural
framing effect below or above the median. Figures A.8B – A.11B upper plots show the
posterior distributions of the mean parameters of the individuals that show a below-median
behavioural framing effect, i.e., for them the difference in the probability of choosing the
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sure option between gain and loss conditions is below the median. Figures A.8B – A.11B
lower plots show, in contrast, the posterior distributions of the mean parameters of the
individuals that show an above-median behavioural framing effect. A Comparison of figures
B between upper and lower plots for each parameter shows that the parameter changes
between the frames are primarily driven by individuals with an above median framing effect.
In fact, for these individuals the drift rate parameter (δ ) and the initial bias parameter (x0) are
significantly larger in the gain condition (p < 0.01) while the attentional discount parameter
(θ ) is (marginally) significantly smaller in the gain condition (p = 0.055), i.e., the unattended
option is more heavily discounted in the gain condition.
How do these differences in parameters help us understand the behavioural framing effect
and the associated response time patterns? Clearly, an increase in the drift rate, keeping
all the other parameters fixed, will affect the evidence accumulation process resulting in a
reduction in reaction time and an increased frequency of choosing the option with a fixation
time advantage. Thus, because the sure option generally enjoys a fixation time advantage,
the higher drift rate in the gain condition compared to the loss condition is one component in
explaining why the sure option is more frequently chosen in the gain condition. In addition,
the faster reaction times that we observe in the gain compared to the loss condition (see
table SA2, supplementary material) can also be explained by the higher drift rate in the gain
condition.
As previously discussed, the initial bias parameter captures some a priori advantage at the
very beginning of the accumulation process – an advantage that may be due to individuals’
spontaneous response when they notice they face the gain or the loss condition. In our
data, we measure a significantly positive initial bias in the gain condition towards the sure
option that is reduced to zero in the loss condition, which further adds to the higher choice
frequency for the sure option in the gain relative to the loss condition.
A possible explanation for this finding could be due to the way the options are presented
in our experiment. Two aspects of the binary choice task may capture participants’ attention
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before they start evaluating and comparing the available options. The first one is the fully
coloured pie-chart that is always associated with the sure option, which makes the sure
option immediately recognisable before knowing the value of the options. Secondly, the
colour associated with gain and loss does not require a valuation of the options and is
instantly noticeable as soon as the decision trial appears on the screen. Thus, a plausible
speculation could be that subjects see instantly which option is the sure option and have
some initial bias towards it. However, when the loss colour is present on the screen, i. e.,
they are facing a loss condition trials, this feature acts against the previous advantage for the
sure option reducing the initial bias to zero. Thus, the initial bias as well may be considered
an attention related mechanism for which, however, it is harder to empirically measure its
link with visual-attention.
The above discussion shows that the observed changes in key parameters of the aDDM
between the gain and the loss condition help us to understand the direction of the observed
choice and RT changes between the conditions. But to what extend are these parameter
changes – in combination with the observation fixation time changes – capable of fully
explaining the behavioural framing effect? In order words, what is the precise quantitative
role of the observed parameter changes in the explanation of the behavioural framing effect?
We ran a logistic mixed-effect regression with random effects for subject specific slopes
and constants with the probability of choosing the sure option as the dependent variable. As
explanatory variables with included the loss condition (omitted category = gain condition),
the percentage of fixation time for the sure option, the subjective value difference, the
monetary expected value of the options (Ms = Ev), and, in addition, for every subjects their
mean value for each parameter of the aDDM for gain and for the loss condition, and all the
interaction with proportion of fixation time to the sure option. Notably, the results show
that the dummy variable for the loss condition has now an insignificant coefficient that is
close to zero (beta = -0.18, p-value = 0.33), implying that the framing induced changes in
visual-attention in combination with the induced changes of the aDDM parameters now
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fully account for the behavioural framing effect.
To better estimate the importance of each component we calculated the R2 for the full
model (Pseudo-R2 = 0.32) and the partial Pseudo-R2 for each component. The proportion of
fixation time to the sure option is the variable that most of all can explain the variance in the
data (Pseudo-R2 = 0.12), and although the parameter of the aDDM contribute to account for
part of the framing effect their Pseudo-R2s are very small (initial bias Pseudo-R2 = 0.017,
drift rate Pseudo-R2= 0.005, all the parameters together Pseudo-R2= 0.034, and condition
dummy Pseudo-R2= 0.004).
However, it is worth noticing that when comparing three different logistic mixed-effect
regression models (figure A.12) for the probability of choosing the sure option, a model
with proportion of fixation time and its interaction with the fitted parameters of the aDDM
(model C, figure A.12) not only fits the data better than other models, but also significantly
outperforms a model in which the condition is specified as a variable (dummy regressor for
condition type, model B, figure A.12), (χ2= 570.77, p-value < 2.2e-16), and a model with
only proportion of fixation time towards the sure option (model A, figure A.12), (χ2= 192.34,
p-value < 3e-12). In addition, the model with only proportion of fixation time fits the data
significantly better than a model with a condition dummy (χ2= 378.43, p-value < 2.2e-16).
To conclude our results suggest a prominent role of visual-fixation time in the framing effect
that interacts with the decision process changing the speed of the accumulation and the
initial advantage of the sure option across frames.
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A.4 Discussion
Visual-attention has been shown to influence choices towards the longest attended option in
value-based decision-making (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011; Krajbich and
Rangel 2012; Towal et al. 2013), and this bias is present even when the duration of fixations
is experimentally manipulated (Shimojo et al. 2013; Armel et al. 2008; Tavares et al. 2017).
Here, we reported for the first time evidence for a bias in visual-attention allocation
linked to the framing effect in a lottery choice-task, and showed that this bias in attention
allocation was highly correlated with the intensity of the framing effect at the trial and at the
individual level.
Furthermore, the purpose of this study was to investigate how visual-attention is related
to differences in choices and reaction time across different frames and how it interacts with
the values of the options in the choice set. Thus, with the aim of building mechanistic and
computational supports for the hypothesis that attention has a prominent role in explaining
the framing effect, we adopted an attentional drift diffusion framework and tested the
quantitative predictions of the model about the interaction between choices, fixations,
options’ values and reaction time in our lottery data set.
We found that all the predictions of the aDDM are confirmed in our data. Specifically, we
observed visual-fixations interacting consistently with choice frequency across frames and
impacting reaction time accordingly to the model assumptions. Furthermore, we observed
evidence for the effect of the multiplicative interaction between visual-fixations and options’
values, i.e. attention seems to modulate the value of the attended option (or underweight the
value of the unattended one).
These results all together provide support for the view that the framing effect is an
attention-driven phenomenon. It appears that the gain frame directs more attention towards
the sure option which then enhances the probability of choosing the sure option more
frequently and more quickly. Nevertheless, this evidence is not sufficient for claiming
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a link between choice frequency and visual-attention that goes from fixations to choices
and not vice-versa, i.e. decision makers choose more often what they attended to and not
necessarily look more often at what they prefer. Thus, we investigated the relation between
fixations duration and options’ value to rule out an independence of subjective values and
value differences from visual-fixation time in our task. We found that both middle fixation
duration and first fixation duration do not correlate with options’ values, and also we do not
find a significant effect on visual-fixation time of value differences in our data. Clearly, this
is not a proof of causality, a rigorous external manipulation of attention would be necessary
for it, however, this is undoubtedly further validation of a main impact of visual-attention on
choices independently of options’ values, corroborating the hypothesis that individuals are
more likely to choose what they attend.
Once all the predictions of the aDDM were tested, we could fit the a hierarchical
Bayesian version of the model (HaDDM) to our experimental lottery data set to investigate
how the framing affects the different aspects of the evidence accumulation process. Hier-
archical Bayesian methods (Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, and Lee, 2011; Wiecki, Sofer,
and Frank, 2013; Wabersich and Vandekerckhove, 2014) have been shown to be superior
and extremely effective in computational model fitting compared to standard methodologies
such as maximum likelihood (MLE), because they allow a posteriori inference on the entire
distribution of the parameters rather than just the most likely estimate, and they enable group
and subject parameters to be estimated simultaneously at different hierarchical levels, thus
providing robust estimates of a model’s free parameters without ignoring or over-weighting
individual differences. Thus, we could benefit from this method to investigate the group
level differences in parameters across gain and loss fitting the model separately for the two
conditions.
Our results from the fitting procedure showed mainly a change in the initial advantage,
i.e. positive initial bias parameter, from choosing the sure option in the gain condition to no
advantage in the loss condition, and a change in drift rate. The initial bias parameter, which
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capture the tendency to prefer one option before the evidence accumulation process starts,
could reflect in this task how much attention the color of the options captures before the
decision-maker even starts evaluating the options in the choice set. The drift rate parameter
change across gain and loss could explain the mean difference in reaction time between the
two conditions.
Ultimately, when running a choice model on the probability of choosing the sure option
including the parameters of the aDDM and all their interactions with proportion of fixation
time to the sure option, we found that we could completely explain, i.e. reduce to zero, the
framing effect on choices.
Thus, our results show one possible way through which framing could change the
subjective values of options, visual-attention. We were able to disentangle the effect of
attention during the decision process and explain all the variability of choice difference




Thirty-six healthy subjects (12 females) participated in our experiment. Six of them were
excluded from the experiment because they failed to understand the choice task. Subjects
received monetary compensation for their participation, were informed about all aspects
of the experiment and gave written informed consent. The experiments conformed to
the standards of the Declaration of Helsinki and the Human Subjects Committee of the
University of Zürich approved the experimental protocol.
Tasks
This experiment used a modified version of the gain-loss paradigm in De Martino and Dolan
2006. The experimental design was divided into four parts: two training phases, a decision
phase and an elicitation phase.
During the first training phase, subjects were trained to learn how probabilities in the
decision task were represented (figure SA3a) through several trials – the number of trials
depended on the performance of each participant, from a minimum of 20 until the subject
performed 10 corrected probability estimations in a row. At the beginning of each trial, a
computer displayed an amount of money in the upper part of the screen and a pie-chart in
the middle. A fraction of this pie-chart was filled either in blue, orange or green. The other
fraction was filled in gray. One colour (for instance, orange) indicated that the monetary
amount displayed in the upper part of the screen was a loss, while the other colours (for
instance, blue or green) indicated that this amount was a gain. The meaning of the colours
was randomized among participants, but kept fixed for the duration of the entire experiment
for a single subject. The size of the filled area in the pie-chart indicated the probability of
keeping/losing the monetary amount. In each training trial, subjects had to indicate whether
the monetary amount was a gain or a loss; and to report the exact probability represented by
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the colour-filled area.
In the second training phase, subjects learned to estimate monetary amounts (figure
SA3b) through several trials – the number of trials depended on the performance of each
participant, from a minimum of 50 until the subject performed 10 corrected money esti-
mations in a row. Subjects started each trial of this training phase with an initial monetary
endowment between 10 and 100 CHF displayed in the middle of the screen. After being
informed about the endowment, a rectangular shape appeared on the screen. As before, a
fraction of this rectangle was gray and the remaining was filled either in blue, orange or
green. One colour (for instance, orange) indicated that the amount was a loss, while the
other colours (for instance, blue or green) indicated that the amount was a gain. In each trial
of this training phase, subjects had to indicate whether the amount of money was a loss or a
gain, and they had to report the exact amount of money represented by the proportion of the
colour-filled area of the rectangle that they could keep or lose from the initial endowment
received. For example, when the filled region of the rectangle was orange, the coloured area
indicated a proportion of the initial endowment to be lost. On the contrary, the filled area
indicated the proportion of the initial endowment to be kept by the subject if, for example,
was coloured in blue or green.
After the training sessions, subjects performed the choice task. During this decision
phase (figure A.1), subjects had to make 150 decision trials between a sure option and a
gamble. 70 of these trials were framed as a gain, 70 framed as loss and 10 were ’no-brainer’
trials, i.e. one of the two options was clearly better in terms of money and probability
than the other, which allowed to control that subjects correctly understood the task. At the
beginning of each trial the participant was presented with a monetary endowment (e.g. ’You
receive 100 CHF’). Ten different starting amounts were used in the experiment (from 10
CHF to 100 CHF with an increment of 10 CHF). To move on to the decision screen, the
participants had to fixate for more than 2 seconds the received monetary amount, which
was positioned in the centre of the screen. The decision in each trial consisted of choosing
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between a sure option and a gamble. The sure option was presented in the Gain frame trials
as an amount of money retained from the starting amount (e.g. keep 70 CHF out of a total
of 100 CHF) and in the Loss frame trials as the total amount of money lost from the starting
amount (e.g. lose 30 CHF out of a total of 100 CHF). The gamble option was identical for
both frames, and it always offered the chance to keep all of the starting amount of money
with some probability. Seven different probabilities were used in the study, such that the
probability of winning (or losing) in a given trial was either 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%,
80% or 90%. The expected outcomes – expected value (EV) - of sure and gamble options
were always equivalent in each trial, and also mathematically equivalent between frames.
However, the EV varied across trials from 3 to 90 CHF.
The sure and the gamble options on the screen were represented through rectangles, pie-
charts and colours. Rectangles indicated the amount of money that the subject could either
keep or lose from the starting amount, pie charts represented probabilities (e.g. the sure
option always had a pie-chart completely filled with a colour), and colours were informative
of whether the subject could keep or lose the amount of money from the starting amount
indicated by the initially presented rectangles (e.g. the gamble always had one of the two
’keep’ colours and never a ’lose’ colour).
In the last phase of the experiment, our participants had to perform a certainty equivalence
(CE) elicitation task in which they were shown all the 70 gambles that they encountered
during the choice task. In each trial – for a total of 70 trials, a gamble and a list of sure
amounts of money was shown to the participant (as an example see figure A.2). The subject
had to make 10 decisions in each trial between the gamble displayed on the left hand-side of
the screen and 10 sure amounts of money. The sure amounts of money were displayed in
a decreasing order from a maximum value smaller but close to the amount of money that
they could win if they choose the gamble to a minimum value close to zero. For instance, in
the example in figure A.2, one the gamble can be described as follows. You first receive
an endowment of 100 CHF and you have a probability of 70% of keeping all the 100 CHF
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(30% of having nothing). In the first line, the participant had to decide between the gamble
and a sure amount of 95 CHF. In the second line, she had to decide between the gamble and
a sure amount of 85 CHF, and so on. The CE was calculated as the mean between the two
amounts of money where the subject switches from choosing the sure amount to choosing
the gamble. Thus, in the example in figure 2 if a participant chooses the sure amounts of
money for every decision lines until 55 CHF, and she chooses the gamble from 45 CHF on,
the CE for this gamble is 50 CHF.
We forced participants to only switch from choosing the sure amount to choosing the
gamble and only once per trial – including the possibility of never switching, i.e. always
choosing the gamble or always choosing the sure amount. The subjects were incentivized
for the experiment with real money. They were informed that one of the two tasks – i.e.
the choice task or the CE elicitation task – was randomly selected and implemented as a
payment at the end of the experiment. If the choice task was selected the subject would
receive the average amount of money of all the 150 realized choices that the subject made.
In case the elicitation task was selected, the payment was given by the following procedure.
One out of the 10 choices in each trial was randomly selected and implemented, then the
payment was calculated as the average of all the 70 randomly selected choices. Furthermore,
subjects were instructed to treat each decision separately and independently of the others.
All tasks were programmed in Matlab 2015b (Matworks), using the Psychophysics
Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007).
Eye-tracking
Before each decision trial, subjects were required to fixate the monetary endowment po-
sitioned at the center of the screen for 2 s before the options would appear, ensuring that
subjects began every trial fixating on the same location.
Subjects’ gaze was recorded at 500 Hz with an EyeLink-1000 (http://www.sr-research.
com/) eye tracker. Choice trials with no gaze time on any option attribute were excluded
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from the analysis (17 trials, 0.004% of the pooled data from the 30 subjects).
Data analysis
We used the R package for statistical analysis of the behavioral results from the decision
task (lme4 extension) and model estimations. The eye-tracking data were processed using
the same procedures used in Krajbich et al., 2010 to analyze eye movements in a binary
choice task.
Model fitting
We fitted the gain and loss condition separately with a hierarchical Bayesian method for
the aDDM (equation A.1 and A.2). The code was implemented in R with extension
package RJags for the hierachical estimation of the parameters, you can find the code on
GitHub (https://github.com/galombardi/method_HtSSM_aDDM). In the hierachical
Bayesian method, we make the standard assumption that individuals are members of a
normally distributed population and assign a normal prior for each individual level parameter.
Furthermore, before fitting the model we ran recovery fitting analysis to make sure the model
was able to correctly fit the data. You can find the recovery procedure in the method paper
(in preparation).
Then, we simulated choices and reaction time for loss and gain conditions with the mean
of the individual posterior distributions for each parameter and each subjects. Figure SA4
shows the goodness of fit of the aDDM.
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A.6 Figures and tables
Figure A.1: Binary choice task. Subjects had to fixate on the first screen the initial amount of
money they received in each trial for 2 s before seeing the decision screen that showed them
the choice set. The decision screen presented the sure option (on the right-hand side of the
screen in this example) and the gamble (on the left-hand side of the screen in this example).
After a selection was made, a white box highlighted the chosen option for 1 s. In both the
gain and the loss condition, the probability with which the subject could win or lose money
was indicated by the colored part of the probability pie. In the gain condition, the amount
of money subjects could win from an option was always indicated by the colored part of
the rectangle. In the loss condition, the colored part of the rectangle for the sure option (in
the above example this is the option that involves the fully orange-colored probability pie)
indicates the amount of money from the initial endowment that the subjects lost for sure
if they chose that condition. Notice that subjects were not shown the numbers and words
written in the example above; they could only see shapes and colors. They learned, however,
the meaning of the colours, rectangles and pie charts in two training sessions that enabled
them to quickly understand the options.
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Figure A.2: Certainty equivalent elicitation task. Subjects were presented with all the
possible gambles that they encounter in the choice task and asked to make a series of
decisions for each of them as shown in the example screen. For each row they had to decide
whether they prefer the gamble or a sure amount of money indicated on the right. For
example, in the first row of the screen in the figure, they had to decide whether they prefer to
keep 100 Swiss Francs that they received with 70% probability (or nothing) or if the prefer
95 Swiss Francs for sure; in the second row, they had to decide whether they wanted to
keep 100 Swiss Francs with 70% probability (or nothing) or a sure amount of money of 85
Swiss Francs, and so on. They were also instructed not to make incoherent decisions, and to
switch from choosing the sure amount of money to choosing the gamble not more than one






















































Figure A.3: Behavioral evidence for the framing effect. a) Probability of choosing the sure
option as a function of expected value of the options for the gain and the loss condition. At
every level of the options’ expected value the sure option is chosen more frequently in the
gain condition. The error bars indicate the standard errors of the mean. b) The behavioral
influence of framing at the individual level. Each bar represents one individual and shows
the difference between the probability of choosing the sure option in the gain condition and














Figure A.4: Example of how a fixation time advantage for one option influences the reaction
time. The plots show two examples of the relative decision value (RDV) for two options with
the same values. The parameters of the model are kept constant across the two examples.
The plots differs exclusively in the first fixation time duration, which is shorter in the upper
plot than in the lower plot. In the figures, the colored part represents a fixation time duration,
in blue for the sure option and in orange for the gamble. In both plots, the RDV crosses the
upper barrier, meaning that the sure option has been chosen. Clearly, the decision time in
the lower plot is smaller (i.e. faster choice) than the decision time in the upper plot, and this
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Figure A.5: The impact of framing on visual-attention and choices. In all figures, the
error bars indicate the standard errors of the mean. (A) Average percentage of fixation
time towards the sure option as a function of the options’ expected value for gain and loss
conditions. (B) Correlation between a measure of frame influence on choices (i.e. the
difference between the probability of choosing the sure option in the gain condition and the
loss condition) and the frame influence on fixations towards the option (i.e. the difference
in percentage of fixation time towards the sure option between gain and loss). Each point
represents a subject in the plot. (C) The probability of choosing the sure option separately
for gain and loss conditions, as a function of expected value and for trials in which the sure





Figure A.6: The impact of framing on response times. In both figures, the error bars indicate
the standard errors of the mean. (a) Average logarithm of the reaction time in milliseconds
as a function of expected value Ev for gain (in blue) and loss (in red) conditions, only for
trials where the sure option has been chosen. (b) Average logarithm of the reaction time in
milliseconds as a function of expected value for trials where the gamble has been chosen (in
light blue) and the sure option has been chosen (in dark blue).
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(a) (b)
Figure A.7: Fixation duration as a function of values. (a) In the upper plot the average
middle fixation duration as a function of the value of the option attended split in quintiles
(value = CE if the attended option is the gamble and value = Ms if the attended option is the
sure option); in the lower plot the average first fixation duration as a function of the value of
the attended option split in quintiles (value = CE if the attended option is the gamble and
value = Ms if the attended option is the sure option). (b) In the upper plot the average middle
fixation duration as a function of the amount of money attended split in quintiles; in the
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Figure A.8: Posterior distributions of the mean attentional discount parameter of the hier-
archical Bayesian model fittings for the aDDM separately for gain (in blue) and loss (in
red) conditions. (A) Posterior distributions of θ mean at the group level. (B) Posterior
distributions of θ mean at the individual level of the HaDDM for two groups of subjects
based on whether they showed a framing effect below or above the median (i.e. the framing
effect is the difference in the probability of choosing the sure option between gain and loss
conditions). The figure on top shows the posterior probability distributions of the individual
level mean for the group of subjects (16) for which the framing effect is below median, and
the figure on the bottom shows the posterior probability distributions of the individual level
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Figure A.9: Posterior distributions of the mean constant drift rate parameter of the hier-
archical Bayesian model fittings for the aDDM separately for gain (in blue) and loss (in
red) conditions. (A) Posterior distributions of δ mean at the group level. (B) Posterior
distributions of δ mean at the individual level of the HaDDM for two groups of subjects
based on whether they showed a framing effect below or above the median (i.e. the framing
effect is the difference in the probability of choosing the sure option between gain and loss
conditions). The figure on top shows the posterior probability distributions of the individual
level mean for the group of subjects (16) for which the framing effect is below median, and
the figure on the bottom shows the posterior probability distributions of the individual level
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Figure A.10: Posterior distributions of the mean initial bias parameter of the hierarchical
Bayesian model fittings for the aDDM separately for gain (in blue) and loss (in red) condi-
tions. (A) Posterior distributions of x0 mean at the group level. (B) Posterior distributions of
x0 mean at the individual level of the HaDDM for two groups of subjects based on whether
they showed a framing effect below or above the median (i.e. the framing effect is the
difference in the probability of choosing the sure option between gain and loss conditions).
The figure on top shows the posterior probability distributions of the individual level mean
for the group of subjects (16) for which the framing effect is below median, and the figure
on the bottom shows the posterior probability distributions of the individual level mean for
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Figure A.11: Posterior distributions of the mean threshold parameter of the hierarchical
Bayesian model fittings for the aDDM separately for gain (in blue) and loss (in red) condi-
tions. (A) Posterior distributions of B mean at the group level. (B) Posterior distributions of
B mean at the individual level of the HaDDM for two groups of subjects based on whether
they showed a framing effect below or above the median (i.e. the framing effect is the
difference in the probability of choosing the sure option between gain and loss conditions).
The figure on top shows the posterior probability distributions of the individual level mean
for the group of subjects (16) for which the framing effect is below median, and the figure
on the bottom shows the posterior probability distributions of the individual level mean for
the group of subjects (14) for which the framing effect is above median.
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Model visual-xation time and aDDM params
Figure A.12: Predicted and empirical probability of choosing the sure option for three
different logistic mixed-effect regression models. (A) The upper-side model is the simple
model in figure 7, in which the regressors are the following: a dummy variable for loss
condition (baseline gain condition), value difference between sure option and gamble
(Ms - CE), expected value (Ev = Ms), and the interactions between value difference and
expected value with loss condition (Loss Condition X (Ms - CE) and Loss Condition X Ev,
respectively). BIC = 3905.5, AIC = 4249.9. (B) The model in the middle is the model that
takes into account only visual-fixations to explain the framing effect. The regressors for
this model are the following: proportion of fixation time to the sure option, value difference
between sure option and gamble (Ms - CE), expected value (Ev = Ms), and the interactions
between value difference and expected value with the proportion of fixation time to the sure
option. BIC = 4184.4, AIC = 3905.5. (C) The lower-side model takes into visual-fixation
time and its interaction with the fitted parameters of the aDDM. The regressors for this model
are the following: proportion of fixation time to the sure option, value difference between
sure option and gamble (Ms - CE), expected value (Ev = Ms), the parameters of the aDDM
(initial bias, attentional discount, drift rate and threshold), and the interactions between value
difference, expected value and the parameter of the aDDM with the proportion of fixation
time to the sure option. BIC = 4617.5, AIC = 3863.2. It is worth noticing that the last model
is the one that better reproduce the data, without the need of a variable that indicates the





Constant 1.719∗∗∗ 1.703∗∗∗ 1.297∗∗∗
(0.283) (0.309) (0.175)





Ms - CE 0.623
∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗ 0.785∗∗
(0.239) (0.274) (0.272)




Loss Cond × Ms - CE −0.045 −0.281 −0.054
(0.234) (0.270) (0.262)
% Fix sure opt 7.001∗∗∗ 6.659∗∗∗
(0.660) (0.678)
Loss Cond × % Fix sure opt −1.628∗ −0.657
(0.634) (0.734)
Ms × % Fix sure opt 1.421
∗∗ 1.086∗
(0.520) (0.477)














% Fix sure opt × x0 −0.335
(0.534)
% Fix sure opt × θ −1.066∗
(0.463)
% Fix sure opt × δ 0.582
(0.531)
% Fix sure opt × B 0.591
(0.447)
Log Likelihood −2,097.969 −1,868.779 −1,804.472
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,249.938 3,867.559 3,986.944
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,421.085 4,279.580 5,184.974
Pseudo-R2 0.2041 0.2910 0.3154
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A.1: Three logistic mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the probability of choosing the sure option. Dependent variable
equals 1 if the sure option is chosen and 0 otherwise. (1) The regressors for model 1 are
the following: a dummy variable for loss condition (baseline gain condition), the value
difference between sure option Ms and certainty equivalence of the gamble (Ms - CE),
the value of the sure option (Ms = Ev), and the interactions between value difference and
expected value with loss condition (Loss Condition X (Ms - CE) and Loss Condition X Ms,
respectively). (2) In addition to the regressors of model 1, in model 2 the proportion of
fixation time towards the sure option and all the possible interactions are investigated (%
Fix Sure Opt, Loss Condition X % Fix Sure Opt, Loss Condition X (Ms - CE), and Loss
Condition X Ev). (3) All the regressors from model 2 are in model 3 plus the parameters
from the fitting of the HaDDM (one value per subject per condition), and their interaction
with the proportion of fixation time to the sure option.
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Dependent variable:











Ms - CE 0.009 0.044
(0.007) (0.069)
Loss Cond × Ms −0.011 −0.163
∗
(0.007) (0.072)
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table A.2: Two mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subject-specific constants
and slopes. (1) Linear mixed-effect model of the proportion of fixation time towards the sure
option as a function of a dummy variable for the loss condition (baseline gain condition),
expected value of the options (MS = Ev), the value difference between sure option and
gamble (MS - CE), and the interaction of expected value and condition (Loss Condition
×MS). (2) Logistic mixed-effect model of the probability that the sure option has a fixation
advantage (= 0 if the gamble has a fixation time advantage, =1 if the sure option has a
fixation advantage) as a function of the a dummy variable for the loss condition (baseline
gain condition), expected value (MS = Ev), value difference between sure option and gamble
























Figure SA2: Mean number of transitions for integration type (e.g. within an option) and




Figure SA3: Training phase. (a) Probability training phase. Subjects had to specify the
probability represented by the colour-filled area of the pie-chart, and to indicate whether the
colour had a ’keep’ or ’lose’ meaning. (b) Money training phase. Subjects had to specify
the amount of money represented by the colour-filled area of the rectangle with respect to
the received amount of money, and to indicate whether the colour had a ’keep’ or ’lose’
meaning.
A B
Figure SA4: Reaction time distribution of the empirical data (histograms) and simulated
data (dashed lines) for (A) gain condition (in blue) and (B) loss condition (in red). In both
plots, the reaction time is split by gamble chosen (from 0 to 30 seconds on the left-hand








| Ms - CE | −0.064
∗∗
(0.019)
Loss Cond × | Ms - CE | 0.022
(0.022)
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SA1: A linear mixed-effects regression with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the logarithm of the reaction time. The regressors for this model are
the following: a dummy variable for loss condition (baseline gain condition), the absolute
value of the value difference (|Ms – CE|), and the interactions between the loss condition

















Gamble Chosen × Ms 0.159
∗∗∗
(0.025)
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SA2: Two linear mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the logarithm of the reaction time. (1) In regression 1, we model
only trials in which subjects choose the sure option. The regressors for this model are
the following: a dummy variable for loss condition (baseline gain condition), expected
value (Ms = Ev), and the interactions between the loss condition dummy and the expected
value (Loss Cond X Ms). (2) In regression 2, all trials are considered. The regressors for
model 2 are the following: a dummy variable for choosing the gamble (Gamble Chosen) for
which the baseline is the sure option chosen, expected value (Ms = Ev), and the interactions
between the Gamble Chosen dummy and the expected value (Gamble Chosen X Ms).
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Dependent variable:









Loss Cond × Transitions Integration 0.095∗∗
(0.030)
Transitions Integration × Ev 0.057∗∗
(0.021)
Loss Cond × Ev 0.059∗
(0.028)
Loss Cond × Transitions Integration × Ev −0.009
(0.029)
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SA3: A poisson mixed-effects regression with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the count of number of transitions’ gazes from one attribute to
the other per trials. The regressors of the model are the following: a dummy for the
type of transition (baseline transition type comparison) which is 0 if the transition is
between attributes of different options (money to money attribute or probability to probability
attribute, i.e. transition comparison) and 1 if the transition is between attributes of the same
option (money to probability or probability to money attributes, i.e. transition integration); a
dummy for condition type (Loss Condition), the expected value of the option (Ev) and all
possible interactions.
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Subject Condition Mean # Trans Mean # Trans
Integration Comparison
1 Gain 4.73 3.10
2 Gain 5.00 2.73
3 Gain 6.09 5.29
4 Gain 6.07 4.17
5 Gain 3.90 2.60
6 Gain 2.97 2.11
7 Gain 4.07 2.00
8 Gain 2.89 1.91
9 Gain 3.90 2.83
10 Gain 1.12 0.94
11 Gain 3.79 2.40
12 Gain 1.96 1.93
13 Gain 2.23 3.70
14 Gain 0.81 2.37
15 Gain 3.86 2.56
16 Gain 3.83 2.24
17 Gain 3.43 2.83
18 Gain 3.29 2.44
19 Gain 3.40 2.53
20 Gain 4.19 1.64
21 Gain 3.03 1.73
22 Gain 5.06 4.63
23 Gain 2.56 1.19
24 Gain 2.99 3.10
25 Gain 2.59 1.77
26 Gain 3.79 2.79
27 Gain 1.82 1.93
28 Gain 3.43 2.47
29 Gain 5.34 2.84
30 Gain 2.26 2.03
1 Loss 5.33 3.17
2 Loss 4.56 1.99
3 Loss 5.46 4.10
4 Loss 5.57 3.06
5 Loss 4.14 2.32
6 Loss 3.66 2.14
7 Loss 4.16 2.37
8 Loss 2.34 1.57
9 Loss 3.70 1.81
10 Loss 2.09 1.72
11 Loss 4.19 2.13
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Subject Condition Mean # Trans Mean # Trans
Integration Comparison
12 Loss 1.63 1.91
13 Loss 2.19 3.00
14 Loss 0.66 2.14
15 Loss 4.13 2.39
16 Loss 5.00 2.74
17 Loss 3.61 2.59
18 Loss 3.39 2.26
19 Loss 4.06 2.91
20 Loss 5.56 2.03
21 Loss 3.43 1.56
22 Loss 4.91 5.30
23 Loss 2.41 1.27
24 Loss 3.06 2.70
25 Loss 2.55 1.96
26 Loss 3.59 2.56
27 Loss 2.83 2.22
28 Loss 4.12 2.42
29 Loss 5.79 2.73
30 Loss 2.31 1.73
Table SA4: Participants mean number of transitions integration type (e.g. within an option)
and comparison type (e.g. between options) of gaze patterns, for gain and loss conditions.
In bold all the subjects for which the mean number of transition integration type is higher




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant 1.297∗∗∗ 1.384∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗ 1.333∗∗∗ 1.357∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.115) (0.248) (0.157) (0.183)
Loss Cond −0.182 −0.346∗ −0.560∗∗ −0.157 −0.321 .
(0.187) (0.145) (0.207) (0.156) (0.181)
Ms 0.501
∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗ 0.510∗∗ 0.525∗∗
(0.172) (0.159) (0.180) (0.163) (0.169)
Ms - CE 0.785
∗∗ 0.587∗∗ 0.611∗ 0.817∗∗ 0.846∗∗
(0.272) (0.204) (0.267) (0.265) (0.279)
Loss Cond × Ms −0.113 −0.250
∗
−0.232 −0.126 −0.118
(0.150) (0.125) (0.144) (0.145) (0.155)
Loss Cond × Ms - CE −0.054 0.076 0.050 −0.053 −0.106
(0.262) (0.201) (0.225) (0.245) (0.278)
% Fix sure opt 6.659∗∗∗ 6.249∗∗∗ 6.840∗∗∗ 6.727∗∗∗
(0.678) (0.645) (0.709) (0.643)
Loss Cond × % Fix sure opt −0.657 −0.734 −1.258 . −0.829
(0.734) (0.720) (0.752) (0.683)
Ms × % Fix sure opt 1.086
∗ 0.915∗ 1.195∗ 1.145∗
(0.477) (0.458) (0.495) (0.480)
Ms - CE × % Fix sure opt 1.525
∗ 1.236 . 1.578∗ 1.525 .
(0.763) (0.641) (0.793) (0.795)
Param x0 1.100
∗∗∗ 1.017∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗ 1.178∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.091) (0.090) (0.085)
Param θ 0.058 0.045 0.191 0.002
(0.102) (0.086) (0.144) (0.119)
Param δ 0.217∗ 0.175∗ 0.420∗ 0.212∗
(0.104) (0.088) (0.167) (0.100)
Param B 0.127 0.157∗ 0.309 . 0.177 . 0.083
(0.082) (0.062) (0.183) (0.097) (0.083)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
% Fix sure opt × x0 −0.335 −0.218 −0.574
(0.534) (0.550) (0.511)
% Fix sure opt × θ −1.066∗ −1.100∗ −1.104∗
(0.463) (0.439) (0.491)
% Fix sure opt × δ 0.582 1.005 . 0.798
(0.531) (0.521) (0.604)
% Fix sure opt × B 0.591 0.518 0.362 0.322
(0.447) (0.372) (0.687) (0.453)
Log Likelihood −1,804 −2,045 −1,835 −1,809 −1,813
Akaike Inf. Crit. 3,987 4,219 3,974 3,921 3,929
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 5,185 4,631 4,938 4,885 4,893
Pseudo-R2 0.32 0.22 0.30 0.31 0.31
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SA5: Five logistic mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the probability of choosing the sure option. Dependent variable
equals 1 if the sure option is chosen and 0 otherwise. (1) Full Model. The regressors for
model 1 are the following: a dummy variable for loss condition (baseline gain condition),
value difference between sure option Ms and certainty equivalence of the gamble (Ms -
CE), value of the sure option (Ms = Ev), the interactions between value difference and
expected value with loss condition (Loss Condition X (Ms - CE) and Loss Condition X Ms,
respectively), the proportion of fixation time towards the sure option and all the possible
interactions are investigated (% Fix Sure Opt, Loss Condition X % Fix Sure Opt, Loss
Condition X (Ms - CE), and Loss Condition X Ev), and the parameters from the fitting of
the HaDDM (one value per subject per condition), and their interaction with the proportion
of fixation time to the sure option. (2) Model without attention. The regressors of model
2 are the same as model 1 expect the proportion of fixation time towards the sure option
and all the possible interactions. (3) Model without the initial bias. The regressors of model
3 are the same as model 1 expect the initial bias and its interaction with the proportion of
fixation time. (4) Model without the attentional discounting factor. The regressors of model
4 are the same as model 1 expect the attentional discounting parameter and its interaction
with the proportion of fixation time. (5) Model without the constant drift parameter. The
regressors of model 5 are the same as model 1 expect the constant drift parameter and its












Ms - CE 0.623
∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗
(0.239) (0.184) (0.163)
Loss Cond × Ms −0.263
∗
(0.132)
Loss Cond × Ms - CE −0.045
(0.234)
% Fix sure opt 6.559∗∗∗ 6.069∗∗∗
(0.548) (0.501)
Ms × % Fix sure opt 0.846 0.898 .
(0.544) (0.485)














% Fix sure opt × x0 −0.162
(0.464)
% Fix sure opt × θ −1.082∗∗
(0.410)
% Fix sure opt × δ 0.897 .
(0.459)
% Fix sure opt × B 0.478
(0.432)
Log Likelihood −2,098 −1,909 −1,813
Akaike Inf. Crit. 4,249.938 3,905.509 3,863
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 4,421 4,184 4,617
Pseudo-R2 0.20 0.28 0.31
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SA6: Three logistic mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the probability of choosing the sure option. Dependent variable
equals 1 if the sure option is chosen and 0 otherwise. (1) Model condition dummy. The
regressors for model 1 are the following: a dummy variable for loss condition (baseline gain
condition), value difference between sure option Ms and certainty equivalence of the gamble
(Ms - CE), value of the sure option (Ms = Ev), the interactions between value difference
and expected value with loss condition (Loss Condition X (Ms - CE) and Loss Condition
X Ms, respectively (2) Model visual-fixation time. Model 2 is similar to model 1 but the
loss condition dummy is replaced by the proportion of fixation time. (3) Model without the
initial bias. The regressors of model 3 are the same as model 2 plus the parameters from the
fitting of the HaDDM (one value per subject per condition), and their interaction with the
proportion of fixation time to the sure option.
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Dependent variable:
Log of Fixation Duration
Middle fixation First fixation
Constant 5.807∗∗∗ 5.604∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.061)
Loss Cond 0.046∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.024)
Option Value 0.022 0.028
(0.014) (0.024)
Loss Cond × Option Value −0.027 . −0.017
(0.016) (0.011)
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SA7: Two linear mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the logarithm of fixation time duration. (1) Middle fixation duration.
The regressors for model are the following: a dummy variable for loss condition (baseline
gain condition), the value of the attended option (i.e. if gamble attended Option Value = CE,
if sure option attended Option Value = Ms) and their interactions. (2) Initial fixation duration.
The regressor for the model are the same as the model for middle fixation duration.
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Appendix B: Study 2
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Is the decoy effect an attention-driven phenomenon?
Gaia Lombardi, Todd Hare, Ernst Fehr
University of Zürich
Department of Economics
Zürich Center for Neuroeconomics (ZNE)
B.1 Abstract
The decoy effect is a well documented example of a preference reversal in which individuals
seem to change their subjective valuation of two options (A vs B) when a third, irrelevant,
alternative (C) is introduced in the choice-set. However, the mechanisms underlying the
decoy effect are still imperfectly understood. Why should an irrelevant change in the
choice-set affect decision-making?
Here, we examine the hypothesis that introducing a third alternative in the choice-set
causes changes in the allocation of visual-attention to the options, and in turns visual-
attention changes give rise to changes in the decision process. We investigate and replicate
the attraction effect in a lottery task, i.e.„ individuals change their risk attitude as a function
of whether the decoy relates to option A or B. Although the decoy is basically never chosen
it has a considerable effect on the relative allocation of attention to the two relevant options.
If the decoy similar is to option A it induces frequent comparisons between the decoy
and this option and thus strongly increases the relative attention to option A. We then ask
how and by which mechanisms these shifts in visual-attention allocation could influence
choices. Based on an sequential sampling process approach (race model and aDDM), we
test different modeling hypothesis that could explain the decoy effect through a reallocation
of visual-attention without changing the valuation of the options in the choice set.
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B.2 Introduction
In classical economics, the standard theory of rational choice assumes that preferences
between alternatives do not depend on the context or on the presence of other options. This
principle assumes that the decision maker has a complete preference order of all options
and she will always choose the higher ranked option in this order. However, experimental
evidence shows that this assumption is violated in many choice contexts (Tversky 1972,
Huber and Puto 1982, Tversky and Simonson 1993; Shafir 1993). One notable example
of this violation is the decoy effect which occurs when the introduction in the choice set
of a third irrelevant option changes the preference relation between the other two options
(Tversky 1972; Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982; Simonson, 1989; Slaughter et al. 1999;
Soltani et al. 2012).
Although the decoy effect has been known in economics since 40 years and also more
recently has been widely investigated in psychology and in neuroscience, which tried to
unveil the brain and psychological processes during this type of decisions, there is still
scarce consensus on the driving mechanisms for such effect, and the conditions under which
decision makers exhibit different forms of this violation are a matter of current debate.
Many computational modelling attempts to explain the various types of decoy effects
have been attempted (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993;
Hotaling et al., 2010; Roe et al., 2001; Usher and McClelland, 2004; Bhatia, 2013; Noguchi
and Stewart 2018; Gluth et al. 2018), the majority of which are based on sequential sampling
models. For the past two decades sequential sampling models have become dominant in
value-based decision making, mainly because of their feature of predicting not only choices
but also reaction time distribution (Ratcliff, R. et al. 2016; Forstmann et al. 2016; Hanks and
Summerfield 2017). The fundamental principle of these models is that during the decision
process the decision maker accumulates evidence for each option until it reaches a certain
threshold at which point a decision is made.
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Also, more recently in neuroscience and psychology, the idea that attention plays a role
in the decoy effect and more in general in decision making has gained popularity (Krajbich
and Rangel, 2011; Tsesos, Chater and Usher 2012; Gluth, Spektor and Rieskamp 2018;
Noguchi and Stewart 2018) and it has been incorporated in some sequential sampling models
(Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Roe et al., 2001; Usher and McClelland, 2004; Bhatia, 2013;
Noguchi and Stewart 2018; Gluth et al. 2018). However, in most of these computational
theories attention plays a secondary role in explaining context-dependent effect such the
decoy. Addittionally, in very few studies that investigate the decoy effect (Nouguchi and
Stewart 2014; Gluth et al. 2018) attention has been fully recorded.
Based on growing literature on the importance of attention in value-based and perceptual
decision making (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011; Krajbich and Rangel
2012; Towal et al. 2013), we hypothesize that attention could play a more important role in
explaining the decoy effect than previously believed. The study aims to seek evidence to
support the assumption of a key role of attention in the decoy effect as inner mechanims
of the decision process. Thus, we combined a behavioral paradigm, eye-tracking and
computational techniques to examine the role of visual-fixations as a proxy for attention in
decoy-dependent changes of preferences during risky decision problems.
We developed a lottery task in which subjects performed a series of trinary decisions
between risky options while their gaze movements were recorded. One of the options was
always the irrelevant decoy, i.e., always dominated in money and probability by one of the
other two options, which we refer to here as the target. This task was designed to capture
the attraction effect, i.e., a decoy effect in which the decoy is never chosen and it attracts
more choices for the target option, in a within-subject design fashion which allowed us to
record changes in visual-attention allocation across two different decoy conditions.
Behaviorally, we replicated the attraction effect, i.e., the target option was chosen more
often than the competitor option. Concerning the visual-attention allocation, we first found a
bias in fixation time towards the target option which was strong and significantly correlated
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to the strengths of the decoy effect at the individual level. Additionally, we recorded an
effect on choice frequency of looking time to the decoy. Surprisingly, the probability of
choosing the target was significantly influenced by the time participants spent attending the
decoy. We investigated this result further and find evidence suggesting that the decoy alters
attention allocation within the choice set making the target option the center of attention.
From our result, it seems reasonably clear that visual-attention plays a major role in the
decoy effect. However, what is not entirely clear is the mechanisms with which attention
acts to influence choices.
Because our experiment was not designed to rule out and isolate the determinants of
the probability of attending the options in the choice set nor to define the proper relation
between attention, options’ values and decoys, we tested the predictions of other models
in our data. Thus, we reviewed the models in the literature that include attention in their
framework and examine different predictions of how attention is allocated among the options
in the choice set, and how it could influences the decoy effect. We find that only very few
predictions of the examined models seem to be in line with our eye-gaze data, suggesting a
more complicated and still unsolved role of attention in the decoy effect.
In summary, our results suggest a fundamental role of the decoy in attracting and shaping
attention allocation which was not previously recorded. The decoy causally manipulates
the attention allocated by the decision maker on options in the choice set and this shifts in





The main goal of this study is to investigate the attentional processes that could play a role
in the decoy effect. In particular, we chose to examine the attraction effect which seems to
be one of the most robust preference reversals among the decoy effects, and simultaneously
record decision makers’ eye movements.
Participants in our experiment performed a series of trinary choices where they had to
decide between three lotteries in each trial: option A, option B and a decoy. Each option,
if chosen, would always give an amount of money with a certain probability p or nothing
with probability 1-p. During the all task, option A was the option with high money and low
probability attributes, and B was the low money and high probability option, whereas the
decoy could be either of type A in half of the trials or of type B in the second half of the
trials (see figure B.1a). Irrespectively of its type, the decoy was always a dominated option.
Namely, in half of the trials both attributes of the decoy were smaller than the attributes of
option A (condition 1, see Figure B.1a for an example), and in the other half of the trials
they were smaller than the attributes of option B (condition 2 in figure B.1a). Whenever the
decoy is of type A we refer to option A as the target option and option B as the competitor.
Vice-versa, when the decoy is of type B, option B is the target option and A the competitor.
Extensive evidence in economics and psychology (e.g., Huber, Payne, and Puto 1982; Shafir
1993; Soltani et al. 2012) highlight a causal role of this type of decoy in increasing the
choice probability for the target option. Thus, in this study we refer to the decoy effect (DE)
as the difference in probability between choosing the target and choosing the competitor.
It is worth mentioning that on the decision screen of the choice-task, participants in
our experiment were not shown the numbers and symbols as we displayed in figure B.1a.
They could only see the shapes and the colors representing the lottery options. This feature
of our design allowed us to have longer fixation durations and to minimize the attentional
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component that might come from memory, because it is much easier to remember the
number and letters than their graphic representation. However, we ensured that subjects
knew the meaning of the shapes and colors with two extensive training phases before we
started the main experiment (see Methods section for details)
Choice Behavior
As expected, we find a decoy effect in our experiment. More specifically, we observed
the predicted attraction effect, i.e., the target was chosen significantly more often than the
competitor (figure B.2a). The decoy effect seems also to be very robust across participants
(figure B.2b). The data also show that there is an overall tendency to choose option B – the
high money and low probability option – more often than option A. This is most likely due
to the fact that the expected value of option B (EV B) was always higher than the expected
value of option A (EV A). We designed the task in such a way to achieve approximate
indifference in choosing between option A and option B in the absence of any decoy. The
result shows that in fact we did not succeed in producing this indifference level between A
and B, however, we obtained a significant decoy effect on choice probability overall.
Furthermore, we show that contrary to what was stated in Frederick et al. 2014, the decoy
effect can be found without numeric representation of the options as in our experiment.
Eye-movements results
Because we measure subjects’ gazes with the eye-tracker, we can use patterns of visual-
fixations to provide a deeper mechanistic understanding of the decoy effect in the decision
makers decision process. Specifically, we want to study how visual-attention is influenced
by different decoys and how this in turns relates to choices and reaction time. There is a
growing body of evidence on the role of attention in decision making suggesting a prominent
role of attention on choice frequency. In particular, visually guided attention has been shown
to bias the decision process in favour of the alternative that is attended longer (Ashby et al.,
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2016; Cavanagh et al., 2014; Konovalov and Krajbich, 2016; Kovach et al., 2014; Krajbich
and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010; Lim et al., 2011; Schonberg et al., 2014; Shimojo et
al., 2003; Stewart et al., 2016; Towal et al., 2013; Vaidya and Fellows, 2015). Considering
that we observed in our data a bias in choice frequency towards the target, based on this
previous evidence we can expect a bias in attention towards this option. Thus, we investigate
whether the decoy not only leads to changes in choice frequency between A and B, but
whether it also drives changes to the allocation of attention between among the two options.
As expected, we find a significant bias in looking time towards option A or B depending
on whether the decoy is of type A or B, respectively. Namely, we register a decoy effect
at the fixation level, i.e., on average a positive fixation time difference between target and
competitor. Figure B.3 and table SB2 in the supplementary material show the proportion of
fixation time as a function of the decoy type.
Furthermore, we are interested in understanding how the resulting bias in fixation time
to the target relates to choice frequency. We find that the probability of choosing the target
can be predicted by the fixation time advantage to the target (beta = 1.6 and p-value < 2e-16,
see table SB1 model 2 and 3 in the supplementary material), and that one standard deviation
increase in the proportion of fixation time to option B produces a three times larger effect on
choice probability of option B than one standard deviation increase of value difference (EV
B – EV A, beta = 0.49, p-value < 5e-06) and the decoy type dummy (beta = 0.3, p-value =
0.052).
In addition to this strong effect of the fixation time bias on choice frequency, table SB1
in the supplementary material show that when controlling for proportion of fixation time
to option B and proportion of fixation time to the decoy, the direct effect of the decoy type
almost vanishes completely, suggesting that attention is able to account for the variability
in the choice probability. Further evidence for this hypothesis can be find in figure B.4a.
We see here that the decoy effect can be reversed for trials in which the fixation time bias
is reversed: in trials in which the competitor is attended longer than the target we find on
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average a higher choice probability for the competitor than the target (see figure B.4a).
The previous evidence suggests a fundamental role of visual-attention on the decoy
effect and also provides support for the view that attention might play more than a secondary
role on this type of preference reversals. However, if fixation time has an impact on choice
frequency, this should also hold at the level of individual trials, regardless of the decoy type.
Namely, in choice trials in which an option is systematically advantaged in terms of fixation
time, this option should have a higher probability of being chosen relative to the choice
trials in which an other option has an advantage in fixation time. Indeed, when splitting
trials depending on which option in the choice set is the longest attended option, we find
that independently of the decoy type trials in which option B has a fixation time advantage
have a higher choice probability in favor of option B compared to the trials in which A is
the longest attended option (figure B.4c). Moreover, this holds even when splitting trials by
which option is the last attended option, see results in figure B.4b.
After observing such a high impact of fixation time advantages on choice probability,
and more specifically on the probability of choosing the target, we examine the questions
of how and why the decoy makes the target the longest attended option in our task. One
possible hypothesis is that the decision maker is trying to first resolve the dominance
relation between target and decoy, and this attempt induces more fixations towards these
two options. When investigating eye-gaze transitions between options, we find that the
number of transitions between target and decoy is significantly higher than those between
competitor and decoy (figure B.5a and table SB3 in the supplementary material). Also,
the probability of transitioning from decoy to target conditional to looking at the decoy is
much larger than the probability of transitioning to the competitor (figure B.5b shows the
conditional probability of eye-graze transitions). This suggests that the decoy makes the
target the center of attention since most of eye-gaze transitions from and to the competitor
or the decoy go via the target which is indeed the longest attended option in the choice set.
Moreover, when analyzing the eye-gaze dynamics during trial time, we find that the time
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the decoy is attended significantly decreases when approaching a decision (figure B.6). This
provides further evidence to the hypothesis that decision makers in our experiment seem
to resolve the dominance relation first and then focus more on the target and competitor
options to make the choice.
According to some theory and empirical evidence on the relation between visual-
attention and subjective values (Krajbich et al. 2010; Krajbich and Rangel 2011), the
eye-gaze dynamics amplifies the evidence for the attended options during the decision
process. Specifically, the more a decision maker looks at an option the more likely she is to
choose that option, and this is in some cases independently of the value of the options. In
our experiment however, the decoy is attended on average 25% of the decision time, but
it is almost never chosen. Thus, what happens to the choice frequency when the decoy is
attended? Does the simply decoy drive more fixations to the target or does attending the
decoy have an impact on the choice frequency between target and competitor?
We investigate the probability of choosing the target as a function of the proportion of
fixation time to the decoy and find that this has an impact on the probability of choosing the
target. Namely, the decoy effect on choices significantly increases with the proportion of
fixation time to the decoy (figure B.7a and table SB1 model 2 and 3 in the supplementary
material), even when controlling for how long the target is attended (table SB1 model 2 and
3 in the supplementary material). We also find that both looking at the decoy and target are
related to the decoy effect at the individual level. Once the decoy is attended long enough,
the decoy effect on choices, i.e., the difference between the probability of choosing the
target and the probability of choosing the competitor, is highly correlated with the decoy
effect on fixations, i.e., the bias in fixation time to the target with respect to the competitor.
Figure B.7b shows the correlation between decoy effect on choices and decoy effect on
fixations for subjects split by median proportion of fixation time to the decoy. We find that
the proportion of fixation time to the decoy amplifies the impact of fixation time difference
between target and competitor on choice probabilities. This effect is also evident when
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running a mixed-effect regression model on the decoy effect on choices as a function of
proportion of fixation time to the decoy and proportion of fixation time difference between
target and competitor, i.e., decoy effect on fixations (see table SB4 in the supplementary
material).
Modelling attention
After analysing eye-movements and transition probabilities it seems reasonably clear that
attention plays an important role in the decoy effect. Thus, we turn to the literature and
investigate the models which incorporate attention in their framework. We ask whether
these models are in line with our data, and which are the most prominent and plausible
mechanisms through which attention operates to affect choices in the decoy effect (for a
detailed review of the models see Models summary in the supplementary material, Turner et
al. 2017 or Busemeyer et al. 2019).
The most prominent theories which make assumptions on attention are the following:
the multialternative decision field theory (MDFT; Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Hotaling
et al., 2010; Roe et al., 2001) model, the multiattribute leaky competing accumulator
(MLCA; Usher and McClelland, 2004) model, the associations and accumulation model
(AAM; Bhatia, 2013), the multialternative decision by sampling model (MDbS, Noguchi
and Stewart 2018), the mutual inhibition value-based attention capture (MIVAC, Gluth et al.
2018), and the attentional drift diffusion model (aDDM, Krajbich and Rangel 2011).
The MDFT and MLCA models have similar predictions on how attention should be
allocated among options’ attributes in the choice set. Even though, attention allocation does
not have a prominent role in explaining the decoy effect in these models, they predict that
the accumulation process is performed at the attribute level and this seems to be important
to explain other decoy effects like the similarity effect. The decision maker switches from
accumulating evidence for one attribute to accumulating evidence to the other attribute in a
race model fashion.
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Thus, if decisions are implemented following such mechanistic processes, we would
expect the decision makers to compare the options at the attribute level. Namely, if during
the decision the evidence is accumulated for each attribute separately, in each time step
the decision maker has to sample one attribute at the time, e.g., the money or probability
attribute, and look at that attribute across options to estimate the distance between them and
integrate it in the accumulation process. However, we find that in our experimental data
subjects significantly look more within than across options, thus performing more integration
type eye-gaze transitions than comparison type transitions. In other words, participants in
our task seem to sample information through eye-gaze in a way that suggests they integrate
the values of the attribute for each option instead of separately comparing the values of the
attributes among the options. Figure B.8 (see also table SB3 in the supplementary material
for the regression model) shows the mean number of transitions types, i.e., integration and
comparison transitions, for each subject in the experiment split by decoy type. Moreover,
we notice not only that the eye-gaze transition type does not depend on the decoy type, but
also the probability of attending one or the other attribute is not affected by the type of
decoy present in the choice set (figure B.9). This evidence suggests that in our experiment it
is unlikely that attention allocation could influence the choice frequency through a bias in
fixation time at the attribute level.
On a similar line as the MDFT and MLCA, the AAM model makes assumptions on
attention allocation at the attribute level. However, contrary to MDFT and MLCA this model
provides detailed predictions about the probability of attending a specific attribute which
depends on the value of the attended attribute and also on the values of the unattended ones.
In particular, it predicts that the probability of attending attribute i has to be proportional to
the overall value of all options in that attribute, and also negatively correlated to the sum of
values of options in the other attributes. For example, the probability of attending the money
attribute has to be proportional to the sum of money of all options and inversely proportional
to the sum of probabilities of all options. When investigating in our data for this prediction,
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we find that the probability of attending the money attribute is significantly anti-correlated
with the sum of all money and it is not significantly correlated with the sum of probabilities
contrary to what the model would predict (see Fig B.10).
Another model which make testable predictions on attention allocation is the MDbS.
This model predicts that similar options’ attributes are more likely to be attended, and that
the probability of attending the attribute of an option depends on the proximity to other
options’ attributes. In particular, the probability of attending attribute i of option A is
proportional to the sum of the exponential of the proximity of A to all other options in the
same attribute i, where the proximity to another option is defined as the negative relative
distance, i.e., relative difference, from that option in attribute i (see Models summary in
the supplementary material for more details). According to their definition, we calculated
the exponential of the proximities for all options and attributes in our data set, i.e., option
A, option B and decoy. We find that the probability of attending an option in an attribute
depends as expected on the proximities to other options, but contrary to what the theory
would predict, the sign of the relation between this probability and the proximities depends
on the type of option we consider. For example, figure B.11 shows that the probability of
attending the money attribute of option B depends positively on the proximity to the closest
option and negatively on the proximity to the farthest option, and, also, the probability of
attending the probability attribute of the decoy does not show a significant correlation with
the proximity to any other options. Also, the model predicts that similar options should be
attended more, thus resulting in a higher number of eye-gaze transitions between them. In
our experiment, this translates in a higher number of eye-gaze transitions between target
and decoy, which are the most similar options, compared to transitions between target and
competitor. We find, however, a significantly higher number of eye-gaze transitions between
target and competitor than transitions between target and decoy, suggesting that the two
options that are attended the longest are target and competitor, and not target and decoy as
the MDbS model would predict (see figure B.5 and B.6, and table SB3 in the supplementary
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material).
As described in details in the model summary section in the supplementary material,
also the MIVAC model, which is a leaky sequential sampling model with inhibition, makes
testable predictions about how attention allocation should influence choice frequency. First,
the model assumes that the probability of attending an option is proportional to its value
and, second, that attention gives a constant boost of evidence to the attended option, i.e., the
subjective value of an option is increased by a constant value every time the decision maker
is looking at it. In our data, however, we do not find the relation between the probability
of attending an option and its value with or without controlling for the decoy type (figure
B.12). Instead, the decoy seems to be the main source of attention manipulation in our
data independently of the values of the options (figure B.12b). This model also makes a
clear prediction on the interaction between the options’ values and fixation time on choice
frequency. The model assumes that during the evidence accumulation process attention
impacts the evidence giving a constant boost to the value of the attended option. Thus, it
clearly predicts that the higher the difference in values between the options the lower this
impact of the attention boost on choice frequency should be. However, we do not see such
negative interaction effect between options’ value difference and fixation time on choice
probability in our data (see table SB1 model 2 and 3 in the supplementary material).
Another sequential sampling model which makes predictions on the influence of attention
allocation on choice frequency is the aDDM. Contrary to most of the models previously
described, the aDDM does not make any assumption on the probability of attending an
option; in the aDDM attention is an exogenous variable that drives the evidence accumulation
process. In particular, the values of the non-attended options are discounted during the
evidence accumulation process by a factor between 0 and 1, and this results in two main
predictions on choice frequency. Firstly, the longer one option is attended the higher the
probability of being chosen and a fixation bias, ceteris paribus, should result in a choice bias.
Secondly, the model predicts an interaction effect between fixation time and the difference
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in the options’ values on choice frequency: the higher the value difference between two
options the lower the impact of fixation time on choice frequency. Also, the probability of
choosing an option should depend on the interaction between the options’ overall values
and fixation time: the higher the sum of option values the higher the impact of fixation time
on choice frequency. This follows from the assumption that the discount factor is multiplied
with the value of the non-attended option. As shows in the previous section, we clearly find
in our data that the probability of choosing an option increases with the fixation time to that
option which is in accordance with the first prediction of the model. However, we do not
see the predicted effects of the interaction between value difference and fixation time on
choice frequency, and the interaction of options’ values and fixation time (see table SB1
model 2 and 3 in the supplementary material). Also, the results displayed in figure B.7a,
which shows the influence of fixation time to the decoy on the probability of choosing the
target, cannot be explained with the standard form of the aDDM, suggesting that a more
complex dynamics of values, visual-attention allocation and reaction time are involved in
this type of decisions.
Overall our results suggest a more complicated and not fully understood effect of
attention allocation on the choice process in the decoy effect. From our analysis it is rule
out and isolate the determinants of the probability of attending the options in the choice
set nor to define the proper relation between attention, options’ values and decoys in this
specific preference reversal effect. However, it seems clear from our results that the decoy
its-self and not necessarily the values or the distance between options (see figure B.12b) is
the main driver of visual-attention allocation, namely the different type of decoy induces
the decision maker to allocate attention differently during the decision process, and this
attention allocation bias seems to have a strong impact on choices.
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B.4 Discussion
The decoy effect has been extensively investigated in economics and psychology for the
last 40 years (Tversky 1972, Huber and Puto 1982, Tversky and Simonson 1993). However,
the inner mechanisms driving this context-dependent effect are still unclear. Here, we
hypothesized that attention has a more fundamental role in the decoy effect than previously
recorded and we tested the hypothesis that the decoy effect changes the way attention is
allocated among the options and that changes in the allocation of attention influence in turns
choice frequency.
We recorded eye-gazes from individuals performing a trinary lottery choice-task which
was designed to induce an attraction effect, i.e., a decoy effect in which the decoy is never
chosen but attracts more choices for the target option. Indeed, we found that the different
decoys drove different allocations of attention to the options in the choice set. In particular,
the decoy not only attracted more choices to the target, but also increased the difference in
fixation time between target and competitor. Furthermore, the decoy effect on choices seems
to be highly correlated with the decoy effect on fixations, and we found that the decoy effect
on choices could be completely reversed for trials in which the competitor was the longest
attended option.
Adding more evidence to the hypothesis that visual-attention influences choice frequency
in our task, we also found an effect of looking time on the probability of choosing an option
that was independent of the decoy type. Namely, fixation time biases to option appeared to
have an effect on choice probability for both types of decoy.
When investigating how and why the decoy made the target to be the longest attended
option, we found evidence for the hypothesis that the decoy impacts the decision process by
making the target the center of attention. First, the decoy forces more eye-gaze transitions
from and to the target compared to the competitor. Second, the probability of transitioning
from decoy to target conditional on looking at the decoy is much larger than the probability
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of transitioning to the competitor, and the probability of transitioning from the competitor to
the target conditional on looking at the competitor is much larger than the probability of
transitioning to the decoy.
One hypothesis for this effect is that decision makers have to resolve the dominance
relation between target and decoy, and thus drives more eye-gaze transitions between target
and decoy compared to target and competitor. Also, the looking time of the decoy in a trial
significantly decreases in time, suggesting that once the dominance relation between target
and decoy has been resolved the decision maker does not need to look at the decoy anymore.
Thus far all the evidence points to an important role of the decoy in shifting the attention
allocation towards the target option making it the center of fixations and attracting more
choices to it. This evidence reminds us of theories of the decision process, such as the
aDDM, that attribute to attention allocation a causal role on choices. In other words, all
the evidence seems to point to the prediction that decision-makers choose options they
have looked at longer more often than would be predicted by their a priori options’ values.
However, we noticed that in fact the decoy option is attended on average 25% of the time.
Thus, we asked whether this time only influences how long the target is going to be attended
or whether this fixation time to the decoy has an impact on the decoy effect on choices. We
found that the decoy effect on choices in our data is significantly increased by the proportion
of fixation time to the decoy, even when controlling for looking time to the target. Hence,
only looking at the decoy increases the probability that the target is chosen. In the logic of
evidence accumulation processes, this means that when the subject looks at the decoy the
evidence for the target is enhanced rather than reduced relative to the competitor. Also, the
time spent looking at the target and the decoy are highly correlated at the individual level to
the decoy effect on choices.
We then decided to examine whether there exists a sequential sampling model that
incorporates attention in a way that can account for the type of behavioral and attentional
patterns we found in our data. For example, one might speculate whether a different version
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of the aDDM in which different attentional discount factors for the different options are at
work and could explain the observed effects. However, when testing the basic predictions
of the aDDM model in our data we do not find evidence for such decision processes.
Furthermore, even when testing the predictions of other sequential sampling models such
as MDFT, MLCA, AAM and MDbS, we do not find evidence supporting any of these
hypothesized decision processes in our data. Clearly, this data set is not sufficient to suggest
a new model or any type of modification to the tested models. However, the evidence
collected in this study undoubtedly points to a different type of mechanism relating visual-
attention allocation and choice frequency in the decoy effect. It appears that the values of
the options or the distances between options do not have such a clear and define role in
attracting attention and thus in influencing the decoy effect. Whereas the presence of the
decoy seems to be the main driver of attention allocation, and since it is the only aspect
of the decision that changes across conditions, could be seen as a causal manipulation of
visual-attention.
To conclude, three very interesting results have been recorded in this study about the
decoy effect. 1) The magnitude of the decoy effect on choices changes accordingly to shifts
in allocation of attentions to the target option and to the decoy its self. 2) The presence
of the decoy influences eye-gaze transitions making the target the center of attention in
the attraction effect. 3) None of the models in literature that incorporate attention in their
framework seems to match the pattern of visual-fixations and choice frequency we find
in our task. Thus, with this study and given the growing literature on the causal role of
attention in choice (Shimojo et al. 2013; Armel et al. 2008; Tavares et al. 2017), we
emphasize the need of investigating the mechanisms that, first, drive visual-attention and,





Forty-two healthy subjects participated in our experiment. Two of them were excluded
from the experiment because the eye-tracker failed to record their eye-movements. Subjects
received monetary compensation for their participation, were informed about all aspects
of the experiment and gave written informed consent. The experiments conformed to
the standards of the Declaration of Helsinki and the Human Subjects Committee of the
University of Zürich approved the experimental protocol.
Task
The experimental design was divided into three parts: two training phases and a decision
phase. During the first training phase, subjects were trained to learn how probabilities in the
decision task were represented (figure SB2b) through several trials – the number of trials
depended on the performance of each participant, from a minimum of 20 until the subject
performed 10 corrected probability estimations in a row. In each trial, a computer displayed
a colored pie-chart in the middle of the screen and box with a random percentage below
it. A fraction of this pie-chart was filled in blue and the remaining part in gray. The size
of the blue filled area in the pie-chart indicated a probability amount. In each training trial,
subjects had to report in the box the exact probability represented by the colour-filled area.
In the second training phase, subjects learned to estimate monetary amounts (figure SB2a)
through several trials – the number of trials depended on the performance of each participant,
from a minimum of 50 until the subject performed 10 corrected money estimations in a row.
In each trial, a computer displayed a colored rectangular shape in the middle of the screen
and box with a random amount of money below it. As before, a fraction of this rectangle
was blue and the remaining was filled in gray. The blue color indicated an amount of money
and subjects had to report the exact amount of money in the box below the rectangle. A
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completely blue filled rectangle represented 10 Swiss Francs and a completely gray filled
rectangle 0 Swiss Francs. The exact amount of money was equivalent to the proportion of
blue filled area of the rectangle times 100 CHF.
After the training sessions, subjects performed the choice task. During this decision
phase (figure B.1a), subjects had to make 136 decision trials between three lotteries: option
A, option B and a decoy. Option A was always low money and high probability and option
B always high money low probability, whereas the decoy was half of the trials of type option
A or option B. However, the decoy was always dominated by option A or option B in both
dimensions, money and probability. For example, the screen in figure 1 shows the following
decision trial. Participants have to choose between the option B on the left-hand side, i.e.,
95 CHF with 40% probability or nothing, option A on the right-hand side, i.e., 45 CHF with
80% probability or nothing, and the decoy in the middle down side of the screen, i.e., 40
CHF with 75% probability. In the example, the decoy is similar to option A and makes
option A the target and option B the competitor. The task is a within subject design, thus
participants faces the same option As and option Bs twice with different decoys, one similar
to A and one similar to B. The amounts of money in the experiment ranged from 5 CHF to
100 CHF and the probability from 10% to 90%. The decoy was always at a fixed distance
from target, i.e., always 5 CHF smaller in the money dimension and 10% smaller in the
probability dimension.
The subjects were incentivized for the experiment with real money. They were informed
that they would receive the average amount of money of all the 136 trials realized choices
that they made. Furthermore, subjects were instructed to treat each decision separately and
independently of the others.
All tasks were programmed in Matlab 2015b (Matworks), using the Psychophysics
Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007).
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Eye-tracking
Before each decision trial, subjects were required to fixate a white cross positioned in the
middle of the three options on a blank black screen for 2 s before the options would appear,
ensuring that subjects began every trial fixating on the same location. Subjects’ gaze was
recorded at 500 Hz with an EyeLink-1000 (http://www.sr-research.com/) eye tracker.
Choice trials with no gaze time on any option attribute were excluded from the analysis (2
trials, 0.035% of the pooled data from the 42 subjects).
Data analysis
We used the R package for statistical analysis of the behavioral results from the decision
task (lme4 extension) and model estimations. The eye-tracking data were processed using
the same procedures used in Krajbich et al., 2010 to analyze eye movements in a binary
choice task.
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Figure B.1: a) Trinary choice task. Two examples of choice screens where subjects had to
choose between a target, a competitor and a decoy options. In condition 1, the decoy was of
type A, i.e., low money high probability, whereas in condition 2 it was of type B, i.e., high
money low probability. In both conditions, the decoy was dominated either by option A
or option B in both attributes. You can see the relation between decoys and options in b)
where the options in the two conditions are displayed in money and probability dimensions.
Notice, in a) numbers, percentages and words are for illustration purposes, the participants




Figure B.2: a) Bar plot of the probability of choosing each option in the experiment split
by condition – i.e., decoy type A and decoy type B. Note that the probability of choosing
option A is significantly higher (see table SB1 in the supplementary material for the logistic
mixed-effect regression model) when the decoy is of type A compared to when the decoy
is type B, and viceversa, the probability of choosing option B is higher for trials of decoy
B than trails of decoy A. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. b) The decoy
effect displayed for each subject in the experiment. The decoy effect is defined as the
difference between the probability of choosing the target and the probability of choosing the





Figure B.3: a) Bar plot of the proportion of fixation time to each option in the experiment
split by condition – i.e., decoy type A and decoy type B. Note that the proportion of fixation
time to option A is significantly higher (see table SB3 in the supplementary material for the
mixed-effect regression model) when the decoy is of type A compared to when the decoy
is type B, and vice-versa, the proportion of fixation time to option B is higher for trials of
decoy B than trails of decoy A. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean. b) The
decoy effect on fixations displayed for each subject in the experiment. The decoy effect on
fixations is defined as the mean difference between proportion of fixation time to target and
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Figure B.4: a) Plot of the decoy effect on choices, i.e., the difference in probability between
choosing the target and choosing the competitor, as a function of the EV difference between
target and competitor, split by trials in which the target has a fixation time advantage (in
green) and trials in which the competitor has a fixation time advantage (in orange). b) Plot
of the mean probability of choosing option B as a function of the EV difference between
option B and option A, split by trials in which the option A is the last attended option during
the decision process (in green) and trials in which option B is the last attended option during
the decision process (in orange). c) Plot of the mean probability of choosing option B as a
function of the EV difference between option B and option A, split by trials in which the
option A has a fixation time advantage (in green) and trials in which option B has a fixation












Figure B.5: a) Box-plot of the mean proportion of eye-gaze transitions between options. In
blue the proportion of transitions between target and decoy, in yellow between competitor
and decoy and in grey between target and competitor. b) Graph of the probability of eye-gaze
transitions conditional on the fixating each option. Notice that the size of the circle for each
option (in green the target, in yellow the competitor and in red the decoy) is scaled with the































































Figure B.6: a) Plot of the mean proportion of fixation time to the decoy before at a fixation
number before the trial ends, i.e., in 0 the plot displays the mean proportion of fixation
time to the decoy in the whole trial, and for instance, in fixation number 10 it displays the
remaining mean proportion of fixation time to the decoy after 10 fixations. b) Plot of the
mean proportion of fixation time to each option (target in green, competitor in yellow and
decoy in red) in windows of fixation numbers before the end of a trial. For example, in 3 – 0
the plot displays the mean proportion of fixation time for each option in the last 3 fixations
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Figure B.7: a) Plot of the decoy effect on choices as a function of the EV difference between
target and competitor, split by trials in which the Decoy is attended below median percentage
of the decision time (in green) and trials in which the Decoy is attended above median
percentage of the decision time (in light blue). b) Scatterplot of the decoy effect on choices
as a function of the difference in proportion of fixation time between target and competitor,
split by trials in which the Decoy is attended below median percentage of the decision
time (plot on the left-hand side) and trials in which the Decoy is attended above median
percentage of the decision time (plot on the right-hand side). Note each point is a subject.
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Figure B.8: Scatterplot of the mean number of gaze transitions within options (i.e., integra-
tion type of gaze) and across options (i.e., comparison type of gaze), splitting trials by decoy
type. Each point is a subject and the plot displays median, quantiles and outliers.
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Figure B.9: Mixed-effect logistic regression model with random effects for subject-specific
and trial-specific constants and slopes of the probability of attending the money attribute as
a function of the a dummy variable for the decoy type (baseline Decoy Type = A), the sum
of all money in each trial (OV money = Money A + Money B + Money Decoy) and the sum
of probabilities in each trial (OV probability = Probability A + Probability B + Probability
Decoy). Note, the interactions are not displayed in the plots but have been included in the
regressions.
Figure B.10: Mixed-effect logistic regression model with random effects for subject-specific
and trial-specific constants and slopes of the probability of attending the money attribute
as a function of the overall values in money and probabilities– i.e., the sum of all the
money values and the sum of all probability values (OV money = Money A + Money B +
Money Decoy and OV probability = Probability A + Probability B + Probability Decoy,




































































































Figure B.11: a) Mixed-effect logistic regression model with random effects for subject-
specific and trial-specific constants and slopes of the probability of attending the money
attribute of option A, B and D, as a function of the distances (see Model summary for the
definition of distance and proximity) from others (A,B,D) in the money attribute. b) Mixed-
effect logistic regression model with random effects for subject-specific and trial-specific
constants and slopes of the probability of attending the probability attribute of option A, B
and D, as a function of the distances (see Model summary in the supplementary material for




Figure B.12: a) Mixed-effect logistic regression model with random effects for subject-
specific and trial-specific constants and slopes of the probability of attending option B as a
function of the expected value of B and the normalized distance from A. b) Mixed-effect
logistic regression model with random effects for subject-specific and trial-specific constants
and slopes of the probability of attending option B as a function of the expected value
of B and the normalized distance from A. Note, similar results hold when analysing the
probability of attending option A or the probability of attending the decoy. Also note, the




Multialternative decision theory (MDFT) and multiattribute leaky competing accu-
mulators (MLCA)
The MDFT (Hotaling et al., 2010; Roe et al., 2001) and the MLCA models are both sequen-
tial sampling type of models, i.e., they assume that decisions are made by accumulating
evaluations (or evidence) until a threshold is reached, at which point the choice is made.
Both models do not assume a prominent role of attention in the attraction effect which is
instead explained by a distance-dependent lateral inhibition in the MDFT and by an asym-
metric value function that accounts for loss aversion in the MLCA. However, other decoy
effects like the similarity effect are explained by attention mechanisms in the models. Thus,
we review the attentional aspect of the models and investigate possible testable predictions
about attention which are independent of the decoy effect under consideration, so that we
can test them in our data. Both models can be formalized as follows.







where Ai(t) is evidence accumulated at time t for option i in the activated attribute, λ is the
neural decay constant, β is the global inhibition parameter, E(t) corresponds to a normally
distributed noise term, and Ii(t) is the input value which depends on the distance between
options in the activated attributes. The input value function can be written as
Ii(t) = ∑
j �=i
V (di j), (SB2)
where V is the value function and di j is the distance between option i and j in the activated
attribute. The evidence is accumulated in one specific attribute, i.e., one attribute is activated,
129
whenever that attribute is attended, then the input function Ii for each option i is calculated
as a function of the distance between options in that specific attribute. Thus, the models
assume that a comparison process between options in each attribute is performed and each
attribute has some probability of being selected at each time step.
Associations and accumulation of preferences model (AAM)
The associations and accumulation model (AAM) uses a connections network model of
the decision process, which assumes an association between choice task and attribute
accessibility within a stochastic sequential-sampling accumulation framework. This model
assumes that the associative connection between an option and an attribute is proportional
to the presence of the attribute in the option. In particular, an option is strongly associated
with an attribute if the option has a large amount of the attribute. Namely, in this model it is
assumed that the associative connection between an alternative and an attribute is equal to
the amount of the attribute in the alternative.
In mathematical terms, the accessibility of an attribute i, at any time period depends on
the value of the attribute of all the options in the choice set.
ai = a0 +∑
X
sxV Xi, (SB3)
where sx is the positive activation given to available and salient options, V Xi is the value (or
association value) of option X in attribute i and a0 is the constant activation identical to all
attributes that serves to moderate the strength of the proposed associative biases.
The probability of the attribute being attended to is determined by the attribute’s accessi-
bility. This can be written as
P(Attending attributei) =
ai
∑ j a j
. (SB4)
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If an attribute i is sampled at any time t, the preference state for option X at time t can be
written
PX(t +1) = dPX(t)+Ui(X)+ ε(t), (SB5)
where Ui(X) is the value function that takes as an input V Xi – i.e., the value of the attribute i
of option X. A decision is made when the preference crosses a threshold.
Multiaternative Decision by Sampling (MDbS) model
In the MDbS model, evidence is accumulated from a series of ordinal comparisons of pairs
of attribute values. For example, in evaluating the price of Car A, no matter the source of
the comparison attribute, if the price of Car A is preferable in the pairwise comparison, one
unit of evidence is accumulated toward deciding on Car A. This pairwise comparison is
considered ordinal, in the sense that evidence is increased one single unit amount regardless
of how large the difference is.
The MDbS model is guided by three main constraints. First, the existing literature shows
that, in multialternative decision, people’s attention fluctuates between pairs of alternatives
on single attributes at one time. The second constraint is that more similar alternatives
receive more attention. Thus, in the MDbS model, more similar alternatives are more likely
to be selected for comparison. Third, the distribution of time taken to make a decision
(response time) is generally positively skewed and, toward the end of a decision, the decision
makers attend more to the alternative which they are going to choose (the gaze cascade
effect).
In MDbS, the probability of evaluating the value of option A on attribute i is proportional









In the MDbS model, the rate at which the evidence in favor of alternative A is accumu-
lated depends on the probability of option A is evaluated in attribute i and the probability
that Ai wins the comparison with other alternatives in attribute i. Thus,
P(Evidence accumulated towardsA) = (SB7)
∑
i∈D





P(Ai is compared against Xi)P(Ai is favored against Xi).
Hence, the MDbS predicts that the probability of attending one attribute of one option
inversely depends on the distances from other options in the same attribute. Also, the
model predicts that more similar options are attended more often, meaning more transitions
between similar options than non-similar options. Concerning the attraction effect, this
should translate in more transitions Target-Decoy than Target-Competitor.
Mutual Inhibition value-based attention capture (MIVAC) model
In re-analyising data from Chau et al. 2014, they found more evidence for the hypothesis
that options seem to capture attention proportional to their value. The MIVAC is an another
example of sequential sampling model with leakage and inhibition terms.
Contrary to the MDFT or the LCA, the input function does not depend on the distance
between option in one specific attribute, but it is dependent on the integrated values of the
options. The extra feature of this model is the probability of attending an option which gives
a constant boost to the accumulator of the attended option. Formally,
At+1 = SAt + It +Et , (SB8)
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Where S represents an n by n leakage and inhibition matrix, It represents an n by t input






where α is a free parameter and nEv(i) is the normalized expected value of option i -
normalization was used to avoid that value-based attentional capture effects depend too
much on the sum of all values. Every time step an option (A for example) is attended the
input to the accumulator for that option is
IA,t = EV (A)+β , (SB10)
and when A is not attended the input reads
IA,t = EV (A), (SB11)
where β is a free parameter representing the attention-based enhancement of accumulation.
However, this model cannot account for the attraction effect in this setting. To explain the
attraction you need to make the input to the accumulator as a function of comparisons of
one option with all the other options.
The multialternative attentional drift diffusion model (MaDDM)
The MaDDM is another example of sequential sampling model without leaky integration
or inhibition term. The key feature of this model is that the evidence accumulated depends
on each time step on the attended option and the subjective value of the unattended options
are discounted by a factor which underweight their value. The model can be formalized as
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follows.
Ai(t +1) = Ai(t)+dIi(t)+E(t), (SB12)
where Ai(t) is evidence accumulated at time t for option i, d is the constant speed of
accumulation and Et corresponds to a normally distributed noise term. The input function
for this model can be written as
Ii(t) = θiVi, (SB13)
where Vi is the subjective value of option i and θi is equal 1 when option i is attended and
equal to a constant between 0 and 1 when option i is not attended.
The model does not make any predictions in term of probability of attending one or the
other option, but the eye-gaze data must be given exogenously to the model.
Pairwise Attribute Normalization
Pairwise Attribute Normalization (Landry and Webb, 2017) explains context-dependent
effects with a model that makes two assumptions. First, information is normalized within
each attribute dimension, and, second, normalization is pairwise in the sense that each pair
of alternatives is compared separately within each attribute dimension. The model is the
following.
"Our model considers a consumer who faces a finite choice set, X. Each alternative
x ∈ X is defined with respect to n > 0 attributes, where xi ≥ 0 is the unnormalized input value
for alternative x on attribute i ≥ n. Letting Cx ∈ X/{x} denote the set of all alternatives in
X besides x, the consumer’s overall valuation of x ∈ X is then given by the pairwise attribute









We use (SB14) as the basis of our descriptive choice model in that the consumer is presumed
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to choose x ∈ X if v(x;Cx) > v(y;Cy) for all y ∈ Cx. More generally, we will say that x is
"preferred" to y given X if v(x;Cx)> v(y;Cy)"
Thus, this model makes one simple testable prediction. Fixing the normalized value
difference, increasing or decreasing the absolute value of the options’ attributes should
not have an effect on choices. We check this prediction in our data. We first calculate the
normalized value difference v(x;Cx)− v(y;Cy) for both attributes as follows.














Finally, we define the overall value in the money attribute and the overall value in the
probability attribute as follows
OVm =VAm +V Bm +V Dm
OVp =VAp +V Bp +V Dp
Figure SB1 shows the logistic regression model of the probability of choosing option B as a
function of the normalized values calculated as above. We can notice that the overall value,
i.e., the sum of all options’ money, has an impact on choice frequency which goes against
pairwise normalization theory. Moreover, if the pairwise Attribute Normalization would be
able to explain the decoy effect, then the normalized value differences of the two attributes
should be able to explain all the variability in the decoy effect. Figure SB1b shows an effect
of the decoy type dummy on the probability of choosing option B.
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B.7.2 Figures and Tables
(a)
(b)
Figure SB1: a) Mixed-effect logistic regression model with random effects for subject-
specific and trial-specific constants and slopes of the probability of choosing option B as
a function of the normalized value difference in money (VD mon norm), the normalized
value difference in probabilities (VD prob norm), the overall value in money and probability
(OV mon and OV prob, respectively). b) Mixed-effect logistic regression model with
random effects for subject-specific and trial-specific constants and slopes of the probability
of choosing option B as a function of the normalized value difference in money (VD mon
norm), the normalized value difference in probabilities (VD prob norm), and a dummy
variable of decoy type B (baseline = decoy type A). Note, the interactions are not displayed




Figure SB2: Training phase. (a) Probability training phase. Subjects had to specify the
probability represented by the colour-filled area of the pie-chart. (b) Money training phase.






Constant 0.489 0.738∗ 0.641 .
(0.342) (0.329) (0.378)
Decoy Type B 0.491∗∗∗ 0.292 .
(0.104) (0.150)
EvB-EvA 0.454∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.074) (0.105)
OV 0.154 0.117 0.295 .
(0.126) (0.118) (0.154)
% Fix Opt B 1.513∗∗∗ 1.606∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.155)
% Fix Decoy 0.579∗∗∗ 0.393∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.103)
Decoy Type B × EvB-EvA 0.031 −0.090
(0.101) (0.130)
Decoy Type B × OV −0.267∗∗ −0.340∗
(0.096) (0.133)
Decoy Type B × % Fix Opt B −0.022
(0.177)
Decoy Type B × % Fix Decoy 0.345∗
(0.156)
% Fix Opt B × EvB-EvA 0.230∗ 0.330∗∗
(0.090) (0.126)
% Fix Opt B × OV −0.212∗ −0.092
(0.091) (0.136)




% Fix Decoy × OV −0.061 −0.016
(0.073) (0.110)
Decoy Type B × % Fix Opt B × EvB-EvA −0.162
(0.185)
Decoy Type B × % Fix Opt B × OV −0.221
(0.196)
Decoy Type B × % Fix Opt Decoy × EvB-EvA −0.088
(0.145)
Decoy Type B × % Fix Opt Decoy × OV −0.025
(0.143)
Log Likelihood −2,570 −2,136 −2,070
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,194 4,379 4,518
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 5,373 4,737 5,770
Pseudo-R2 0.32 0.44 0.46
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SB1: Three logistic mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the probability of choosing option B. Dependent variable equals 1
if option B is chosen and 0 otherwise. (1) The regressors for model 1 are the following: a
dummy variable for decoy type B (baseline decoy type A), expected value difference Ev B –
Ev A, overall value (OV = Ev B + Ev A), and all possible interactions. (2) The regressors
for model 2 are the following: expected value difference Ev B – Ev A, overall value (OV =
Ev B + Ev A), proportion of fixation time to option B (% Fix Opt B), proportion of fixation
to the decoy (% Fix Decoy) and all possible interactions. (3) Model 3 combines all the
regressors of model 1 and 2 plus all possible interactions.




Proportion of Fix Time option A Proportion of Fix Time option B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.395∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Decoy Type B −0.028∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.017∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
EvB-EvA −0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003)








Decoy Type B × EvB 0.002
(0.004)
Observations 5,407 5,407 5,423 5,423
Log Likelihood 3,282.720 3,291.892 3,306.167 3,311.372
Akaike Inf. Crit. −6,535.439 −6,553.785 −6,582.335 −6,592.744
Bayesian Inf. Crit. −6,436.508 −6,454.853 −6,483.359 −6,493.768
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SB2: Three linear mixed-effects regressions with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the proportion of fixation time to option A - models (1) and (2) - and
of the proportion of fixation time to option B - models (3) and (4). The regressors of models
(1) and (3) are the following: a dummy variable for decoy type B (baseline decoy type A),
the expected value difference Ev B – Ev A, and their interactions. The regressors of models
(2) and (4) are the following: a dummy variable for decoy type B (baseline decoy type A),
the expected value of option A (EvA) or the expected value of option B in model (1) or (3)
respectively, and their interactions.
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Dependent variable:
Count of Number of transitions
Constant in Baseline
i.e., Type Transition: TARGET - DECOY 0.983∗∗∗
(0.051)
Type Transition:
COMPETITOR - DECOY −0.524∗∗∗
(0.040)
Type Transition:




| EV target - EV competitor | baseline 0.053
(0.051)
Type Transition:
COMPETITOR - DECOY × OV −0.025
(0.026)
Type Transition:
TARGET - COMPETITOR × OV 0.033
(0.026)
Type Transition:
COMPETITOR - DECOY × | EV target - EV competitor | −0.038
(0.045)
Type Transition:
TARGET - COMPETITOR × | EV target - EV competitor | −0.091
(0.061)
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SB3: A poisson mixed-effects regression with random effects for subject-specific
constants and slopes of the count of number of transitions’ gazes from one option to the
other per trials. The regressors of the model are the following: a categorical variable for the
type of transition (the baseline is transition type TARGET-DECOY) which is 0 if the count is
for transitions from target to decoy or vice-versa, it is 1 for the count of transitions between
competitor and decoy (transition type COMPETITOR-DECOY) and it is 2 for the count of
transitions between target and competitor (transition type TARGET-COMPETITOR); the
overall value (OV = EV target + EV competitor), the distance in expected value between






% Fix Target - % Fix Competitor 0.073∗∗∗
(0.018)
% Fix Decoy −0.020
(0.014)
(% Fix Target - % Fix Competitor) × % Fix Decoy 0.037∗∗∗
(0.008)
Note: . p<0.1; ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Table SB4: Linear regression model on the mean decoy effect, i.e., difference in probabil-
ities between choosing the target and choosing the competitor, as a function of the mean
proportion of fixation time difference between target and competitor (% Fix Target - % Fix
Competitor), the mean proportion of fixation time to the decoy (% Fix Decoy) and their
interactions.
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Appendix C: Study 3
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Simple method to fit hierarchical Bayesian piecewise time-constant drift diffusion
models.
Gaia Lombardi and Todd Hare
University of Zürich
Department of Economics
Zürich Center for Neuroeconomics (ZNE)
C.1 Abstract
Noisy accumulation of evidence to a decision bound has been widely used in psychology
and neuroscience to model decision-making process for value-based and perceptual deci-
sions - e.g. drift diffusion model (DDM), race models. For mainly simplicity reasons in
computational setups, most of the models in literature have assumed a time-constant drift
rate (i.e. constant speed of the accumulation of the evidence in time) as the standard DDM
or the leaky competing accumulator model (LCA). Additionally, the rise of hierarchical
Bayesian estimation methodologies have further penalised the use of time-varying drift rate
models as they require an analytical solution for the model which is not always possible to
mathematically derive. Even though there are attempts to approximate the analytical solu-
tion for some type of time-varying drift rate DDMs, it is theoretically and computationally
challenging to estimate and implement such formulations.
Here, we developed a theoretically and practically simple method to estimate drift
diffusion models for which the drift rate is piecewise time-constant. Not only our method is
very practical to implement and estimate, further it allows the use of pre-existing hierarchical
Bayesian methodologies already developed for the standard DDM. To demonstrate the
efficacy and the benefit of this method, we apply it to two practical examples, the attentional
drift diffusion model (aDDM) and the time-varying sequential sampling (tSSM). We derive
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the mathematical formulations of the method for these two examples, and we apply them
to simulated and real data sets. Our results show that the method allows us to quickly
and accurately recover parameters from simulations and fit real data set in a hierarchical
Bayesian fashion.
C.2 Introduction
Noisy accumulation of evidence to a decision bound has proven to be an important and
highly influential concept within models of value-based and perceptual decisions in the
social and biological sciences. This process is at the core of widely used sequential sampling
models such as the drift diffusion model (DDM; Ratcliff, 1978; Smith and Ratcliff 2004;
Ratcliff et al. 2001; White et al. 2010), decision field theory (MDFT; Hotaling et al., 2010;
Roe et al., 2001), the leaky competing accumulators model (LCA; Usher and McClelland,
2004), the association and accumulation model (AAM; Bathia 2013), the linear ballistic
accumulator (LBA; Brown and Heathcote, 2008), and several. To date, most examples of
this class of model that have been fit to empirical data have assumed a constant evidence
accumulation or drift rate throughout the choice process (e.g. the standard DDM or the LCA).
One important reason for maintaining this assumption has been the practical considerations
relating to the computational complexity and time required to fit models that relax this
assumption. The rise of hierarchical Bayesian estimation methodologies (Vandekerckhove,
Tuerlinckx, and Lee, 2011; Wiecki, Sofer, and Frank 2013; Wabersich and Vandekerckhove
2014) may have further dissuaded researchers from using time-varying drift rate models
because Bayesian estimation using popular Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods
generally require an analytical solution for equations within the model in order to generate
the posterior distribution. Bayesian data analytic methods have at least two benefits for the
decision sciences. First, Bayesian methods allow inference on the entire distribution of the
parameters rather than just the most likely estimate as in methodologies based on maximum
likelihood (MLE). These full distributions of parameters are useful because they provide
145
a measure of the uncertainty in the parameters’ values. Second, hierarchical structures
are efficiently embedded in the Bayesian frameworks. Standard modelling methodologies
(Myung 2003; Turner and Sederberg 2012; Turner and Sederberg 2014) have either to
assume complete independence in the data structure (i.e., as in single-subject MLE) or
complete pooling (i.e., fitting averaged data and implicitly assuming that all participants
are identical), whereas hierarchical Bayesian modelling implements a compromise between
the two strategies allowing group and subject parameters to be estimated simultaneously
at different hierarchical levels, and thus also providing robust estimates of a model’s free
parameters without ignoring or over-weighting individual differences. Namely, they can
allow for the more complete theoretical explanation of data from a single task, letting
different people use different cognitive processes, or letting the same people use different
processes at different times. However, as mentioned above, efficiently generating the poste-
rior distribution of the parameters in hierarchical Bayesian methods requires an analytical
solution for equations within the model framework. Analytical solutions are not always
possible to mathematically derive for models with time-varying evidence accumulation (i.e.
drift) rates. Although there are attempts to approximate the analytical solution for some
types of time-varying drift rate DDMs (Srivastavaa et al. 2015), it often remains theoretically
and computationally challenging to estimate and implement such formulations. Despite the
added complexity of their estimation, time-varying drift rate models are important because
there are many types of decision strategies and mechanisms that cannot be modeled with a
fixed drift rate. In fact, there are several notable examples in literature in which sequential
sampling models have a time-varying drift rate, such as the attentional drift diffusion model
(aDDM; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010), the relative-starting-time drift
diffusion model (stDDM, in preparation), the dual-stage two-phase (DSTP) model (Hubneret
al. 2010), the piecewise linear ballistic accumulator (pLBA; Trueblood and Holmes 2016;
Holmes and Trueblood 2018) and others. Critically, all of the models listed above share
the fact that they do not have completely time-dependent drift rates in the sense of a linear
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or quadratic relation to time. Instead the drift rate is time-constant in fixed or alternating
intervals, i.e. it is piecewise time-constant, in all of these models. Diffusion models with
piecewise time-constant drift rates (pcDDM) can be approximated with a standard drift
diffusion model (DDM) for which the drift rate is constant in time. Here, we show how
a simple, yet powerful, piecewise constant approximation method allows for the use of
existing hierarchical Bayesian estimation tools that were developed for the standard DDM to
approximate the time-varying drift rate of pcDDMs. The advantage of using well-establish
standard DDM methodologies can be found in the faster speed of estimation and in the
simplicity of implementation when comparing to other methods such as the martingales
method (Srivastavaa et al. 2015) or the probability density approximation (PDA) method
(Turner and Sederberg 2014; Holmes 2016; Holmes and Trueblood 2018).
In this paper, we illustrate how to transform a pcDDM into a standard DDM with a
fully time-constant drift rate. We will show that a piecewise time-constant drift rate can
be expressed as a constant drift that is a function of the first passage time - i.e reaction
time - and the times for each constant interval. We explain in detail how to derive the drift
rate function from a discrete version of the pcDDM - i.e. bounded accumulation series
model or Euler method - that is a numerical approximation of the continuous version - i.e.
stochastic differential equation (SDE) process. Then, we demonstrate how to substitute
the constant drift rate of the continuous DDM with this derived drift function in order to
obtain a pcDDM in a continuous formulation that can be solved as a standard DDM. We
also walk through two concrete examples of how to apply this methodology. We derive
the piecewise time-constant drift for the aDDM and for the stDDM, and implement these
drifts in a hierarchical Bayesian DDM implemented in R and Jags. We then show the
recovery fitting analysis of the two models to demonstrate that 1) we correctly recover the
time-varying parameters through this reparameterization of the standard DDM, and 2) that
the other DDM parameters are not affected by the inclusion of these extra parameters for
the drift rate. Lastly, we will fit pcDDM models using the methods we’ve outlined to two
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experimental data sets, and show goodness of fit measures for the experimental reaction
time and choice distributions.
C.3 Results
We first introduce two different formulations of the standard DDM, the continuous version
and the discrete approximation of the continuous version - i.e. Euler method. We show how
it is possible to derive a closed-form solution for the Euler method in the DDM and apply
the same procedure to the pcDDM. From this closed-form solution is possible to derive the
piece-wise time-constant drift rate of the pcDDM and express it as a function of the reaction
time and the interval’s times, to obtain a constant drift rate similar to the one of the DDM.
We show this procedure in general terms and then we apply it to two example models, the
aDDM and stDDM.
Standard drift diffusion model (DDM)
A standard drift diffusion model is commonly expressed in two different forms in the
literature: 1) as a stochastic differential equation (SDE), or 2) as a bounded accumulation
series model. The first form of the model makes use of stochastic accumulation in a
continuous time framework - i.e. SDE, whereas the latter formalises the accumulation
process as a discrete bounded accumulation series which is a numerical approximation - i.e.
Euler method - of the SDE form of the model. The two formulations can be expressed as
following.
dx(t) = µ dt +σ dW (t) x(0) = x0,
τ = inf{t > 0|x(t) /∈ (−B,B)}
(C.1)
xti = xti−1 +µ(ti − ti−1)+ εti xt0 = x0,
τ = tN = min{ti,∀i ∈ N| |xti | ≥ B}
(C.2)
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where x(t) ( xti) is the evidence accumulated at time t (ti), τ the first passage time (or reaction
time) when the evidence crosses a certain threshold B, µ is the drift rate or speed of the
accumulation process, σ is the diffusion rate or standard deviation of the brownian motion,
x0 is the initial bias and εt ∼ N(0,σ
2).
In equation C.1, the evidence x(t) evolves in time according to a biased random walk
with Gaussian increments, i.e. dx(t)∼ N(µ dt,σ2 dt), and the analytical solution for the
distribution of the reaction time τ can be easily derived when drift rate µ and diffusion
rate σ are constant in time (see Navarro and Fuss, 2009, Fast and accurate calculations for
first-passage times in Wiener diffusion models).
Concerning the second formulation of the DDM, equation C.2, the decision variable is
modelled as a discrete stochastic evolution towards one or the other decision threshold -B or
B. Although this formulation of the model is mostly used to generate simulations for the
evidence accumulation process and response times, equation C.2 has a closed-form solution
that can be derived by simply solving the series recursively until the first passage time τ .
We will derive the closed-form solution in details for equation C.2 in the next paragraph.
Closed-form solution of the bounded accumulation series
Let us assume for simplicity that the time step is equal to 1 - i.e. ti − ti−1 = 1. If the
first passage time step N is known, then the bounded accumulation series can be solved
recursively for each time step from N to 0, and a closed solution for C.2 can be derived as
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follows.
xtN = xtN−1+µ + εtN
xtN−1 = xtN−2 +µ + εtN−1
xtN−2 = xtN−3 +µ + εtN−2
...
xtN = xtN−2+µ + εtN−1 +µ + εtN












Further, we can resolve the first sum and divide both sides of the equation by a positive




























xti , ∀i∈N and τ = tN =min{ti,∀i ∈ N| |xti | ≥ B}=min
{





We showed that knowing the first passage time, N, we can derive the closed-form
solution for the discrete series of the DDM. We will show in the next section how this so-
lution changes when the drift rate µ is not constant in time, but is instead piece-wise constant.
General piece-wise time-constant DDM (pcDDM)
As noted in the introduction section of the paper, some of the most prominent time-varying
DDMs found in literature, e.g. the aDDM, do not have fully time-dependent drift rates, but
rather have drift rates that are constant over discrete intervals. The continuous SDE of such
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a model (pcDDM) can be written as follows.
dx(t) = µ(t) dt +σ dW (t) x(0) = x0,
µ(t) = µi, for ti ≤ t < ti+1
τ = inf{t > 0|x(t) /∈ (−B,B)}
(C.5)
and the corresponding numerical approximation - i.e bounded accumulation series formula-
tion, is
xti = xti−1 +µti(ti − ti−1)+ εti xt0 = x0,
µti = µ j, for s j ≤ ti < s j+1
τ = tN = min{ti,∀i ∈ N| |xti | ≥ B}
(C.6)
where s j is jth time step for which µs j �= µs j+1 , and µti = µti+k = µ j for ti, ti+k ∈ [s j,s j+1),
∀ j ∈ N, ∀k ∈ N.
The intuition behind our method for fitting such pcDDMs is to combine the piece-wise
constant drift rates, µs1 : µsn , into a single constant drift rate, µave, that is equal to the
weighted average of µs1 : µsn as in equation C.4. We can then use this µave for estimating
the analytical solution of the continuous pcDDM in equation C.5. Thus, we derive the
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closed-form solution for equation C.6 as we did in C.3 for the pcDDM, as follows.
xtN = xtN−1+µtN + εtN
xtN−1 = xtN−2 +µtN−1 + εtN−1
xtN−2 = xtN−3 +µtN−2 + εtN−2
...
xtN = xtN−2+µtN−1 + εtN−1 +µtN + εtN












where we can write the sum of the drift rates as a function of the time intervals in which the








(s j+1 − s j)µ j (C.8)
where n−1 is the number of times the drift rate changes, and it is constant (i.e. µti = µ j) in
ti ∈ [s j,s j+1). Thus, we can divide both sides of the equation by the first passage time step




































j=1(s j+1 − s j)µ j for µ j ∈ R is constant in [s j,s j+1). Then, if the first passage
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time is known, the continuous form of the pcDDM can be written as








τ = inf{t > 0|x(t) /∈ (−B,B)}
(C.10)
where µ is a function of first passage time τ , the number of intervals n and their duration
ti+1 − ti.
In the next section, we will show the drift rate formula µ for two specific examples of
pcDDM, the aDDM and the stDDM.
aDDM
The aDDM model is an example of a modified version of a standard DDM for which the
drift rate varies in time. The basic idea of the model is that the drift rate changes every
time the decision maker visually fixates one option or another, assuming there are only two
options in the choice set. The discrete bounded accumulation series of the aDDM writes







δ (VA −θVB) if option A is attended at time ti
δ (θVA −VB) if option B is attended at time ti
τ = tN = min{ti,∀i ∈ N| |xti | ≥ B},
(C.11)
where θ is the discount factor that penalises the value of the unattended option, δ is the drift
constant parameter and VA and VB are the values of option A and B, respectively. The series
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As for the generalised pcDDM in C.9, we can resolve the first sum and divide both side of



































xti , ∀i∈N and τ = tN =min{ti,∀i ∈ N| |xti | ≥ B}=min
{







































where NA is the number of time steps for which option A is attended and NB is the number of
time steps for which option B is attended. Finally, we can use the derived constant drift rate
µ for the continuous formulation of the aDDM and rewrite the model as a standard DDM.








τ = inf{t > 0|x(t) /∈ (−B,B)}
(C.15)
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where τA and τB are the total fixation times to option A and option B, respectively.
stDDM
The relative-starting-time DDM (stDDM) is another example of a piece-wise constant DDM
for multi-attribute choices. This formulation of the DDM includes a relative-starting-time
parameter that allows for one attribute to begin being considered before another. Other than
that additional parameter, the model is a basic drift diffusion model, in which the drift rate
depends on the weighted value differences of two attributes. This model can be used for
different types of options that have two or more attributes, for example lotteries with money
and probabilities or food items with healthiness and tastiness attributes. The key idea of the
model is that one of the two attributes might have some delay in entering the accumulation
process relative to the other. For instance, a decision maker that has to choose between a
salad and a chocolate cake might immediately think about the delicious taste of the cake
compared to the salad, and only after some milliseconds start to consider the fact that the
chocolate cake would be a far less healthy option.
The discrete bounded accumulation series of the stDDM can be formulated as follows.
xti = xti−1 +µti + εti













wT VDT if s > 0 ∧ 0 < i < s
wHVDH if s < 0 ∧ 0 < i < |s|
wHVDH +wT VDT if i > |s|
(C.16)
where wT is the weight given to the taste attribute, wH the weight to the health attribute,
VDT and VDH are the value differences in taste and in health respectively, s is the time step
at which the health attribute comes into the accumulation process - s > 0 means taste is on
from the beginning and health comes in at time ts, s < 0 means that the health attribute is on
the accumulation process from the beginning and taste comes in at time t|s|.
155



















i=1 wT VDT +∑
N





i=|s|+1 (wHVDH +wT VDT ) if s < 0
∑
N
i=1 wT VDT if s > 0 ∧ s > N
∑
N
i=1 wHVDH if s < 0 ∧ |s|> N
(C.17)
As in the previous sections, we can divide both side of the equation by a positive constant





















































































(wHVDH +wT VDT ) if s < 0 ∧ |s|< N
wT VDT if s > 0 ∧ s > N
wHVDH if s < 0 ∧ |s|> N
(C.19)
Finally, we can use the derived constant drift rate µ for the continuous formulation of
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the stDDM and rewrite the model as a standard DDM.






























(wHVDH +wT VDT ) if s < 0 ∧ |s|< τ
wT VDT if s > 0 ∧ s > τ
wHVDH if s < 0 ∧ |s|> τ
τ = inf{t > 0|x(t) /∈ (−B,B)}
(C.20)
In summary, we have shown that both the aDDM and the stDDM can be written as a
standard DDM for which the drift rate is a function of the reaction time and the duration
of the constant intervals (i.e. relative fixation time advantage or relative starting time
advantage). The advantage of this formulation is that we have an analytical solution for
the pcDDMs that coincides with the analytical solution of the DDM (Navarro and Fuss
2009), thus a hierarchical Bayesian approach can now be easily applied to this type of
model. Here, we implement the piece-wise constant approximation method described above
within a hierarchical Bayesian estimation framework giving us the hierarchical Bayesian
attention drift diffusion model (HaDDM) and the hierarchical Bayesian relative-start-time
DDM (HstDDM). We coded the HaDDM and the HstDDM in Jags using equations C.5 and
C.20 above, and performed recovery fitting analysis in R (see the Method section for details
and https://github.com/galombardi/ for the full code). Below we report and discuss tests of
the parameter recovery accuracy for both models.
Recovery fitting analysis
To assess and demonstrate the validity of this method, we performed a parameter recovery
analysis for the HaDDM and the HstDDM. We demonstrate that the piece-wise constant
approximation method is able to correctly recover the parameters at the individual and at the
group levels, and that the mean of the posterior distribution is informative of the real value
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of the generating parameter.
The aim of this recovery fitting analysis is twofold. Firstly, it is to show the ability of
the method to recover different parameter combinations at the individual and the group
level and, in particular, that the mean of the posterior distributions from the recover of each
parameter is informative of the real generating values. Secondly, we want to show that this
fitting method is able to recover different parameters for different individuals from the same
population. Thus, we performed parameter recovery with two types of participant samples,
A) samples of participants with homogeneous parameters (i.e. identical for all individuals)
so that we could test several different combinations of parameters, and B) a participant
sample with a heterogeneous distribution of parameters across individuals so that we could
determine recovery accuracy at the individual level. In the homogeneous sample tests, for
both the HaDDM and the HstDDM, the sets of parameters we tested varied around the
best fitting parameter estimates from past fits to empirical data sets. For the heterogeneous
samples, each of the parameters were randomly drawn from Gaussian distributions with
a fixed mean and standard deviation. All simulations for both samples were performed
with the bounded accumulation series version of the diffusion model for a fixed number of
subjects, trials, and value differences that we took from existing empirical data sets (see
Methods section for details). For all samples and versions of the diffusion model, we fitted
a hierarchical Bayesian version of the model. As a brief reminder, an advantage of using
hierarchical Bayesian estimation procedures is that we can directly estimate the posterior
distributions of each parameter at the group and at the individual levels. Thus, hierarchical
Bayesian fitting methods allow us to make inference about the population distributions of
the parameters, while explicitly accounting for variability due to individual differences.
We will show in the next sections that the piece-wise constant approximation method




Fitting the HaDDM to groups of agents with homogeneous model parameters
We first tested parameter recovery accuracy for the HaDDM using a group of agents (N =
30 agents per group) that all made choices based on the same underlying model parameters.
Specifically, we simulated the bounded accumulation series of the aDDM for several different
groups while keeping the parameters combinations constant for all agents/subjects within a
given group. The parameters’ values were based on the range of parameters estimated for
choices from real human subjects. The attention discount factor θ was drawn from the set
{0.2,0.4,0.6,0.8}, the drift constant δ from {6,10,14} and the standard deviation of the
noise σ from {0.3,0.45,0.6}, and then we simulated choices from samples having all the
possible parameter combinations. Lastly, we fit the HaDDM using the piece-wise constant
approximation method, and evaluated the recovered posterior distributions of the parameters
for all simulated groups.
In figure C.1, we show the posterior distribution of the group-level mean of the discount
parameter θ varying the drift scaling parameter δ and the standard deviation of the noise
σ . Notably, the generating θ parameter was recovered well in all of the different groups.
However, as expected, increasing the noise or decreasing the drift rate scaling parameter
decreases the relative accuracy of the parameter recovery. We also confirmed that varying the
attention discount factor θ does not influence the recovery accuracy of the other parameters.
In Figures C.2 and C.3, we show the ability of the model to recover the generating δ and
σ parameters respectively, varying the other two parameters. The piece-wise constant
approximation method is able to accurately recover all the different parameters. However,
it is worth noting that there is a systematic bias in the drift scaling parameter δ , which
appears to be overestimated. A plausible explanation for this overestimation is the fact that
the discrete bounded accumulation series is a numerical approximation of the continuous
analytical solution of the model used to fit the parameters in the HaDDM. In other words, the
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bias we observe in the estimation may not be due to the piece-wise constant approximation
method itself, but rather is the result of an approximation error between the discrete bounded
accumulation series and the analytical solution of the DDM.
To test this hypothesis, we ran parameter recovery tests for the standard DDM using
simulated choices and response times generated by either the bounded accumulation series
in equation C.2 or from the analytical solution of equation C.1. We then estimated the
best-fitting parameters for these data sets using the same hierarchical Bayesian method that
we used for the standard DDM. As predicted, we find that, when choices are simulated with
the bounded accumulated series, the drift rate scaling parameter in a standard DDM has
the same systematic bias that we see for the aDDM (and in the stDDM reported in next
section). Critically, this bias is absent when the choice response times are simulated with the
analytical solution of the DDM as the generating model, appendix figure C.20. Thus, these
results indicate that the bias stems from simulating the diffusion models with the bounded
accumulation series, which is a numerical approximation of the continuous time model. If
the evidence accumulation process in humans or other animals operates in continuous time,
then there will be no bias. In any case, this bias is not problematic because it is a small,
constant overestimation of the drift parameter. We will show in the next section that it does
not significantly affect the goodness of fit of the response time distributions and it is even
smaller at the individual than the group level (see for example figures C.18d and C.7).
Analyses of the differences between two sets of generating and recovered δ parameters
showed that the piece-wise constant approximation method is able to fully distinguish
between different generating δ parameters. Specifically, we calculated the posterior density
of the difference between the drift scaling parameters, δ , from recovery fits for two different
simulations, and compared it with the difference in the generating parameters. Figure C.4
shows that the recovered difference in δ estimates between simulations was highly accurate
and unbiased. This is critical because in most cases researchers will be fitting piece-wise
constant DDMs to compare across different individuals or experimental conditions.
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Fitting the HaDDM to groups of agents with heterogeneous model parameters
It is also important to check whether our hierarchical Bayesian estimation method yields
accurate estimates at the individual as well as the group level. When fitting choice data
generated by humans or other animals, the groups or samples will not have homogeneous
model parameters. Indeed, often it is the nature and magnitudes of differences between
individuals in the sample that are the question of interest. Therefore, in a second set of
parameter recovery analyses, we simulated data using different generating parameters for
each agent/subject in the group. The generating parameters were randomly drawn from the
gaussian distributions shown in Figure C.5a. Once again we were able to accurately recover
the parameters, this time focusing on the individual level. Figure C.6, figure C.7 and figure
C.8 show the recovery at the individual level for each subject for the θ , the δ and the σ
parameters, respectively.
HstDDM
Fitting the HstDDM to groups of agents with homogeneous model parameters
We repeated the same procedures described for the aDDM to test parameter recovery from the
stDDM. Thus, we simulated choice data from several combinations of parameters that were
drawn from a range of plausible parameters based on fits to human behavior. The relative
starting time parameter s was taken from the set {−0.75,−0.5,−0.25,0,0.25,0.5,0.75},
and the standard deviation of the noise, σ , was drawn from {0.3,0.45,0.6}. The weighting
parameters for different attributes are always defined relative to one another, therefore, we
kept one fixed and varied the other. Specifically, wt was fixed to 2.2 and wh was taken from
the set, {1.9,2.2,2.9}. Figure C.9 shows the recovered relative start time parameter s for
different values of σ and wh. The plot shows the posterior distribution of the group level
mean of the s parameter, and demonstrates that a HstDDM based on our piece-wise constant
approximation method can accurately recover known relative starting time parameters.
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Figures C.10, C.11 and C.12 show the posterior distributions of the other mean parameters
at the group level. As expected based on the recovery analysis for the HaDDM, there is a
small overestimation bias for parameters defining the drift scaling terms, i.e. the weight
parameters in the stDDM. Thus, once again we checked that the method was able to correctly
distinguish between different parameter magnitudes. We calculated the posterior probability
distribution of the difference between wh parameters for different simulations. Figure C.13
confirms that the method is able to distinguish between different magnitude of the weight
parameters.
Further evidence to support this claim can be found in analysing the difference in weights
wh −wt . As shown in Webb 2018, the probability of choosing one option over the other in a
DDM framework can be approximated by logistic function. Thus, a change in unit of one
attribute’s weight relative to the other attribute’s weight is quantifiable as the exponential
of the difference in weights, e.g. ewh−wt . Figure C.14 shows that the piece-wise constant
approximation method is able to correctly recover the difference in weights wh −wt .
Fitting the HstDDM to groups of agents with heterogeneous model parameters
Next, we tested parameter recovery accuracy for the HstDDM when each agent in the group
has a different combination of model parameters. For each subject in the simulated groups,
we randomly drew the parameters from gaussian distributions around a specific mean. The
means and distributions of the generating parameters are shown in figure C.5b. The model
was able to accurately recover the generating parameters at the individual level when each
subject had different generating parameters. Figure C.15, C.16 and C.17 show the posterior
distributions of the mean parameters at the individual level, for each subject separately.
Notably, the parameters are correctly recovered for almost all the subjects in the data set.
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Fitting empirical data from human participants
Lastly, we report the results of fitting the HaDDM and HstDDM to two sets of human
choice data using our piece-wise constant approximation method. The full details of the
experiments that generated these data are listed in the Methods section, and brief summaries
of the behavioral paradigms are given in the two subsections below. Overall, simulations
from the best-fitting HaDDM and HstDDM parameters can faithfully reproduce the human
choice and response time patterns observed in the data they were fit to, indicating that the
two models, when fit using the piece-wise constant approximation method, fit human choice
data well.
Similar to the above recovery fitting analysis, we assume that participants come from
a single population, thus that the hierarchical structure consists of a single group. Based
on this, we make the standard assumption that individuals are members of a normally
distributed population and assign a normal prior for each individual level parameter.
HaDDM fits to human choice data
We used a real data set of a binary lottery-choice task experiment in which participants had
to complete 70 decision trials between a gamble and a sure option, to test the piece-wise
constant approximation method for fitting the aDDM. Briefly, in each trial of this task,
the sure option offered a certain amount of money with probability = 1, and the gamble
option offered a higher amount with some probability p or nothing with probability 1-p. We
tracked participants’ eye-movements and recorded response times during each trial. Notably,
participants were free to look anywhere on the computer screen that displayed the options
and to take as long they needed to reach a decision (see Method section for further details).
The aDDM parameters estimated using the piece-wise constant approximation method
can accurately recreate the empirical pattern of choices and response times in the lottery
data set. In particular, Figure C.18d shows that the simulated and the empirical reaction time
distributions conditional to the choice are strikingly similar. This suggests that the estimated
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δ , θ , and σ parameters are reasonably accurate.
We ran an additional parameter recovery test after fitting the lottery task data set because
the estimated values of certain parameters were outside the range we included in the a priori
recovery tests above. Specifically, the posterior distribution of the δ parameter at the group
level was outside of the range of values we used in the parameter recovery analysis in the
previous section. The reason for the lower value of δ in these data is straightforward. The
response times (see figure C.18d) in this particular lottery task experiment are slower than
those in the food choice data on which we based the parameter ranges in the parameter
recovery analysis. Thus, the drift parameters are estimated to be lower in the lottery choices
to account for these slower RTs. Therefore, to make sure that lower drift rates do not affect
the ability of the model to recover the discount factor parameter, θ , we ran another recovery
fitting analysis with the parameter values for δ and σ that we obtained when fitting the
model to the empirical data. We generated simulated choice data with the θ parameter set
to {0.2,0.4,0.8} in order to check whether the model was able to accurately recover the
three values of θ when δ was 1.2. This additional parameter recovery test indicated that
the piece-wise constant approximation method was able to recover these known values of θ
even with the relatively lower value of δ (see Figure C.21).
The importance of confirmatory parameter recovery tests
Running parameter recovery tests for the values estimated from a given empirical data set
is a good practice. It is especially important when dealing with new data sets. It is often
mathematically and computationally challenging to determine a priori all the potential
combinations of parameter’s values for which the model (or the fitting method) is not able
to properly fit the data or return the true generating parameters. For instance, a low signal to
noise ratio certainly affects the ability to accurately recover parameters, but what is "low"
exactly? Further, a narrow range of value differences between choice options could affect the
ability of a diffusion model to fit the data and derive the generating parameters, but what is a
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"good" or a "bad" range? Answering these questions with satisfactory precision is not trivial,
and therefore, running a posteriori parameter recovery checks is best practice. The first step
in such a recovery test is to check the ability of the model and fitting procedure to recover
relevant known generating parameters. This can be done by simulating the data with the
parameters obtained when originally fitting the empirical data, and then re-fitting the model
to the simulated choice and response times. However, it is also possible that the recovery
fitting fails by always returning the same parameters independently of the generating values.
Therefore, success in this first step does not ensure you against this flaw in the model or
fitting procedures. Thus, a necessary second step is to make sure that the model and fitting
procedures are able to accurately distinguish between different generating parameter values.
Specifically, for the second recovery testing step, all the simulating parameters but one are
taken from the fitting of the empirical data as in the first step. The one remaining parameter
is then varied across a range of plausible values that you want to test. This procedure ensures
that the model can recover different magnitudes of that specific parameter of interest under
the real data conditions, i.e. all the other parameters equal to the originally estimated values.
Ideally, this second testing step would be run for each parameter in the model. At minimum,
it should be run for all parameters of interest in the current study.
stDDM fits to human choice data
To test the piece-wise constant approximation method for the stDDM, we used real data
from a binary food-choice task experiment in which participants had to complete 50 decision
trials between food items. Before performing the food-choice task, participants had to rate
all the 180 food items in the choice set for healthiness and tastiness (see Method section for
details).
Figure C.19 shows the results of fitting the HstDDM to this food-choice task data set.
Noticeably, in figure C.19d the simulated and the empirical reaction time distributions
conditional to the choice are compared. As for the HaDDM data fitting, fitted choices
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and reaction time are remarkably similar to the empirical ones. Further, we performed the
confirmatory parameter recovery analysis as described in the section above to make sure the
model was able to return the true generating parameters for these specific data (see Figure
C.22).
To give a possible estimate of the running time, we also performed some extra fittings
varying number of subjects and trials with a standard machine of 4 cpu and 16 GB of ram.
We ran 10 subjects with 10 trials each as a time baseline and measured the time increase
when doubling number of trials, number of subjects or both. To run 10 subjects and 10 trials,
the estimated time was 427 seconds - about 7 minutes. When increasing the number of
trials to 20 the time did not doubled, whereas it was estimated to be 660 seconds - about 11
minutes. When increasing the number of subjects to 20 - with still 10 trials each - the time
almost doubled to 858 seconds - about 14 minutes. And finally, the time when increasing
both trials and subjects to 20 was estimated to 1372 seconds - about 23 minutes.
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C.4 Discussion
Here, we presented the explicit derivation of a method to mathematically approximate a
pcDDM with a standard DDM given the response time and the interval times in which the
drift rate of the pcDDM is not time constant. We provided two practical examples of pcD-
DMs, the aDDM and the stDDM, and derived their mathematical formulations as standard
DDMs. We also used three distinct parameter fitting and recovery analyses to show that
this piece-wise constant approximation method was able to accurately estimate the aDDM
and the stDDM. The first recovery analysis demonstrated the method for both the aDDM
and the stDDM in their hierarchical Bayesian formulations was able to accurately estimate
the different magnitudes of parameters at the group and individual levels in simulated data
sets. The second recovery analysis showed that the method could accurately recover known
heterogeneous individual-level parameters within the hierarchical Bayesian models. Finally,
the last analysis tested if the experimental data sets that we used as case studies could
be accurately captured by the piece-wise constant approximation method when trying to
recover the originally estimated empirical parameters.
Overall, all of the recovery fitting parameter analyses proved to be successful for both the
HaDDM and the HstDDM with a high degree of accuracy. Specifically, we could apply this
parameter estimation method to the two experimental data sets and show that the HaDDM
and the HstDDM reproduced the choice and response time distributions well in both cases.
Thus, the piece-wise constant approximation method proved to be a simple, yet powerful,
method that allows existing hierarchical Bayesian estimation tools developed for the standard
DDM to approximate the time-varying drift rate of pcDDMs. We also showed how fast the
model could fit experimental data of standard size and we believe this method can allow
researchers not familiar with computational modelling to accurately fitting experimental
data set. Nevertheless, we argue here that any model fitting procedure to new data sets, even
when methods or models have been tested to be robust and consistent in the field, should
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be taken with caution, and few preliminary steps should be followed rigorously before
making any inference on the fitted parameters. Although we do not explicitly show it in this
paper since it is not relevant for the method discussed here, before running any recovery or
empirical fitting the predictions of a model should always be tested in the experimental data
in order to verify that the model is good approximation of the generating process of interest.
Then, a recovery fitting parameter analysis must be implemented to ensure that the model is
able to return the known generating parameters’ values. This analysis does not necessarily
go through all the steps described in the present paper, but as we suggested in the results
section a confirmatory parameter recovery test is recommended. This can be done first by
simulating the data with the parameters obtained when originally fitting the empirical data
and re-fitting the model to the simulated choice and response times. And second, testing a
following recovery analysis in which all the simulating parameters but one are taken from
the fitting of the empirical data as in the first step. The one remaining parameter is then
varied across a range of plausible values that has to be tested. Ideally, this second testing
step would be run for each parameter of the model. At minimum, it should be run for all
parameters of interest in the current study. Such analysis is good practice to make sure that
specific experimental data can be accurately be fitted by the model of interest, and also it is
a effective way to test whether the model of interest is identifiable. To conclude, we show
that our method is simple, fast and robust in fitting simulated and experimental data with
pcDDMs. Given the spread in recent years of such models, we believe that this approach





Subjects. Thirty-six healthy subjects participated in our experiment. Six of them were
excluded from the experiment because they failed to understand the choice task. Subjects
received monetary compensation for their participation, were informed about all aspects of
the experiment and gave written informed consent. The experiments conformed to the stan-
dards of the Declaration of Helsinki and the Human Subjects Committee of the University
of Zürich approved the experimental protocol.
Task. The experimental design was divided into two main parts: a decision phase and
an elicitation phase. During this decision phase, participants had to make 70 lottery decision
trials between a sure option and a gamble. At the beginning of each trial the participant was
presented with a monetary endowment (e.g. "You receive 50 CHF"). Ten different starting
amounts were used in the experiment (from 10 CHF to 100 CHF with an increment of 10
CHF). To move on to the decision screen, the participants had to fixate for more than 2
seconds the received monetary amount, which was positioned in the centre of the screen.
After the fixation period a sure option and a gamble appeared on the screen. The sure option
was presented as an amount of money retained from the starting amount (e.g. keep 20 CHF
out of a total of 50 CHF). The gamble option always offered the chance to keep all of the
starting amount of money with some probability. Seven different probabilities were used in
the study, such that the probability of winning in a given trial was either 30%, 40%, 50%,
60%, 70%, 80% or 90%. The expected outcomes, i.e. expected value (EV), of sure and
gamble options were always equivalent in each trial. However, the EV varied across trials
from 3 to 90 CHF. The sure and the gamble options on the screen were represented through
rectangles and pie-charts. Rectangles indicated the amount of money that the subject could
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keep from the starting amount, pie charts represented probabilities (e.g. the sure option
always had a pie-chart completely filled with a color). Before performing the choice task,
subjects went through training task to learn the meaning of rectangles and pie-charts.
In the second phase of the experiment, our participants had to perform a certainty
equivalence (CE) elicitation task in which they were shown all the 70 gambles that they
encountered during the choice task. In each trial, for a total of 70 trials, a gamble and a
list of sure amounts of money was shown to the participant. The subject had to make 10
decisions in each trial between the gamble displayed on the left hand-side of the screen and
10 sure amounts of money. The sure amounts of money were displayed in a decreasing order
from a maximum value smaller but close to the amount of money that they could win if they
choose the gamble, to a minum value close to zero. For instance, a gamble can be described
as follows. You first receive an endowment of 100 CHF and you have a probability of 70%
of keeping all the 100 CHF (30% of having nothing). In the first line, the participant had
to decide between the gamble and a sure amount of 95 CHF. In the second line, she had
to decide between the gamble and a sure amount of 85 CHF, and so on until the last line
in which she had to choose between the gamble and a sure amount of money of 5 CHF.
The CE was calculated as the mean between the two amounts of money where the subject
switches from choosing the sure amount to choosing the gamble. Thus, in the example
above, if a participant chooses the sure amounts of money for every decision lines until 55
CHF, and she chooses the gamble from 45 CHF on, the CE for this gamble is 50 CHF. We
forced participants to only switch from choosing the sure amount to choosing the gamble
and only once per trial — including the possibility of never switching, i.e. always choosing
the gamble or always choosing the sure amount.
All tasks were programmed in Matlab 2015b (Matworks), using the Psychophysics
Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997; Kleiner et al, 2007).
Eye Tracking. Before each decision trial, subjects were required to fixate the monetary
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endowment positioned at the center of the screen for 2 s before the options would appear,
ensuring that subjects began every trial fixating on the same location. Subjects’ gazes were
recorded at 500 Hz with an EyeLink-1000 (http://www.sr-research.com/) eye tracker. Choice
trials with no gaze time on any option attribute were excluded from the analysis (17 trials,
0.004% of the pooled data from the 30 subjects).
Food-choice task
Subjects. Ninety-seven healthy subjects participated in our experiment. Eleven of them
were excluded from the experiment because they either failed the questionnaire about the
choice task - i.e. understanding the task, or because they did not comply with the health
agreement. Subjects received monetary compensation for their participation, were informed
about all aspects of the experiment and gave written informed consent.
Task. The experimental design was divided into two parts: a rating phase and a deci-
sion phase. During the rating phase participants had to rate 180 food items for healthiness
and tastiness on a continuous scale from -5 to 5. The food items were shown to the subjects
as images on the computer screen with a rating bar below one at the time. After the ratings,
subjects had to perform a binary food-choice task consisting of 60 trials in which two food
items were presented on the computer screen and they had to choose the food that they would
like to receive at the end of the experiment. Before starting the food-choice task, we gave
each subject an health agreement instruction form in which the benefits of eating healthy
were illustrated and in which subjects were asked to try to make healthy choices during the
following food-choice task. In addition, subjects had to express their willingness to try to
eat, i.e. choose, healthy check-marking the yes or no option at on the health agreement.




We fitted and simulated data with R and RJags. We wrote the model in Jags using the
dwieners function of the DDM. This function takes as inputs the following parameters:
dwieners(α ,ndt,β ,µ ,σ ), where α is the boundary separation parameter, ndt the non-decision
time, β the bias parameter, d the drift rate parameter and σ the standard deviation of the
drift process. Concerning the drift rate µ , we set it to be equal to the function derived in
equation 15 and 20 for the aDDM and the stDDM, respectively. Thus, for the aDDM the








where τ is the reaction time, τS and τG the total fixation time towards the sure option and
the gamble respectively, δ is the drift constant parameter, and VS and VG the value of the
sure option and the gamble, respectively.




















τ wT VDT +
τ−s




τ (wHVDH +wT VDT ) if s < 0 ∧ |s|< τ
wT VDT if s > 0 ∧ s > τ
wHVDH if s < 0 ∧ |s|> τ
where wT is the weight given to the taste attribute, wH the weight to the health attribute,
VDT and VDH are the value differences in taste and in health respectively, s is the time at
which the health attribute comes into the accumulation process - s > 0 means taste is on
from the beginning and health comes in at time s, s < 0 means that the health attribute is on
the accumulation process from the beginning and taste comes in at time |s|.
For both models, we fixed the boundary separation parameter β = 2, and estimated
the standard deviation of the noise σ and the non-decision time ndt. Specifically for
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the aDDM, we estimated the drift rate constant δ and the discount factor θ , whereas
the total fixation times τS and τG were given as an input to the model. Concerning the
stDDM, we estimated the weights parameters wT and wH , and the relative starting time




Figure C.1: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean θ parameters from
the HaDDM fits of simulations varying the δ and the σ parameters. The dashed grey lines
indicate the input generating parameters for the simulations.
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Figure C.2: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean δ parameters from
the HaDDM fits of simulations varying the θ and the σ parameters. The dashed grey lines
indicate the input generating parameters for the simulations.
175
Figure C.3: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean σ parameters from
the HaDDM fits of simulations varying the δ and the θ parameters. The dashed grey lines
indicate the input generating parameters for the simulations.
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Figure C.4: Group level posterior probability distributions of the difference in mean between
δ parameters from HaDDM fits of separate simulations varying the θ and the σ param-





Figure C.5: Distributions for the generating parameters in the second step of the recovery
analysis procedure. a) Generating gaussian distributions N(µ,σ2) of the aDDM parameters.
θ ∼ N(0.35,0.0025), δ ∼ N(12,0.25), σ ∼ N(0.41,0.00064). b) Generating gaussian
distributions N(µ,σ2) of the stDDM parameters. s ∼ N(0,0.09), wt ∼ N(2.5,0.01),wh ∼
N(2.8,0.01), σ ∼ N(0.41,0.0006).
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Figure C.6: Individual level posterior probability distributions of the mean θ parameters
from the HaDDM fits for each subject in the data set. The dashed grey lines indicate the
input generating parameters used for the simulations.
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Figure C.7: Individual level posterior probability distributions of the mean δ parameters
from the HaDDM fits for each subject in the data set. The dashed grey lines indicate the
input generating parameters used for the simulations.
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Figure C.8: Individual level posterior probability distributions of the mean σ parameters
from the HaDDM fits for each subject in the data set. The dashed grey lines indicate the
input generating parameters used for the simulations.
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Figure C.9: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean s parameters from
the HstDDM fits of simulations varying the weights and the σ parameters. The dashed grey
lines indicate the input generating parameters for the simulations.
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Figure C.10: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean wh parameters from
the HstDDM fits of simulations varying the s and the σ parameters. The dashed grey lines
indicate the input generating parameters for the simulations.
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Figure C.11: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean wt parameters from
the HstDDM fits of simulations varying the s and the σ parameters. The dashed grey lines
indicate the input generating parameters for the simulations.
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Figure C.12: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean σ parameters from
the HstDDM fits of simulations varying the weights and the s parameters. The dashed grey
lines indicate the input generating parameters for the simulations.
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Figure C.13: Group level posterior probability distributions of the difference in mean
between wh parameters from HstDDM fits of separate simulations varying the s and the
σ parameters. The dashed grey lines indicate the input generating parameter difference
between simulations.
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Figure C.14: Group level posterior probability distributions of the difference in mean
between wh and wt from HstDDM fits of simulations varying the s and the σ parameters.
The dashed grey lines indicate the input generating parameter differences between the
weights.
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Figure C.15: Individual level posterior probability distributions of the mean s parameters
from the HaDDM fits for each subject in the data set. The dashed grey lines indicate the
input generating parameters used for the simulations.
188
Figure C.16: Individual level posterior probability distributions of the mean wh,(in blue) and
wt (in red) parameters from the HstDDM fits for each subject in the data set. The dashed
lines indicate the input generating parameters used for the simulations.
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Figure C.17: Individual level posterior probability distributions of the mean σ parameters
from the HstDDM fits for each subject in the data set. The dashed grey lines indicate the




Figure C.18: Model fitting analysis of experimental data with the HaDDM. a) Posterior
probability distribution of the θ mean at the group level. b) Posterior probability distribution
of the δ mean at the group level. c) Posterior probability distribution of the σ mean at
the group level. d) Goodness of fit plot of the reaction time for choosing the sure option
(negative values) or the gamble (positive values). The red dashed line is the simulated





Figure C.19: Model fitting analysis of experimental data with the HaDDM. a) Posterior
probability distribution of the s mean at the group level. b) Posterior probability distributions
of the wh and wt means at the group level. c) Posterior probability distribution of the σ mean
at the group level. d) Goodness of fit plot of the reaction time for choosing the right option
(negative values) or the left option (positive values). The red dashed line is the simulated





Figure C.20: Group level posterior probability distributions of the δ mean from HDDM fits
of separate simulations. The dashed grey lines indicate the input generating parameter. a)
Simulations were performed with the discrete bounded accumulation series of the DDM -
i.e. Euler method. b) Simulations were performed with the continuous SDE version of the
DDM.
Figure C.21: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean θ parameters from
the HaDDM fits of simulations with δ and the σ parameter values from the model fitting of
the experimental data. The dashed grey lines indicate the input generating parameters for
the simulations.
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Figure C.22: Group level posterior probability distributions of the mean s parameters
from the HstDDM fits of simulations with wh, wt and the σ parameter values from the
model fitting of the experimental data. The dashed grey lines indicate the input generating
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